Es are good. Cognition as enacted, embodied, embedded, affective and extended

In Fabio Paglieri (ed.), Consciousness in Interaction: The role of the natural and social context in shaping consciousness (2012)
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Abstract
We present a specific elaboration and partial defense of the claims that cognition is enactive, embodied, embedded, affective and (potentially) extended. According to the view we will defend, the enactivist claim that perception and cognition essentially depend upon the cognizer’s interactions with their environment is fundamental. If a particular instance of this kind of dependence obtains, we will argue, then it follows that cognition is essentially embodied and embedded, that the underpinnings of cognition are inextricable from those of affect, that the phenomenon of cognition itself is essentially bound up with affect, and that the possibility of cognitive extension depends upon the instantiation of a specific mode of skillful interrelation between cognizer and environment. Thus, if cognition is enactive then it is also embodied, embedded, affective and potentially extended.
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Extended Mind and Cognitive Enhancement: Moral Aspects of Cognitive Artifacts.Richard Heersmink - 2017 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 16 (1):17-32.

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