Multiple actualities and ontically vague identity

Philosophical Quarterly 58 (230):134-154 (2008)
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Abstract

Although the Evans argument against vague identity has been much discussed, proposah for blocking it have not so far satisfied general conditions which any solution ought to meet. Moreover, the relation between ontically vague identity and ontic vagueness more generally has not yet been satisfactorily addressed. I advocate a way of resisting the Evans argument which satisfies the conditions. To show how this approach can vindicate particular cases of ontically vague identity, I develop a framework for describing ontic vagueness in general in terms of multiple actualities. This provides aprìncipled approach to ontically vague identity which is unaffected by the Evans argument.

Author's Profile

Robert Williams
University of Leeds

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