This book traces the development of formal logic from its origins inancient Greece to the present day. The authors first discuss the work oflogicians from Aristotle to Frege, showing how they were influenced by thephilosophical or mathematical ideas of their time. They then examinedevelopments in the present century.

In Leviathan Thomas Hobbes defines moral philosophy as 'the science of Virtue and Vice', yet few modern readers take this description seriously. Moreover, it is typically assumed that Hobbes' ethical views are unrelated to his views of science. Influential modern interpreters have portrayed Hobbes as either an amoralist, or a moral contractarian, or a rule egoist, or a divine command theorist. David Boonin-Vail challenges all these assumptions and presents a new, and very unorthodox, interpretation of Hobbes's ethics. He shows that (...) Hobbes is best understood as embracing a theory of virtue concerned with the development of good character traits rather than with rules of behaviour. In focusing in a quite new way on Hobbes's moral theory this book is likely to attract considerable attention amongst both philosophers and intellectual historians. (shrink)

Thomas Hobbes was the first great English philosopher and one of the most important theorists of human nature and politics in the history of Western thought. This superlative introduction presents Hobbes' main doctrines and arguments, covering all of Hobbes' philosophy. A.P. Martinich begins with a helpful overview of Hobbes' life and work, setting his ideas against the political and scientific background of seventeenth-century England. He then introduces and assesses, in clear chapters, Hobbes' contributions to fundamental areas of philosophy: epistemology and (...) metaphysics, in particular Hobbes' materialism and determinism and his relation to Descartes ethics and political philosophy, concentrating on Hobbes' most famous work, _Leviathan,_ and the theory of the social contract it advances philosophy of science, logic and language, considering Hobbes' theory of nominalism and his writing on rhetoric and the uses of language; religion, examining Hobbes' analyses of revelation, prophets and miracles. The final chapter considers the legacy of Hobbes' thought and his influence on contemporary philosophy. (shrink)

In this book, S. A. Lloyd provides a radical interpretation of Hobbes' laws of nature, revealing them to be not egoistic precepts of personal prudence but rather moral instructions for obtaining the common good. This account of Hobbes' moral philosophy stands in contrast to both divine command and rational choice interpretations. Drawing from the core notion of reciprocity, Lloyd explains Hobbes' system of 'cases in the law of nature' and situates Hobbes' moral philosophy in the broader context of his political (...) philosophy and views on religion. Offering ingenious new arguments, Lloyd defends a reciprocity interpretation of the laws of nature through which humanity's common good is secured. (shrink)

Noel Malcolm, one of the world's leading experts on Thomas Hobbes, presents a set of extended essays on a wide variety of aspects of the life and work of this giant of early modern thought. Malcolm offers a succinct introduction to Hobbes's life and thought, as a foundation for his discussion of such topics as his political philosophy, his theory of international relations, the development of his mechanistic world-view, and his subversive Biblical criticism. Several of the essays pay special attention (...) to the European dimensions of Hobbes's life, his sources and his influence; the longest surveys the entire European reception of his work from the 1640s to the 1750s. All the essays are based on a deep knowledge of primary sources, and many present striking new discoveries about Hobbes's life, his manuscripts, and the printing history of his works. Aspects of Hobbes will be essential reading not only for Hobbes specialists, but also for all those interested in seventeenth-century intellectual history more generally, both British and European. (shrink)

This essay examines Hobbes’ philosophy of space, with emphasis placed on the variety of interpretations that his concept of imaginary space has elicited from commentators. The process by which the idea of space is acquired from experience, as well as the role of nominalism, will be offered as important factors in tracking down the elusive content of Hobbes’ conception of imaginary space.

Are Hobbes's laws of nature to be understood primarily as theorems of reason, or as commands of God, or as commands of the civil sovereign? Each of these accounts can be given textual support; each identifies a role that the laws may be thought to play. Examining the full range of textual references, discussing the place of the laws of nature in Hobbes's argument, and considering how the laws may be known, give strongest support to the first of the three (...) accounts, that the laws are primarily rational precepts and only secondarily civil and divine commands. (shrink)

In a new introduction, the authors describe how science and its social context were understood when this book was first published, and how the study of the history of science has changed since then.

Lloyd's book, Morality in the Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, correctly stresses the deductive element in Hobbes's proofs of the laws of nature. She believes that “the principle of reciprocity” is the key to these proofs. This principle is effective in getting ego-centric people to recognize moral laws and their moral obligations. However, it is not, I argue, the basic principle Hobbes uses to derive the laws of nature, from definitions. The principle of reason, which dictates that all similar cases be (...) treated similarly, is. It is important not to diminish the centrality of reason for Hobbes because it is essential to understanding his reply to “the fool” and understanding why the state of nature cannot be a continuum. (shrink)

Contains the English version of the author's political and moral philosophy. This title also includes the English translation of "De Homine," chapters X-XV. It also features the English translation of "De Cive.".

This work provides an original account of Francis Bacon's conception of natural inquiry. P'erez-Ramos sets Bacon in an epistemological tradition that postulates an intimate relation between objects of cognition and objects of construction, and regards the human knower as, fundamentally, a maker. By exploring the background to this tradition, and contrasting the responses of major philosophers of the 17th century with Bacon's own, the book charts Bacon's contribution to the modern philosophy of science.

Thomas Hobbes took a new look at the ways in which society should function, and he ended up formulating the concept of political science. His crowning achievement, Leviathan, remains among the greatest works in the history of ideas. Written during a moment in English history when the political and social structures as well as methods of science were in flux and open to interpretation, Leviathan played an essential role in the development of the modern world. This edition of Hobbes' landmark (...) work is based on the original text. It incorporates the author's own corrections and retains the period spelling and punctuation, offering both flavorful authenticity and the utmost clarity of expression. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 41.1 (2003) 111-120 [Access article in PDF] Hobbes on Law, Nature, and Reason Kinch Hoekstra Balliol College, University of Oxford The reason of a thing is not to bee inquired after till you are sure the thing it selfe bee soe. Wee comonly are att (What's the reason of it?) before wee are sure of the thing. T'was an excellent question of my (...) Lady Cotton, when Sr. Robert Cotton was magnifying of a shoe, wch was Moses's or Noahs, & Wondering att the strange shape & fashion of it: but, Mr. Cotton, sayes shee, are you sure 'tis a shooe. 1A law of nature is a rule discovered by reason. 2 This is the key to John Deigh's attempt to show that "Hobbes's ethics is logically independent of his moral psychology." 3 By this he means that the "theorems" of Hobbes's ethics, the laws of nature, "have no other ground than the definition on which it [his ethics] is based." 4 Deigh thinks he establishes this conclusion by taking seriously both Hobbes's definition of a law of nature as "a Precept, or generall Rule, found out by Reason, by which a man is forbidden to do, that, which is destructive of his life," and his definition of reason as "nothing but Reckoning (that is, Adding and Substracting) of the Consequences of generall names." 5 Deigh puts these two definitions together to argue that Hobbes's ethics is a deductive science, and that those who instead think of his ethics as dependent on desire or as involving instrumental reason ("means-to-ends thinking," as he calls it) are mistaken. The particular virtue of this interpretation, Deigh says, is that without it we have to read Hobbes in the Leviathan as sometimes using "reason" in a way that is different from the way he defines it in chapter 5. 6I will argue that Deigh misunderstands the basis, status, and scope of Hobbesian natural law. In his attempt to save Hobbes from using "reason" equivocally, Deigh attributes mistakes and inconsistencies to him that are more serious and have less [End Page 111] textual justification than that apparent equivocation. A source of the misunderstanding is a simplification—accepted by Mark Murphy and many other interpreters—of Hobbes's conception of reason.Let us begin with Deigh's view of the scope of the law of nature, as he admits that his interpretation would be undermined were he wrong about this. "While the laws of nature are dictates of reason for people living in a state of nature," he says, "they are not truly laws in such circumstances and therefore not sources of obligation in them." 7 If Murphy is right that Hobbes does think they are obligatory outside of civil society, then it is, Deigh concedes, "a genuine problem" for his account. 8 In reply, Deigh refers to the two passages where Hobbes says that the laws of nature are "not properly Lawes," quoting the one from chapter 26, which explicitly recapitulates a claim from chapter 15. 9 In this earlier passage, however, Hobbes adds: "But yet if we consider the same Theoremes, as delivered in the word of God, that by right commandeth all things; then are they properly called Lawes." 10 Hobbes thinks that the laws of nature are always obligatory. He holds, for example, that the law of nature that covenants be kept obliges even "in the condition of meer Nature" or "condition of Warre," and that "the rule of Manners, without Civill Government, is the Law of Nature." 11 Hobbes says that although the laws of nature donot always oblige "in foro externo; that is, to the putting them in act," they do always "oblige in foro interno; that is to say, they bind to a desire they should take place." 12 Although they only require "a desire, and endeavour," Hobbes makes clear that these requirements are laws, and that they are binding and obligatory. 13If Deigh were right, sovereigns would not be obligated by... (shrink)

Where generations of moral philosophers had attempted to end conflict by recommending their own versions of the summum bonum, Hobbes offered instead a vision of the summum malum, a condition of radical uncertainty in which the fear of violent death made any pursuit of commodious living impossible. Hobbes’s state of nature thus emerged as the condition that any rational individual would wish to avoid. His successive images of anarchy reveal a consistent strategy aimed at rendering the natural condition of mankind (...) a credible encapsulation of the perils of disobedience. The success of that strategy is evident in the fact that Hobbes’s improbable state of nature became an inescapable consideration for emulators and critics alike. (shrink)

early modern philosophers commonly appeal to a mathematical method to demonstrate their philosophical claims. Since such claims are not always followed by what we would recognize as mathematical proofs, they are often dismissed as mere rhetoric. René Descartes, Thomas Hobbes, and Benedict de Spinoza are perhaps the most well-known early modern philosophers who fall into this category. It is a matter of dispute whether the ordo geometricus amounts to more than a method of presentation in Spinoza’s philosophy. Descartes and Hobbes (...) clearly appeal to a method of discovery modeled after geometry, but neither employs it to develop a heavily quantitative physics. Whereas Descartes’s version of the geometrical method .. (shrink)

Photos. "This is a masterly book which brings together the two major Bacons--the politician and the philosopher. . .

This paper surveys the many misunderstandings of Descartes Meditations in Hobbes' objections --the third set--issued in 1641. Some of the understanding can be traced to different understandings of philosophy or science, as well as differences over the importance epistemological scepticism.

Several recent commentators argue that Thomas Hobbes’s account of the nature of science is conventionalist. Engaging in scientific practice on a conventionalist account is more a matter of making sure one connects one term to another properly rather than checking one’s claims, e.g., by experiment. In this paper, I argue that the conventionalist interpretation of Hobbesian science accords neither with Hobbes’s theoretical account in De corpore and Leviathan nor with Hobbes’s scientific practice in De homine and elsewhere. Closely tied to (...) the conventionalist interpretation is the deductivist interpretation, on which it is claimed that Hobbes believed sciences such as optics are deduced from geometry. I argue that Hobbesian science places simplest conceptions as the foundation for geometry and the sciences in which we use geometry, which provides strong evidence against both the conventionalist and deductivist interpretations. (shrink)

Originally published in 1889, Ferdinand Tonnies published versions of two works by Thomas Hobbes. His editions of The Elements of Law: Natural and Politic and of Behemoth: or The Long Parliament were the first modern critical editions, based on manuscripts of works by Hobbes. Completed in 1640, The Elements of Law was Hobbes's first systematic political work. The book helps us see Hobbes's mind at work, for it is the first version of his later political works.

Hobbes on Demonstration and Construction DAVID GAUTHIER 1~ IN 1656 Hobbes published Six Lessons to the Professors of Mathematics, with an Epistle Dedicatory to the Marquis of Dorchester, Lord Pierrepont. In this Epistle, Hobbes distinguishes the demonstrable from the indemonstrable arts: "demonstrable are those the construction of the subject whereof is in the power of the artist himself, who, in his demonstration, does no more but deduce the consequences of his own operation" . Although this passage, with the explication Hobbes (...) offers for it and the consequences he draws from it, and a similar discussion in De homine, published two years later, have not been unnoticed, their significance for Hobbes's account of science in general, and civil philosophy or politics in particular, has not, I think, been I am grateful to the University of East Anglia for appointing me a Visiting Research Fellow during the period in which the first draft of this paper was written. A second draft was presented at the Third Quadrennial International Fellows Conference of the Center for Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh, sponsored by the Florence Center for the History and Philosophy of Science. I am grateful for the remarks of my commentator, J. E. McGuire, and for the discussion. I am also grateful for the comments of the two referees who read this paper for the Journal of the History of Philosophy. References to Hobbes's works appear as.. (shrink)

The moral doctrine of Hobbes, in many ways the most interesting of our major British philosophers, is, I think, commonly seen in a false perspective which has seriously obscured its real affinities. This is, no doubt, largely due to the fact that most modern readers begin and end their study of Hobbes's ethics with the Leviathan , a rhetorical and, in many ways, a popular Streitschrift published in the very culmination of what looked at the time to be a permanent (...) revolution, and do not pay such attention to the more calmly argued statements of the same doctrine contained in the Elements of Law , circulated before the outbreak of the Civil War, or the De Cive. (shrink)

Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) was the first great English philosopher and one of the most important theorists of human nature and politics in the history of Western thought. This superlative introduction explains Hobbes's main doctrines and arguments, covering all of Hobbes's philosophy. A.P.Martinich begins with a helpful overview of Hobbes's life and work, setting his ideas against the political and scientific background seventeenth century England. He then introduces and assesses, in clear chapters, Hobbes's contributions to fundamental areas of philosophy: * Epistemology (...) and metaphysics, in particular Hobbes's materialism and determinism and his relation to Descartes * Ethics and political philosophy, concentrating on Hobbes's most famous work, Leviathan and the theory of the social contract it advances * Philosophy of science, logic and language, considering Hobbes's theory of nominalism and his writing on rhetoric and the uses of language; * Religion, examining Hobbes's analyses ofrevelation, prophets and miracles. The final chapter considers the legacy of Hobbes's thought and his influence on contemporary philosophy. Additional features * Chapter summaries * Annotated further reading. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 41.1 (2003) 97-109 [Access article in PDF] Notes and Discussions Reply to Mark Murphy John Deigh Northwestern University 1. Hobbes put his ideas about ethics in the form of a theory of natural law. The core of this theory appears in chapters 14 and 15 of Leviathan. Those chapters contain a systematic exposition of the laws of nature that pertain to the maintenance (...) of social order. Hobbes began this exposition by defining a law of nature as a "general rule, found out by reason," and he concluded it by referring to the laws he had expounded as "dictates of reason." 1 What he meant in saying that these rules were found out by reason and were dictates of reason is the subject of some controversy. A common interpretation is that Hobbes, having previously advanced an egoistic theory of human motivation and having then affirmed that the ultimate end of voluntary actions is the actor's well-being, took the laws to be consequences of the determination of means to this end. A good example of this interpretation can be found in Sidgwick's Outlines of the History of Ethics. 2 Introducing his account of Hobbes's ethics, having first described Hobbes's psychology, Sidgwick writes, What, then, is the conduct that [according to Hobbes] ought to be adopted...? In the first place, since all voluntary actions of men tend to their own preservation or pleasure, it cannot be reasonable to aim at anything else; in fact, nature rather than reason fixes the end of human action, to which it is reason's function to show the means. Hence, if we ask why it is reasonable for any individual to observe the rules of social behavior that are commonly called moral, the answer is obvious that this is only indirectly reasonable, as means to his own preservation or pleasure. 3One can find other examples of this interpretation in the commentaries of prominent contemporary writers on Hobbes such as David Gauthier and Jean Hampton. 4The interpretation appears sound as long as one looks only at the chapters in Leviathan that contain the core of Hobbes's ethics. Once one examines earlier [End Page 97] chapters, however, problems emerge. In particular, it becomes clear that the interpretation does not fit the accounts of reason and the other powers of human cognition that Hobbes gave in these early chapters. Hobbes uses the first three chapters of Leviathan to develop an account of the cognitive powers human beings have in common with other animals, and in the next two chapters he then discusses the powers that, being the result of acquiring language and the capacity for speech, are unique to human beings. In chapter 5, he identifies reason with one of these powers. It is, he says, the faculty of reckoning with words and other symbols. 5 And in chapter 8, he divides human cognitive powers into two categories, natural wit and acquired wit, and places the faculties of imagination, judgment, and prudence in the former and that of reason in the latter. 6 Means-to-ends thinking, he makes clear, involves the combined exercise of powers that belong exclusively to the category of natural wit. It does not involve the exercise of reason. So unless one assumes that Hobbes abandoned the accounts of reason and the other powers of human cognition that he gave in Leviathan's early chapters, one cannot interpret him as having taken the contribution of means-to-ends thinking to the determination of the laws of nature as what qualifies them as general rules found out by reason or as dictates of reason. In other words, to accept this common interpretation of Hobbes's exposition of the natural law means attributing to Leviathan a fundamental incoherence between its early chapters and the chapters containing that exposition.I raised this problem for the interpretation in my article "Reason and Ethics in Hobbes's Leviathan." 7 The problem, I argued, results from the supposition, which anyone giving this interpretation must make, that Hobbes, in defining the laws of... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Desire and Ethics in Hobbes's Leviathan:A Response to Professor DeighAccording to the "orthodox" interpretation of Hobbes's ethics, the laws of nature are the products of means-end thinking. According to the "definitivist" interpretation recently offered by John Deigh, the laws of nature are generated by reason operating on a definition of "law of nature," where the content of this definition is given by linguistic usage.2 I aim to accomplish two (...) things in this note. First, I want to locate as clearly as possible the point at which the orthodox and definitivist interpretations must disagree. Second, I want to show that once the claim on which these interpretations disagree is made clear, it is the orthodox interpretation that turns out to be the superior.31.Deigh takes as the initial test case for the various interpretations of Hobbes's moral theory the passage in chapter fifteen of Leviathan commonly known as "the reply to the fool." The fool, it will be recalled, argues that the precept that covenants be kept is not a rule of reason; Hobbes argues that the fool's "specious reasoning is neverthelesse [End Page 259] false," for to break a valid covenant is to violate a dictate of reason.4 Deigh summarizes his criticism of the orthodox interpretation of this passage as follows.On [the orthodox] interpretation, the dispute between Hobbes and the Fool concerns the deliverances of reason when reason is exercised in the service of self-interest, that is, when its exercise consists in determining the fittest means to achieving the ends set by egoistic desires. Such an exercise falls outside of the definition of reason that Hobbes gives in chapter five. It exemplifies strategic or means-to-end thinking and not deduction. Indeed, it corresponds to what Hobbes, in chapter three, defines as seeking... Hence, the orthodox interpretation of the laws of nature implies that Hobbes, in expounding the laws of nature, went back on the notion of reason he defined in chapter five. It implicitly attributes a fundamental inconsistency to Hobbes's philosophy.5The laws of nature—among which is the rule requiring the keeping of covenants6 —are held by Hobbes to be precepts of reason.7 Hobbes deems them, collectively, a science,8 by which he means that they are the deliverances of reason that pertain to a specific subject-matter.9 But, argues Deigh, Hobbes understands reason in a very specific way, a way that is distinct from the sort of means-end thinking that Hobbes describes in detail in chapter three and labels "seeking." Thus the orthodox interpretation of Hobbes's moral theory is at odds with Hobbes's own conception of the laws of nature individually as dictates of reason and collectively as the science of the true moral philosophy.It is of course true that the sort of thinking that Hobbes calls "seeking" and the sort of thinking that Hobbes calls "reasoning" are fundamentally different. Seeking takes its origin from experience: we have seen certain events following other events, and we retain a trace of that experience in imagination. Thus when we have some desire, there arises "the Thought of some means we have seen produce the like of that which we ayme at; and from the thought of that, the thought of means to that mean; and so continually, till we come to some beginning within our power."10 Those that are able to engage in this sort of thinking well are prudent,11 and on Hobbes's view, humans with comparable experience will exhibit a comparable degree of prudence.12 And because seeking requires only desire to regulate thought and some experience of events succeeding other events, there is nothing distinctively human about this form of thinking, and indeed Hobbes acknowledges that prudence is common to humans and other animals.13 By contrast, the process that Hobbes calls "reasoning" [End Page 260] is characterized independently of desire. All that is essential to reasoning is that it involves the drawing of consequences that follow from sentences formed from aptly-defined general terms.14 Thus all deliverances of reason are, either explicitly or implicitly, conditional in form: necessarily, if p... (shrink)

Hobbes promises to teach philosophers how to imitate God. With this bold claim as its basis, the paper questions the widely accepted view that Hobbes authored an early instance of a modern social science. It focuses on the constraints that Hobbes imposes on the language of philosophical practitioners. He restricts its truth-claims to the closed circle of language; he does not philosophize to describe, model, predict, or mirror empirical reality. He nevertheless makes claims for a useful science, one that can (...) construct a stable commonwealth. The restrictive claims concerning truth and Hobbes 's claim to a practical philosophy are reconciled through an investigation of his distinction between 'a posteriori' and 'a priori' sciences. Hobbes teaches philosophers to imitate God as a creator : as a 're-creator' of divinely produced effects, or by manipulating matter to create things we design ourselves. The science of politics is a priori. It dictates the motions so as to create a well-ordered commonwealth, an artificial man, a creation made in our own image. (shrink)

In Leviathan Thomas Hobbes defines moral philosophy as 'the science of Virtue and Vice', yet few modern readers take this description seriously. Moreover, it is typically assumed that Hobbes' ethical views are unrelated to his views of science. Influential modern interpreters have portrayed Hobbes as either an amoralist, or a moral contractarian, or a rule egoist, or a divine command theorist. David Boonin-Vail challenges all these assumptions and presents a new, and very unorthodox, interpretation of Hobbes's ethics. He shows that (...) Hobbes is best understood as embracing a theory of virtue concerned with the development of good character traits rather than with rules of behaviour. In focusing in a quite new way on Hobbes's moral theory this book is likely to attract considerable attention amongst both philosophers and intellectual historians. (shrink)

Thomas Hobbes adheres to a conception of philosophy as causal knowledge that bears the mark of the Aristotelian tradition, as Cees Leijenhorst has elaborated in another issue of The Monist. Referring to Aristotle, Hobbes states explicitly in two mathematical studies of the 1660’s: “To know is to know by causes.” But according to Hobbes, we encounter obstacles when we search for causes in the field of natural philosophy. Consequently, his well-known definition of philosophy consists of two parts. The earliest version, (...) elaborated in the so-called A 10 manuscript, reads: “Philosophy is the knowledge, acquired by correct ratiocination, of properties of bodies from their conceived manners of generation, and again, of such manners of generation, as may be, from known properties.” This definition reappears almost literally in several of Hobbes’s other essays, for example in De Cive and in the Leviathan, and in a modified version in De Corpore. In the latter, he replaces “properties of bodies” by “effects or appearances” and “manners of generation” by “causes or manners of generation.” But one essential point remains unchanged: the second part of the definition is not a simple reversal of the first part, since Hobbes does not speak of “manners of generation” or of “causes,” but only of possible manners of generation or of possible causes. It is this second part of Hobbes’s theory that refers to natural philosophy. Hobbes stresses repeatedly that in the case of natural philosophy, causes can be concluded only from known effects. In contrast, in First Philosophy or geometry, conclusions can be drawn from known and true principles to their effects. According to Hobbes, this is the essential distinction of natural philosophy, which does not exist by accident. This essay explicates Hobbes’s argumentation for claiming this distinction for natural philosophy but not for geometry. In addition, the consequences of Hobbes’s methodological argument for natural philosophy are examined, especially the consequences for optics and astronomy. Finally, the question of whether there is a development in this theory will be explored. (shrink)

According to the "orthodox" interpretation of Hobbes's ethics, the laws of nature are the products of means-end thinking. According to the "definitivist" interpretation recently offered by John Deigh, the laws of nature are generated by reason operating on a definition of "law of nature," where the content of this definition is given by linguistic usage. I aim to accomplish two things in this note. First, I want to locate as clearly as possible the point at which the orthodox and definitivist (...) interpretations must disagree. Second, I want to show that once the claim on which these interpretations disagree is made clear, it is the orthodox interpretation that turns out to be the superior. (shrink)

This chapter is concerned with the foundations of Hobbes’s natural philosophy, notably his account of space and time, as well as an inertial law the author terms the “persistence principle” and a mechanistic principle of action by contact. The author argues that these foundational concepts and principles serve as a framework that places constraints upon the kinds of hypotheses that may figure in the explanation of phenomena, but they do not uniquely determine how natural philosophy is to be developed. In (...) particular, the author shows that Hobbes took questions about the infinitude and uniqueness of the world as unanswerable in principle, although he regarded the question of the vacuum as an empirical matter that could be settled by experiment. Hobbes did, however, hold that certain doctrines were incoherent and should be rejected on a priori grounds. (shrink)

This book gives a comprehensive treatment of Thomas Hobbes' thought in the light of the most important research currently being produced by historians, philosophers, and political scientists. His life and political, religious, and scientific views are explained within the cultural context of Stuart England.