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  1. The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1954 - Wiley Publications in Statistics.
    Classic analysis of the subject and the development of personal probability; one of the greatest controversies in modern statistcal thought.
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  • Truth and Probability.F. Ramsey - 1926 - In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. Routledge. pp. 52-94.
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  • The Logic of Decision.Richard C. Jeffrey - 1965 - New York, NY, USA: University of Chicago Press.
    "[This book] proposes new foundations for the Bayesian principle of rational action, and goes on to develop a new logic of desirability and probabtility."—Frederic Schick, _Journal of Philosophy_.
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  • An Expected Utility Theory for State-Dependent Preferences.Edi Karni & David Schmeidler - 2016 - Theory and Decision 81 (4):467-478.
    This note is a generalization and improved interpretation of the main result of Karni and Schmeidler. A decision-maker is supposed to possess a preference relation on acts and another preference relation on state-prize lotteries, both of which are assumed to satisfy the von Neumann–Morgenstern axioms. In addition, the two preference relations restricted to a state of nature are assumed to agree. We show that these axioms are necessary and sufficient for the existence of subjective expected utility over acts with state-dependent (...)
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  • Do Bets Reveal Beliefs?Jean Baccelli - 2017 - Synthese 194 (9):3393-3419.
    This paper examines the preference-based approach to the identification of beliefs. It focuses on the main problem to which this approach is exposed, namely that of state-dependent utility. First, the problem is illustrated in full detail. Four types of state-dependent utility issues are distinguished. Second, a comprehensive strategy for identifying beliefs under state-dependent utility is presented and discussed. For the problem to be solved following this strategy, however, preferences need to extend beyond choices. We claim that this a necessary feature (...)
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  • De Finetti Was Right: Probability Does Not Exist.Robert F. Nau - 2001 - Theory and Decision 51 (2/4):89-124.
    De Finetti's treatise on the theory of probability begins with the provocative statement PROBABILITY DOES NOT EXIST, meaning that probability does not exist in an objective sense. Rather, probability exists only subjectively within the minds of individuals. De Finetti defined subjective probabilities in terms of the rates at which individuals are willing to bet money on events, even though, in principle, such betting rates could depend on state-dependent marginal utility for money as well as on beliefs. Most later authors, from (...)
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  • Foundations of Contemporary Revealed Preference Theory.D. Wade Hands - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (5):1081-1108.
    This paper examines methodological issues raised by revealed preference theory in economics: particularly contemporary revealed preference theory. The paper has three goals. First, to make the case that revealed preference theory is a broad research program in choice theory—not a single theory—and understanding this diversity is essential to any methodological analysis of the program. Second, to explore some of the existing criticisms of revealed preference theory in a way that emphasizes how the effectiveness of the critique depends on the particular (...)
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  • On Indeterminate Probabilities.Isaac Levi - 1974 - Journal of Philosophy 71 (13):391-418.
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  • The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory.James M. Joyce - 1999 - Cambridge University Press.
    This book defends the view that any adequate account of rational decision making must take a decision maker's beliefs about causal relations into account. The early chapters of the book introduce the non-specialist to the rudiments of expected utility theory. The major technical advance offered by the book is a 'representation theorem' that shows that both causal decision theory and its main rival, Richard Jeffrey's logic of decision, are both instances of a more general conditional decision theory. The book solves (...)
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  • Studies in Subjective Probability.Henry Ely Kyburg (ed.) - 1964 - Krieger.
    Truth and probability; Foresight: its logical laws, its subjective sources; The bases of probability; Subjective probability as the measure of a non-measurable set; The elicitation of personal probabilities; Probability: beware of falsifications; Probable knowledge.
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  • The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory.Isaac Levi & James M. Joyce - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (7):387.
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  • Risk and Rationality.Lara Buchak - 2013 - Oxford University Press.
    Lara Buchak sets out a new account of rational decision-making in the face of risk. She argues that the orthodox view is too narrow, and suggests an alternative, more permissive theory: one that allows individuals to pay attention to the worst-case or best-case scenario, and vindicates the ordinary decision-maker.
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  • The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1956 - Philosophy of Science 23 (2):166-166.
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  • Ramsey’s Representation Theorem.Richard Bradley - 2004 - Dialectica 58 (4):483–497.
    This paper reconstructs and evaluates the representation theorem presented by Ramsey in his essay 'Truth and Probability', showing how its proof depends on a novel application of Hölder's theory of measurement. I argue that it must be understood as a solution to the problem of measuring partial belief, a solution that in many ways remains unsurpassed. Finally I show that the method it employs may be interpreted in such a way as to avoid a well known objection to it due (...)
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  • The Logic of Decision.Henry E. Kyberg - 1968 - Philosophical Review 77 (2):250.
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  • La Prévision: Ses Lois Logiques, Ses Sources Subjectives.Bruno de Finetti - 1937 - Annales de l'Institut Henri Poincaré 17:1-68.
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  • Revealed Preference, Belief, and Game Theory.Daniel M. Hausman - 2000 - Economics and Philosophy 16 (1):99-115.
    The notion of ‘revealed preference’ is unclear and should be abandoned. Defenders of the theory of revealed preference have misinterpreted legitimate concerns about the testability of economics as the demand that economists eschew reference to (unobservable) subjective states. As attempts to apply revealed-preference theory to game theory illustrate with particular vividness, this demand is mistaken.
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  • State-Dependent Utility.Edi Karni - 2009 - In Paul Anand, Prasanta Pattanaik & Clemens Puppe (eds.), Handbook of Rational and Social Choice. Oxford University Press.
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  • The Effect of Exchange Rates on Statistical Decisions.Mark J. Schervish, Teddy Seidenfeld & Joseph B. Kadane - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (4):504-532.
    Statistical decision theory, whether based on Bayesian principles or other concepts such as minimax or admissibility, relies on minimizing expected loss or maximizing expected utility. Loss and utility functions are generally treated as unit-less numerical measures of value for consequences. Here, we address the issue of the units in which loss and utility are settled and the implications that those units have on the rankings of potential decisions. When multiple currencies are available for paying the loss, one must take explicit (...)
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  • The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1959 - Synthese 11 (1):86-89.
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  • Hard Choices: Decision Making Under Unresolved Conflict.Isaac Levi - 1991 - Mind 100 (2):297-300.
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  • Subjective Probability and Expected Utility Without Additivity.David Schmeidler - 1989 - Econometrica 57:571-589.
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  • On Indeterminate Probabilities.Isaac Levi - 1978 - In A. Hooker, J. J. Leach & E. F. McClennen (eds.), Journal of Philosophy. D. Reidel. pp. 233--261.
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  • State-Dependent Utilities.Mark J. Schervish, Teddy Seidenfeld & Joseph B. Kadane - unknown
    Several axiom systems for preference among acts lead to a unique probability and a state-independent utility such that acts are ranked according to their expected utilities. These axioms have been used as a foundation for Bayesian decision theory and subjective probability calculus. In this article we note that the uniqueness of the probability is relative to the choice of whatcounts as a constant outcome. Although it is sometimes clear what should be considered constant, in many cases there are several possible (...)
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