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  1. Recent Work on Radical Skepticism.Duncan Pritchard - 2002 - American Philosophical Quarterly 39 (3):215-257.
    This discussion surveys recent developments in the treatment of the epistemological problem of skepticism. These are arguments which attack our knowledge of certain truths rather than, say, our belief in the existence of certain entities. In particular, this article focuses on the radical versions of these skeptical arguments, arguments which purport to show that knowledge is, for the most part, impossible, rather than just that we lack knowledge in a particular discourse. Although most of the key recent developments in this (...)
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  • Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2003 - Metaphilosophy 34 (1/2):106--130.
    The recent movement towards virtue–theoretic treatments of epistemological concepts can be understood in terms of the desire to eliminate epistemic luck. Significantly, however, it is argued that the two main varieties of virtue epistemology are responding to different types of epistemic luck. In particular, whilst proponents of reliabilism–based virtue theories have been focusing on the problem of what I call “veritic” epistemic luck, non–reliabilism–based virtue theories have instead been concerned with a very different type of epistemic luck, what I call (...)
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  • Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Oxford University Press UK.
    One of the key supposed 'platitudes' of contemporary epistemology is the claim that knowledge excludes luck. One can see the attraction of such a claim, in that knowledge is something that one can take credit for - it is an achievement of sorts - and yet luck undermines genuine achievement. The problem, however, is that luck seems to be an all-pervasive feature of our epistemic enterprises, which tempts us to think that either scepticism is true and that we don't know (...)
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  • Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
    Knowledge and its Limits presents a systematic new conception of knowledge as a kind of mental stage sensitive to the knower's environment. It makes a major contribution to the debate between externalist and internalist philosophies of mind, and breaks radically with the epistemological tradition of analyzing knowledge in terms of true belief. The theory casts new light on such philosophical problems as scepticism, evidence, probability and assertion, realism and anti-realism, and the limits of what can be known. The arguments are (...)
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  • Knowledge, Belief, and Character: Readings in Virtue Epistemology.Guy Axtell (ed.) - 2000 - Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
    This is a unique collection of new and recently-published articles which debate the merits of virtue-theoretic approaches to the core epistemological issues of knowledge and justified belief. The readings all contribute to our understanding of the relative importance, for a theory of justified belief, of the reliability of our cognitive faculties and of the individuals responsibility in gathering and weighing evidence. Highlights of the readings include direct exchanges between leading exponents of this approach and their critics.
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  • Knowledge and Varieties of Epistemic Luck.Hamid Vahi - 2001 - Dialectica 55 (4):351–362.
    It is generally thought that knowledge is incompatible with epistemic luck as the post‐Gettier literature makes it abundantly clear. Examples are produced where although a belief is true and justified, it nevertheless falls short of being an instance of knowledge because of the intrusion of luck. Knowledge is regarded as being distinct from lucky guesses. It is, nevertheless, acknowledged by a number of epistemologists that some kind of luck is in fact an inevitable component of the process of knowledge acquisition. (...)
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  • The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy.John Dewey - 1910 - Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
    The influence of Darwinism on philosophy.--Nature and its good: a conversation.--Intelligence and morals.--The experimental theory of knowledge.--The intellectualist criterion for truth.--A short catechism concerning truth.--Beliefs and existences.--Experience and objective idealism.--The postulate of immediate empiricism.--"Consciousness" and experience.--The significance of the problem of knowledge.
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  • Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry Into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge.Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski - 1996 - Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
    Almost all theories of knowledge and justified belief employ moral concepts and forms of argument borrowed from moral theories, but none of them pay attention to the current renaissance in virtue ethics. This remarkable book is the first attempt to establish a theory of knowledge based on the model of virtue theory in ethics. The book develops the concept of an intellectual virtue, and then shows how the concept can be used to give an account of the major concepts in (...)
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  • Ernest Sosa: And His Critics.John Greco (ed.) - 2004 - Wiley-Blackwell.
    This is the first book devoted to the work of Ernest Sosa, one of the most influential contemporary epistemologists. Part of the acclaimed Philosophers and Their Critics series. The editor’s introduction serves as an introduction to Sosa’s epistemology. Contains critical essays by more than twenty of the most prominent epistemologists in the world, commenting on Sosa's work. Concludes with Sosa’s own reply to his critics.
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  • Virtue Epistemology.John Turri, Mark Alfano & John Greco - 1999 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:1-51.
    Contemporary virtue epistemology (hereafter ‘VE’) is a diverse collection of approaches to epistemology. At least two central tendencies are discernible among the approaches. First, they view epistemology as a normative discipline. Second, they view intellectual agents and communities as the primary focus of epistemic evaluation, with a focus on the intellectual virtues and vices embodied in and expressed by these agents and communities. -/- This entry introduces many of the most important results of the contemporary VE research program. These include (...)
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  • Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.
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  • Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry Into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of the Mind.Linda Zagzebski - unknown
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  • Felix Culpa: Luck in Ethics and Epistemology.Guy Axtell - 2003 - Metaphilosophy 34 (3):331--352.
    Luck threatens in similar ways our conceptions of both moral and epistemic evaluation. This essay examines the problem of luck as a metaphilosophical problem spanning the division between subfields in philosophy. I first explore the analogies between ethical and epistemic luck by comparing influential attempts to expunge luck from our conceptions of agency in these two subfields. I then focus upon Duncan Pritchard's challenge to the motivations underlying virtue epistemology, based specifically on its handling of the problem of epistemic luck. (...)
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  • A (Different) Virtue Epistemology.John Greco - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (1):1-26.
    Section 1 articulates a genus-species claim: that knowledge is a kind of success from ability. Equivalently: In cases of knowledge, S’s success in believing the truth is attributable to S’s ability. That idea is then applied to questions about the nature and value of knowledge. Section 2 asks what it would take to turn the genus-species claim into a proper theory of knowledge; that is, into informative, necessary and sufficient conditions. That question is raised in the context of an important (...)
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  • A (Different) Virtue Epistemology.John Greco - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (1):1-26.
    Section 1 articulates a genus-species claim: that knowledge is a kind of success from ability. Equivalently: In cases of knowledge, S's success in believing the truth is attributable to S's ability. That idea is then applied to questions about the nature and value of knowledge. Section 2 asks what it would take to turn the genus-species claim into a proper theory of knowledge; that is, into informative, necessary and sufficient conditions. That question is raised in the context of an important (...)
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  • Reliabilism and Safety.Kelly Becker - 2006 - Metaphilosophy 37 (5):691-704.
    : Duncan Pritchard has recently highlighted the problem of veritic epistemic luck and claimed that a safety‐based account of knowledge succeeds in eliminating veritic luck where virtue‐based accounts and process reliabilism fail. He then claims that if one accepts a safety‐based account, there is no longer a motivation for retaining a commitment to reliabilism. In this article, I delineate several distinct safety principles, and I argue that those that eliminate veritic luck do so only if at least implicitly committed to (...)
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  • Character, Reliability and Virtue Epistemology.Jason Baehr - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (223):193–212.
    Standard characterizations of virtue epistemology divide the field into two camps: virtue reliabilism and virtue responsibilism. Virtue reliabilists think of intellectual virtues as reliable cognitive faculties or abilities, while virtue responsibilists conceive of them as good intellectual character traits. I argue that responsibilist character virtues sometimes satisfy the conditions of a reliabilist conception of intellectual virtue, and that consequently virtue reliabilists, and reliabilists in general, must pay closer attention to matters of intellectual character. This leads to several new questions and (...)
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  • Sosa on Abilities, Concepts, and Externalism.Timothy Williamson & John Greco - 2004 - In John Greco (ed.), Ernest Sosa: And His Critics. Blackwell.
    A kind of intellectual project characteristic of Ernest Sosa is to resolve an apparently flat-out dispute by showing that it is not after all a zero-sum game. His irenic goal is to do justice to both sides and give each of them most of what it wants. In his subtle paper ‘Abilities, Concepts, and Externalism’ he applies this strategy to the dispute between internalism and externalism in the philosophy of mind. It is a pleasure to engage in discussion with a (...)
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  • On Justifying and Being Justified.Adam Leite - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):219–253.
    We commonly speak of people as being ‘‘justified’’ or ‘‘unjustified’’ in believing as they do. These terms describe a person’s epistemic condition. To be justified in believing as one does is to have a positive epistemic status in virtue of holding one’s belief in a way which fully satisfies the relevant epistemic requirements or norms. This requires something more (or other) than simply believing a proposition whose truth is well-supported by evidence, even by evidence which one possesses oneself, since one (...)
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  • Why Epistemologists Are so Down on Their Luck.Wayne Riggs - 2007 - Synthese 158 (3):329 - 344.
    It is nearly universally acknowledged among epistemologists that a belief, even if true, cannot count as knowledge if it is somehow largely a matter of luck that the person so arrived at the truth. A striking feature of this literature, however, is that while many epistemologists are busy arguing about which particular technical condition most effectively rules out the offensive presence of luck in true believing, almost no one is asking why it matters so much that knowledge be immune from (...)
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  • Prospects for Epistemic Compatibilism.Sven Bernecker - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 130 (1):81-104.
    This paper argues that Sosa’s virtue perspectivism fails to combine satisfactorily internalist and externalist features in a single theory. Internalism and externalism are reconciled at the price of creating a Gettier problem at the level of “reflective” or second-order knowledge. The general lesson to be learned from the critique of virtue perspectivism is that internalism and externalism cannot be combined by bifurcating justification and knowledge into an object-level and a meta-level and assigning externalism and internalism to different levels.
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  • A Trial Separation Between the Theory of Knowledge and the Theory of Justified Belief.Richard Foley - manuscript
    In his 1963 article, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?”1 Edmund Gettier devised a pair of counterexamples designed to illustrate that knowledge cannot be adequately defined as justified true belief. The basic idea behind both of his counterexamples is that one can be justified in believing a falsehood P from which one deduces a truth Q, in which case one has a justified true belief in Q but does not know Q. Gettier’s article inspired numerous other counterexamples, and the search was (...)
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  • Contemporary pyrrhonism.Barry Stroud - 2004 - In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Pyrrhonian Skepticism. Oxford University Press. pp. 174--187.
    Fogelin claims that when he and others reflect on how we disregard uneliminated but eliminable defeaters while making knowledge claims in everyday life, our level of scrutiny rises, and we are inclined to give up those claims to know. This essay responds that a Pyrrhonist should resist this inclination and retain everyday knowledge claims. The possibilities which Fogelin classifies as uneliminated but eliminable defeators are actually eliminated by everyday evidence that we possess. As a result, Pyrrhonism is said to depend (...)
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  • The Skeptics Are Coming! The Skeptics Are Coming!Robert J. Fogelin - 2004 - In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Pyrrhonian Skepticism. Oxford University Press. pp. 161--173.
    This essay explains a Pyrrhonian skepticism in contrast with Cartesian skepticism, and then argues that what externalists and contextualists oppose is only Cartesian skepticism. It contends that externalists and contextualists actually back themselves into a Pyrrhonist position because externalists give up the search for reasons for belief, and contextualists admit that believers have no reasons for their beliefs within epistemological contexts, which is whenever skepticism is at issue.
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  • Virtue-Theoretic Responses to Skepticism.Guy Axtell - 2008 - In John Greco (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism. Oxford University Press.
    This chapter focuses on the responses that proponents of virtue epistemology (VE) make to radical skepticism and particularly to two related forms of it, Pyrrhonian skepticism and the “underdetermination-based” argument, both of which have been receiving widening attention in recent debate. Section 1 of the chapter briefly articulates these two skeptical arguments and their interrelationship, while section 2 explains the close connection between a virtue-theoretic and a neo-Moorean response to them. In sections 3 and 4 I advance arguments for improving (...)
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  • What Are the “Chances” of Being Justified?Wayne D. Riggs - 1998 - The Monist 81 (3):452-472.
    It will startle no one to hear that there is widespread disagreement among philosophers about the nature and criteria of epistemic justification. There are many distinct notions of epistemic justification, distinguished from one another in a bewildering variety of ways. There are internalist justification, externalist justification, coherentist justification, foundationalist justification, deontic justification, consequentialist justification, propositional justification, doxastic justification, personal justification, situational justification, objective justification, subjective justification, cognitive justification, and structural justification. None of these is quite equivalent to another, yet each (...)
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  • Insights and Blindspots of Reliabilism.Robert B. Brandom - 1998 - The Monist 81 (3):371-392.
    One of the most important developments in the theory of knowledge during the past two decades has been a shift in emphasis to concern with issues of the reliability of various processes of belief formation. One way of arriving at beliefs is more reliable than another in a specified set of circumstances just insofar as it is more likely, in those circumstances, to produce a true belief. Classical epistemology, taking its cue from Plato, understood knowledge as justified true belief. While (...)
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  • Knowledge and Varieties of Epistemic Luck.Hamid Vahi - 2001 - Dialectica 55 (4):351-362.
    It is generally thought that knowledge is incompatible with epistemic luck as the post‐Gettier literature makes it abundantly clear. Examples are produced where although a belief is true and justified, it nevertheless falls short of being an instance of knowledge because of the intrusion of luck. Knowledge is regarded as being distinct from lucky guesses. It is, nevertheless, acknowledged by a number of epistemologists that some kind of luck is in fact an inevitable component of the process of knowledge acquisition. (...)
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  • Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?Edmund L. Gettier - 1963 - Analysis 23 (6):121.
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  • Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
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  • Blind Man’s Bluff: The Basic Belief Apologetic as Anti-Skeptical Stratagem.Guy Axtell - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 130 (1):131--152.
    Today we find philosophical naturalists and Christian theists both expressing an interest in virtue epistemology, while starting out from vastly different assumptions. What can be done to increase fruitful dialogue among these divergent groups of virtue-theoretic thinkers? The primary aim of this paper is to uncover more substantial common ground for dialogue by wielding a double-edged critique of certain assumptions shared by `scientific' and `theistic' externalisms, assumptions that undermine proper attention to epistemic agency and responsibility. I employ a responsibilist virtue (...)
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  • Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?Edmund L. Gettier - 1963 - Analysis 23:123-126.
    Russian translation of Gettier E. L. Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? // Analysis, vol. 23, 1963. Translated by Lev Lamberov with kind permission of the author.
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  • How to Preserve Your Virtue While Losing Your Perspective.John Greco - 2004 - In Greco John (ed.), Ernest Sosa and His Critics. pp. 96--105.
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  • Perceptual Knowledge and Epistemological Satisfaction.Barry G. Stroud - 2004 - In John Greco (ed.), Ernest Sosa and His Critics. Malden MA: Blackwell. pp. 165--173.
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  • Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?Edmund L. Gettier - 1963 - Analysis 23 (6):121-123.
    Edmund Gettier is Professor Emeritus at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. This short piece, published in 1963, seemed to many decisively to refute an otherwise attractive analysis of knowledge. It stimulated a renewed effort, still ongoing, to clarify exactly what knowledge comprises.
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  • Epistemic Luck in Light of the Virtues.Guy Axtell - 2001 - In Abrol Fairweather & Linda Zagzebski (eds.), Virtue Epistemology: Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility. Oxford University Press. pp. 158--177.
    The presence of luck in our cognitive as in our moral lives shows that the quality of our intellectual character may not be entirely up to us as individuals, and that our motivation and even our ability to desire the truth, like our moral goodness, can be fragile. This paper uses epistemologists' responses to the problem of “epistemic luck” as a sounding board for this fragility; it locates the source of much of the internalist-externalist debate in epistemology in divergent, value-charged (...)
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  • The Present Dilemma in Philosophy.Guy Axtell - 2006 - Contemporary Pragmatism 3 (1):15-35.
    In opening the Lowell Lectures of 1906 with "The Present Dilemma in Philosophy," William James confounded his audience with the initial thesis that "The history of philosophy is to a great extent that of a certain clash of temperaments." This article revisits James's thesis, using the latitude afforded by his title to describe a different dilemma than he was concerned with in his lecture. Pragmatism can be applied to diagnose the apparently irreconcilable perspectives that give rise to a dilemma about (...)
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  • Knowledge and Its Limits.R. Foley - 2002 - Mind 111 (443):718-726.
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  • Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry Into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge.William P. Alston - 1996 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):197-201.
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  • Character in Epistemology.Jason S. Baehr - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 128 (3):479-514.
    This paper examines the claim made by certain virtue epistemologists that intellectual character virtues like fair-mindedness, open-mindedness and intellectual courage merit an important and fundamental role in epistemology. I begin by considering whether these traits merit an important role in the analysis of knowledge. I argue that they do not and that in fact they are unlikely to be of much relevance to any of the traditional problems in epistemology. This presents a serious challenge for virtue epistemology. I go on (...)
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  • Blind Man’s Bluff: The Basic Belief Apologetic as Anti-Skeptical Stratagem.Guy Axtell - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 130 (1):131-152.
    Today we find philosophical naturalists and Christian theists both expressing an interest in virtue epistemology, while starting out from vastly different assumptions. What can be done to increase fruitful dialogue among these divergent groups of virtue-theoretic thinkers? The primary aim of this paper is to uncover more substantial common ground for dialogue by wielding a double-edged critique of certain assumptions shared by 'scientific' and 'theistic' externalisms, assumptions that undermine proper attention to epistemic agency and responsibility. I employ a responsibilist virtue (...)
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  • 'Two False Dichotomies: Foundationalism/Coherentism and Internalism/Externalism'.Ernest Sosa - 2004 - In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Pyrrhonian Skepticism. Oxford University Press. pp. 146--160.
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  • Thin Concepts to the Rescue: Thinning the Concepts of Epistemic Justification and Intellectual Virtue.Heather Battaly - 2001 - In Abrol Fairweather & Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (eds.), Virtue Epistemology: Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility. Oxford University Press. pp. 98--116.
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