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Truth and other self-effacing properties
Philosophical Quarterly 54 (217):577–586 (2004)
Abstract
A “self-effacing” property is one that is definable without referring to it. Colin McGinn (2000) has argued that there is exactly one such property: truth. I show that if truth is a self-effacing property, then there are very many others—too many even to constitute a set.Author's Profile
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Added to PP
2009-01-28
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2009-01-28
Downloads
281 (#54,821)
6 months
64 (#62,827)
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