Vagueness, Indiscernibility, and Pragmatics: Comments on Burns

Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (S1):49-62 (1995)
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Abstract

In ‘Something to Do with Vagueness ...’, Linda Burns defends an analogy between the informational and the borderline-case variety of vagueness. She argues that the latter is in fact less extraordinary and less disastrous than people in the tradition of Michael Dummett and Crispin Wright have told us. However, her account involves presuppositions that cannot be taken for granted. Here is to take a closer look at some of these presuppositions and argue hat they may—when left unguarded—undermine much of Burns’ general account.

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Achille C. Varzi
Columbia University

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