Though the Revised Edition of A Theory of Justice, published in 1999, is the definitive statement of Rawlsıs view, so much of the extensive literature on ...

Is morality rational? In this book Gauthier argues that moral principles are principles of rational choice. He proposes a principle whereby choice is made on an agreed basis of cooperation, rather than according to what would give an individual the greatest expectation of value. He shows that such a principle not only ensures mutual benefit and fairness, thus satisfying the standards of morality, but also that each person may actually expect greater utility by adhering to morality, even though the choice (...) did not have that end primarily in view. In resolving what may appear to be a paradox, the author establishes morals on the firm foundation of reason. Gauthier's argument includes an account of value, linking it to preference and utility; a discussion of the curcumstances in which morality is unnecessary; and an application of morals by agreement to relations between peoples at different levels of development and different generations. Finally, he reflects on the assumptions about individuality and community made by his account of rationality and morality. (shrink)

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Now in a new edition, this volume updates Davidson's exceptional Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (1984), which set out his enormously influential philosophy of language. The original volume remains a central point of reference, and a focus of controversy, with its impact extending into linguistic theory, philosophy of mind, and epistemology. Addressing a central question--what it is for words to mean what they do--and featuring a previously uncollected, additional essay, this work will appeal to a wide audience of philosophers, linguists, (...) and psychologists. (shrink)

Though the revised edition of A Theory of Justice, published in 1999, is the definitive statement of Rawls's view, so much of the extensive literature on Rawls's theory refers to the first edition. This reissue makes the first edition once again available for scholars and serious students of Rawls's work.

"The three works in this collection, all dating from Nietzsche's last lucid months, show him at his most stimulating and controversial: the portentous ...

Essays discuss relativism, knowledge, creativity, progress, Aristotle, Galileo, cultural pluralism, and reason.

Transcendental pragmatics is the attempt to make Kants transcendental philosophy philosophically defensible by means of a reconstruction in terms of semiotics and the theory of communication. The central theses of transcendental pragmatics are: philosophical final justification is possible. The claim of radical fallibilism: "all propositions are fallible, therefore final justification is impossible" is false. Both theses are defended against H. Keuths critique, recently published in this journal. Radical fallibilism, which admits the application of the principle of fallibility to itself entangles (...) itself pecisely for this reason in a whole raw of contradictions. Keuths objections rest upon a misunderstanding. His critique does not demonstrate the invalidity of reflexive final justification arguments because he misses the essential feature of such arguments namely that they are intended as strictly reflexive arguments. (shrink)

Employing the techniques of modern economic analysis, Professor Buchanan reveals the conceptual basis of an individual's social rights by examining the ...

Der kommunikativen Alltagspraxis müssen kognitive Deutungen, moralische Erwartungen, Expressionen und Wertungen einander durchdringen. Die Verständigungsprozesse der Lebenswelt bedürfen deshalb einer kulturellen Überlieferung auf ganzer Breite, nicht nur der Segnungen von Wissenschaft und Technik. So könnte die Philosophie ihren Bezug zur Totalität in einer der Lebenswelt zugewandten Interpretenrolle aktualisieren. Sie könnte mindestens dabei helfen, das stillgestellte Zusammenspiel des Kognitiv-Instrumentellen mit dem Moralisch-Praktischen und dem Ästhetisch-Expressiven wie ein Mobile, das sich hartnäckig verhakt hat, wieder in Bewegung zu setzen.

Gauthier's title is potentially misleading. The phrase “morals by agreement” suggests a social contract theory of morality according to which basic moral principles arise out of an actual or hypothetical agreement. John Rawls defends a hypothetical agreement version, arguing that the basic principles of justice are those that would be agreed to in an initial position of fair equality. I myself defend an actual agreement version, arguing that the moral principles that apply to a person derive from implicit conventions the (...) person has accepted in dealing with other people. Gauthier's view is different from either of these sorts of contract theory. Instead, he holds that certain basic principles of impartiality are prior to actual agreements. (shrink)

Bd. 1. Sprachanalytik, Semiotik, Hermeneutik. Bd. 2. Das Apriori der Kommunikationsgemeinschaft.

Part I of this essay will be devoted to Gauthier's principle of minimax relative concession. Part II will focus, more generally, on the variety of possible strategies available to liberal theory. In Part I, I will argue that the principle of minimax relative concession does not define “essential justice” as Gauthier claims. In Part II, I will argue that the difficulties facing Gauthier's strategy are common to other strategies of die same general kind. I will close by suggesting what I (...) think may prove to be a more promising approach. (shrink)

Attempts to justify statements or norms lead into the well-known trilemma infinite regress, circular reasoning, dogmatism. Apel's transformed transcendental philosophy is to avoid this problem. A recent version of it is examined. It admits fallibilism to be valid with empirical hypotheses but claims it to be contradictory if applied to philosophical theses on conditions of the possibility of knowledge and argumentation. This claim is refuted. The proposed "final justification" is to start not with what is certain but with doubt. Reflection (...) on the conditions of the possibility of meaningful doubting is to show a borderline beyond which undoubtable certainties are to be found. Such certainties are the rules of argumentation. Whoever utters "The rules of argumentation are not valid in my case" is said to make a necessarily false statement. This line of argument is even carried over to the justification of absolutely binding metanorms of a normative ethics of communication. The whole procedure of "final justification" is shown to be faulty. (shrink)

I take it as my assignment to criticize the Gauthier enterprise. At the outset, however, I should express my general agreement with David Gauthier's normative vision of a liberal social order, including the place that individual principles of morality hold in such an order. Whether the enterprise is, ultimately, judged to have succeeded or to have failed depends on the standards applied. Considered as a coherent grounding of such a social order in the rational choice behavior of persons, the enterprise (...) fails. Considered as an extended argument implying that persons should adopt the moral stance embodied in the Gauthier structure, the enterprise is, I dunk, largely successful. Considered as a set of empirically falsifiable propositions suggesting that persons do, indeed, choose as the Gauthier precepts dictate, the enterprise offers Humean hope rather than Hobbesian despair. (shrink)