Winners and Losers in the Folk Epistemology of Lotteries

In James Beebe (ed.), Advances in Experimental Epistemology. London, United Kingdom: pp. 45-69 (forthcoming)
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Abstract

We conducted five experiments that reveal some main contours of the folk epistemology of lotteries. The folk tend to think that you don't know that your lottery ticket lost, based on the long odds ("statistical cases"); by contrast, the folk tend to think that you do know that your lottery ticket lost, based on a news report ("testimonial cases"). We evaluate three previous explanations for why people deny knowledge in statistical cases: the justification account, the chance account, and the statistical account. None of them seems to work. We then propose a new explanation of our own, the formulaic account, according to which some people deny knowledge in statistical cases due to formulaic expression.

Author Profiles

Ori Friedman
University of Waterloo
John Turri
University of Waterloo

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