Do the Results of Divine Actions Have Preceding Causes?

European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 3 (2):347-367 (2011)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

If God brings about an event in the universe, does it have a preceding cause? For example, if the universe began with the Big Bang and if God brought it about, did the Big Bang then have a preceding cause? The standard answer is: yes, it was caused by a divine willing. I propose an alternative view: God’s actions, unlike human actions, are not initiated by willings, undertakings, or volitions, but God brings about the intended event directly. Presenting a solution to the dilemma of free will I explain what ‘bringing about directly’ means and show that the question of what an action begins with is distinct from the question whether it is a basic action.

Author's Profile

Daniel von Wachter
International Academy of Philosophy In The Principality of Liechtenstein

Analytics

Added to PP
2012-06-02

Downloads
534 (#27,820)

6 months
90 (#40,375)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?