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  1. Abortion and deprivation: a reply to Marquis.Anna Christensen - 2019 - Journal of Medical Ethics 45 (1):22-25.
    In ‘Why Abortion is Immoral’, Don Marquis argues that abortion is wrong for the same reason that murder is wrong, namely, that it deprives a human being of an FLO, a ‘future like ours,’ which is a future full of value and the experience of life. Marquis’ argument rests on the assumption that the human being is somehow deprived by suffering an early death. I argue that Marquis’ argument faces the ‘Epicurean Challenge’. The concept of ‘deprivation’ requires that some discernible (...)
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  • (1 other version)Why abortion is immoral.Don Marquis - 1989 - Journal of Philosophy 86 (4):183-202.
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  • The badness of death and priorities in health.Carl Tollef Solberg & Espen Gamlund - 2016 - BMC Medical Ethics 17 (1):1-9.
    BackgroundThe state of the world is one with scarce medical resources where longevity is not equally distributed. Given such facts, setting priorities in health entails making difficult yet unavoidable decisions about which lives to save. The business of saving lives works on the assumption that longevity is valuable and that an early death is worse than a late death. There is a vast literature on health priorities and badness of death, separately. Surprisingly, there has been little cross-fertilisation between the academic (...)
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  • The Epicurean View of Death.Eric T. Olson - 2013 - The Journal of Ethics 17 (1-2):65-78.
    The Epicurean view is that there is nothing bad about death, and we are wrong to loathe it. This paper distinguishes several different such views, and shows that while some of them really would undermine our loathing of death, others would not. It then argues that any version that did so could be at best vacuously true: If there is nothing bad about death, that can only be because there is nothing bad about anything.
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  • The evil of death.Harry S. Silverstein - 1980 - Journal of Philosophy 77 (7):401-424.
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  • Harming the dead.Don Marquis - 1985 - Ethics 96 (1):159-161.
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  • Less good but not bad: In defense of epicureanism about death.Aaron Smuts - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (2):197-227.
    In this article I defend innocuousism– a weak form of Epicureanism about the putative badness of death. I argue that if we assume both mental statism about wellbeing and that death is an experiential blank, it follows that death is not bad for the one who dies. I defend innocuousism against the deprivation account of the badness of death. I argue that something is extrinsically bad if and only if it leads to states that are intrinsically bad. On my view, (...)
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  • A More Palatable Epicureanism.David B. Hershenov - 2007 - American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (2):171 - 180.
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