Difference-Making and Easy Knowledge: Reply to Comesaña and Sartorio

Logos and Episteme 6 (1):141-146 (2015)
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Abstract

Juan Comesaña and Carolina Sartorio have recently proposed a diagnosis of what goes wrong in apparently illegitimate cases of ‘bootstrapping’ one’s way toexcessively easy knowledge. They argue that in such cases the bootstrapper bases at least one of her beliefs on evidence that does not evidentially support the proposition believed. I explicate the principle that underlies Comesaña and Sartorio’s diagnosis of such cases and show that their account of what goes wrong in such cases is mistaken.

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Erik Wielenberg
DePauw University

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