Of Miracles and Evidential Probability

Hume Studies 31 (1):37-61 (2005)
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This paper defends Hume’s argument against miracles from John Earman’s Bayesian attack. Attention to historical context and to details of interpretation show that Hume’s argument is different and more sophisticated than Earman and other critics have held. The linchpin in the defense is showing that Hume’s theory of probability is deliberately different from the mathematical theory of probability, and in particular that it has its roots in a tradition of evidential probability going back to ancient Roman law
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