Counterfactual Triviality: A Lewis-impossibility result for counterfactuals

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Abstract
I formulate a counterfactual version of the notorious ‘Ramsey Test’. Even in a weak form, this makes counterfactuals subject to the very argument that Lewis used to persuade the majority of the philosophical community that indicative conditionals were in hot water. I outline two reactions: to indicativize the debate on counterfactuals; or to counterfactualize the debate on indicatives.
Reprint years
2012
ISBN(s)
0031-8205  
PhilPapers/Archive ID
WILALR
Revision history
Archival date: 2018-11-02
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Conditionals.R. A. Briggs - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 543-590.

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2009-12-09

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