Response-Dependence in Moral Responsibility: A Granularity Challenge

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
According to the response-dependence view of moral responsibility, a person is morally responsible just in case, and in virtue of the fact that, she is an appropriate target for reactive attitudes. This paper raises a new puzzle regarding response-dependence: there is a mismatch between the granularity of the reactive attitudes and of responsibility facts. Whereas the reactive attitudes are comparatively coarse-grained, responsibility facts can be quite fine-grained. This poses a challenge for response-dependence, which seeks to ground facts about responsibility in facts about the reactive attitudes. Specifically, reactive attitudes are not enough for grounding facts about degrees of moral responsibility. The responsedependence view thus requires significant revisions or supplementations.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
WANRIM-2
Upload history
Archival date: 2021-09-23
View other versions
Added to PP index
2021-09-23

Total views
24 ( #61,361 of 2,448,958 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
24 ( #27,085 of 2,448,958 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.