Perspectivism and the Argument from Guidance

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (2):361-374 (2017)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Perspectivists hold that what you ought to do is determined by your perspective, that is, your epistemic position. Objectivists hold that what you ought to do is determined by the facts irrespective of your perspective. This paper explores an influential argument for perspectivism which appeals to the thought that the normative is action guiding. The crucial premise of the argument is that you ought to φ only if you are able to φ for the reasons which determine that you ought to φ. We show that this premise can be understood in different ways. On one reading, it provides no support for perspectivism. On another reading, the premise lacks support. So, the argument fails. An important upshot of the paper is that the objectivist can embrace the thought about guidance.

Author Profiles

Daniel Whiting
University of Southampton
Jonathan Way
University of Southampton

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-12-08

Downloads
670 (#22,123)

6 months
104 (#36,443)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?