Is consciousness intrinsically valuable?

Philosophical Studies 175 (1):1-17 (2018)
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Is consciousness—subjective, qualitative experience—valuable for its own sake? Some theorists favor the positive view, according to which consciousness itself has intrinsic value, independent of the particular kind of experience instantiated. In contrast, I favor the neutral view, according to which consciousness is neither intrinsically valuable nor disvaluable. This paper clarifies what is at stake when we ask whether consciousness is intrinsically valuable and carves out the theoretical space. Along the way, I also discuss why the neutral view is attractive and why certain arguments for the positive view do not work.
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References found in this work BETA
Mortal Questions.Nagel, Thomas
Are There Levels of Consciousness?Bayne, Tim; Hohwy, Jakob & Owen, Adrian M.
Two Distinctions in Goodness.Korsgaard, Christine M.
Principia Ethica.McGilvary, Evander Bradley & Moore, George Edward
Death.Nagel, Thomas

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