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How Is Weakness of the Will Possible?Donald Davidson - 1969 - In Joel Feinberg (ed.), Moral concepts. London,: Oxford University Press.details
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Life and action: elementary structures of practice and practical thought.Michael Thompson - 2008 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.details
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Must There Be Basic Action?Douglas Lavin - 2012 - Noûs 47 (2):273-301.details
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Internalism Defended.Richard Feldman & Earl Conee - 2001 - American Philosophical Quarterly 38 (1):1 - 18.details
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Freedom of the will and the concept of a person.Harry Frankfurt - 2004 - In Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas (eds.), Metaphysics: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press UK.details
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The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 141:125-126.details
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The Value of Rationality.Ralph Wedgwood - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Understanding volition.Jing Zhu - 2004 - Philosophical Psychology 17 (2):247-274.details
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On the principle of intention agglomeration.Jing Zhu - 2010 - Synthese 175 (1):89 - 99.details
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The Value of Rationality. [REVIEW]Sebastian Schmidt - 2019 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 73 (1):153-157.details
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The Value of Rationality. [REVIEW]Ralph Wedgwood - 2019 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 73 (1):153-157.details
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Addiction as defect of the will: Some philosophical reflections. [REVIEW]R. Jay Wallace - 1999 - Law and Philosophy 18 (6):621–654.details
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Addiction as Defect of the Will: Some Philosophical Reflections.R. Jay Wallace - 1999 - Law and Philosophy 18 (6):621-654.details
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The Possibility of Practical Reason.Thomas Pink - 2003 - Mind 112 (448):812-816.details
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Practical Reflection, by J. David Velleman. [REVIEW]Michael H. Robins - 1991 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (4):949-952.details
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Practical reflection.J. David Velleman - 1985 - Philosophical Review 94 (1):33-61.details
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Consistency Among Intentions and the ‘Simple View’.Steven Sverdlik - 1996 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26 (4):515-522.details
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From Volitionalism to the Dual Aspect Theory of Action.Joshua Stuchlik - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (3):867-886.details
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The moral problem.Michael Smith - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.details
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Michael Smith: The Moral Problem. [REVIEW]James Lenman - 1994 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 1 (1):125-126.details
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Rationality in Action: A Symposium.Barry Smith - 2001 - Philosophical Explorations 4 (2):66-94.details
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How truth governs belief.Nishi Shah - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482.details
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Doxastic deliberation.Nishi Shah & J. David Velleman - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (4):497-534.details
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Cognitivism about Instrumental Reason.Kieran Setiya - 2007 - Ethics 117 (4):649-673.details
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Rationality in Action.John R. Searle - 2001 - MIT Press.details
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The scope of instrumental reason.Mark Schroeder - 2004 - Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):337–364.details
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The Concept of Trying.Severin Schroeder - 2001 - Philosophical Investigations 24 (3):213-227.details
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The Concept of Trying.Severin Schroeder - 2001 - Philosophical Investigations 24 (3):213-227.details
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A Phenomenal, Dispositional Account of Belief.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2002 - Noûs 36 (2):249-275.details
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Ceteris paribus laws, component forces, and the nature of special-science properties.Robert D. Rupert - 2008 - Noûs 42 (3):349-380.details
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A conditional theory of trying.David-Hillel Ruben - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (1):271-287.details
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Where does the akratic break take place?Amelie Oksenberg Rorty - 1980 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 58 (4):333 – 346.details
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The Myth of Instrumental Rationality.Joseph Raz - 2005 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1 (1):28.details
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The conclusion of practical reasoning: the shadow between idea and act.Sarah K. Paul - 2013 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (3):287-302.details
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The Will: A Dual Aspect Theory (2 Vols.).Brian O'Shaughnessy - 1980 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.details
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Trying (As the Mental "Pineal Gland").Brain O'Shaughnessy - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (13):365-386.details
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Self-Knowing Agents * By LUCY O'BRIEN.Lucy O’Brien - 2009 - Analysis 69 (1):187-188.details
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Actions as Prime.Lucy O'Brien - 2017 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 80:265-285.details
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Springs of action: understanding intentional behavior.Alfred R. Mele - 1992 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Intention, intentional action, and moral responsibility.Alfred Mele & Steven Sverdlik - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 82 (3):265 - 287.details
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Intentional action.Alfred R. Mele & Paul K. Moser - 1994 - Noûs 28 (1):39-68.details
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Volition and basic action.Hugh McCann - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (4):451-473.details
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Is Raising One's Arm a Basic Action?Hugh McCann - 1972 - Journal of Philosophy 69 (9):235.details
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Dispositions and conditionals.C. B. Martin - 1994 - Philosophical Quarterly 44 (174):1-8.details
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On linking dispositions and conditionals.David Manley & Ryan Wasserman - 2008 - Mind 117 (465):59-84.details
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Ability, modality, and genericity.John Maier - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (2):411-428.details
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Mind and Meaning.William G. Lycan - 1984 - Philosophical Review 93 (2):282.details
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Finkish dispositions.David Kellogg Lewis - 1997 - Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187):143-158.details
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What 'must' and 'can' must and can mean.Angelika Kratzer - 1977 - Linguistics and Philosophy 1 (3):337--355.details
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