Function, Dysfunction, and the Concept of Mental Disorder

Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 28 (4):371-375 (2021)
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Abstract

Naturalistic accounts of mental disorder aim to identify an objective basis for attributions of mental disorder. This goal is important for demarcating genuine mental disorders from artificial or socially constructed disorders. The articulation of a demarcation criterion provides a means for assuring that attributions of 'mental disorder' are not merely pathologizing different forms of social deviance. The most influential naturalistic and hybrid definitions of mental disorder identify biological dysfunction as the objective basis of mental disorders: genuine mental...

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Jonathan Y. Tsou
University of Texas at Dallas

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