- (2 other versions)Individualism and the Mental.Tyler Burge - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(5 other versions)What is it Like to be a Bat?Thomas Nagel - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Epiphenomenal Qualia.Frank Jackson - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(4 other versions)Naming and Necessity.S. Kripke - 1972 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 45 (4):665-666.details
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Thinking about Consciousness.Diana Raffman - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):171-186.details
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(1 other version)Remarks on David Papineau's Thinking about Consciousness1.Christopher S. Hill - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):147-147.details
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(1 other version)Consciousness, Color and Content.Michael Tye - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (213):619-621.details
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(1 other version)Thinking about Consciousness.David Papineau - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (215):333-335.details
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Thinking About Consciousness.David Papineau - 2002 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Conceptual mastery and the knowledge argument.Gabriel Rabin - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (1):125-147.details
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There are no phenomenal concepts.Derek Ball - 2009 - Mind 118 (472):935-962.details
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The contingent a priori and rigid designators.Keith S. Donnellan - 1977 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1):12-27.details
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(5 other versions)What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1979 - In Mortal questions. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 435 - 450.details
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(1 other version)Consciousness, color, and content.Michael Tye - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 113 (3):233-235.details
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Is semantics possible?Hilary Putnam - 1970 - Metaphilosophy 1 (3):187–201.details
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(1 other version)Brains in a vat.Anthony L. Brueckner - 1986 - Journal of Philosophy 83 (3):148-167.details
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(1 other version)Epiphenomenal qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.details
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Concepts, definitions, and meaning*,*.Tyler Burge - 1993 - Metaphilosophy 24 (4):309-25.details
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(2 other versions)Individualism and the mental.Tyler Burge - 1979 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.details
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Intellectual norms and foundations of mind.Tyler Burge - 1986 - Journal of Philosophy 83 (December):697-720.details
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Phenomenal and perceptual concepts.David Papineau - 2006 - In Torin Andrew Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. New York, US: Oxford University Press. pp. 111--144.details
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Physicalism and phenomenal concepts.Daniel Stoljar - 2005 - Mind and Language 20 (2):296-302.details
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(3 other versions)Max Black's objection to mind-body identity.Ned Block - 2006 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 2:3-78.details
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Imaginability, conceivability, possibility and the mind-body problem.Christopher S. Hill - 1997 - Philosophical Studies 87 (1):61-85.details
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(2 other versions)The Two-Dimensional Argument Against Materialism.David Chalmers - 2006 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Sven Walter (eds.), Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.details
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What Mary couldn't know: Belief about phenomenal states.Martine Nida-Rumelin - 1995 - In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Paderborn: Ferdinand Schoningh. pp. 219--41.details
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There's Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument.Peter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa & Daniel Stoljar (eds.) - 2004 - MIT Press.details
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(2 other versions)Phenomenal states.Brian Loar - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:81-108.details
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A limited defense of the knowledge argument.Torin Alter - 1998 - Philosophical Studies 90 (1):35-56.details
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(1 other version)Phenomenal concepts and the knowledge argument.David J. Chalmers - 2004 - In Peter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), There's Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument. MIT Press. pp. 269.details
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Conceptual analysis and reductive explanation.David J. Chalmers & Frank Jackson - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (3):315-61.details
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Materialism and qualia: The explanatory gap.Joseph Levine - 1983 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64 (October):354-61.details
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(5 other versions)What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (4):435-50.details
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Conscious Experience.Thomas Metzinger (ed.) - 1995 - Paderborn: Ferdinand Schoningh.details
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The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates.Ned Block, Owen Flanagan & Guven Guzeldere (eds.) - 1997 - MIT Press.details
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Zombies and Consciousness.José Luis Bermúdez - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (227):306-308.details
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Zombies and Consciousness.Robert Kirk - 2005 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
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The Knowledge Argument and the Implications of Phenomenal Knowledge.Robert J. Howell - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (7):459-468.details
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Faster than Thought.Thomas Metzinger - 1995 - In Conscious Experience. Paderborn: Ferdinand Schoningh.details
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Thought And Object: Essays On Intentionality.Andrew Woodfield (ed.) - 1982 - New York: Oxford: Clarendon Press.details
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Postscript.[author unknown] - 1976 - Philosophy 51 (198):379-379.details
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Contemporary Materialism: A Reader.Paul K. Moser & J. D. Trout (eds.) - 1995 - New York: Routledge.details
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Thought and Object: Essays on Intentionality.J. M. Howarth - 1984 - Philosophical Quarterly 34 (134):81-83.details
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Oxford Studies in Metaphysics Volume 2.Dean Zimmerman (ed.) - 2006 - Oxford University Press UK.details
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(1 other version)Minds and Persons: Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement: 53.Anthony O'Hear (ed.) - 2003 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.details
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Consciousness, colour, and content. Michael Tye.Bill Brewer - 2001 - Mind 110 (439):869-874.details
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Postscript.[author unknown] - 1964 - Vivarium 2 (1):161-162.details
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Conceptual structure and the individuation of content.Derk Pereboom - 1995 - Philosophical Perspectives 9:401-428.details
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(1 other version)Brains in a Vat.Anthony L. Brueckner - 1986 - Journal of Philosophy 83 (3):148-167.details
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