Lacey's Concept of Value-Free Science

Teorie Vědy / Theory of Science 40 (2):191-210 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Many philosophers of science have maintained that science should be value-free; still others believe that such ideal is neither achievable nor desirable for science. Hugh Lacey is presently one of the main supporters of the idea of value-free science and his theory is probably the most debated today and attracts the most attention and criticism. Therefore, in this text, I will primarily analyze his theory of value-free science. After briefly defining the notion of value I highlight which strategy Lacey chooses to lay a firm foundation for the concept of science without value, with his starting point being the differentiation between cognitive and non-cognitive values. Then I describe three basic characteristics of Lacey’s value-free science: impartiality, neutrality, and autonomy. However, the overall plan and design of his project, together with some concrete steps he takes, are not without problems in our view. I will try to point out some of these problematic issues and provide brief suggestions for alleviating them.

Author's Profile

Miroslav Vacura
Prague University of Economics and Business

Analytics

Added to PP
2019-03-30

Downloads
491 (#30,683)

6 months
208 (#10,485)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?