Permissivism, The Value of Rationality, and a Convergence-Theoretic Epistemology

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Epistemic permissivism says that sometimes there are multiple rational responses to the same body of evidence. A recent argument against permissivism says that this view is incompatible with a plausible understanding of the accuracy-conduciveness of rationality, according to which rationality is accuracy-conducive because rational credence is more expectedly accurate than irrational credence. This is called ‘the value problem for permissivism.’ In this paper, I propose a new response to this problem. I defend a convergence- theoretic epistemology: Rationality is accuracy-conducive not because rational credence is more expectedly accurate than irrational credence, but because rational credence performs better with regard to convergence to truth. Drawing on recent developments in formal learning theory, I argue that this ‘convergence-to-truth’ understanding of the accuracy-conduciveness of rationality has many attractive features, and I argue that the convergence understanding is compatible with and even favors permissivism.
Categories
(categorize this paper)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
YEPTV
Upload history
Archival date: 2021-10-29
View other versions
Added to PP index
2021-10-29

Total views
109 ( #45,217 of 65,558 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
109 ( #5,743 of 65,558 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.