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Dual‐Aspect Monism

Philosophical Investigations 39 (4):335-352 (2016)

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  1. Philosophy of Mind.Alex Byrne & Jaegwon Kim - 1998 - Philosophical Review 107 (1):113.
    In the preface, Kim writes hopefully that his introduction to the philosophy of mind is “intended to be accessible to those without a formal background in philosophy”. The blurb at the end is more realistic: Philosophy of Mind is “a textbook for upper-level undergraduates and graduate students”. It is an admirable addition to Westview’s excellent Dimensions of Philosophy series. Brisk, workmanlike chapters profile the usual suspects: behaviorism, the identity theory, mind as computer and as causal structure, mental causation, consciousness, mental (...)
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  • Four Dimensionalism.Theodore Sider - 1997 - Philosophical Review 106 (2):197-231.
    Persistence through time is like extension through space. A road has spatial parts in the subregions of the region of space it occupies; likewise, an object that exists in time has temporal parts in the various subregions of the total region of time it occupies. This view — known variously as four dimensionalism, the doctrine of temporal parts, and the theory that objects “perdure” — is opposed to “three dimensionalism”, the doctrine that things “endure”, or are “wholly present”.1 I will (...)
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  • Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
    Challenging, with several powerful arguments, some of our deepest beliefs about rationality, morality, and personal identity, Parfit claims that we have a false view about our own nature. It is often rational to act against our own best interersts, he argues, and most of us have moral views that are self-defeating. We often act wrongly, although we know there will be no one with serious grounds for complaint, and when we consider future generations it is very hard to avoid conclusions (...)
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  • The Analysis of Mind.Bertrand Russell - 1921 - Duke University Press.
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  • Realistic Monism - Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism.Galen Strawson - 2006 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11):3-31.
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  • The Real Combination Problem}: Panpsychism, Micro-Subjects, and Emergence.Sam Coleman - 2013 - Erkenntnis (1):1-26.
    Taking their motivation from the perceived failure of the reductive physicalist project concerning consciousness, panpsychists ascribe subjectivity to fundamental material entities in order to account for macro-consciousness. But there exists an unresolved tension within the mainstream panpsychist position, the seriousness of which has yet to be appreciated. I capture this tension as a dilemma, and offer advice to panpsychists on how to resolve it. The dilemma is as follows: Panpsychists take the micro-material realm to feature phenomenal properties, plus micro-subjects to (...)
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  • The Principles of Psychology.William James - 1890 - Dover Publications.
    This first volume contains discussions of the brain, methods for analyzing behavior, thought, consciousness, attention, association, time, and memory.
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  • Why Panpsychism Doesn’T Help Us Explain Consciousness.Philip Goff - 2009 - Dialectica 63 (3):289-311.
    This paper starts from the assumption that panpsychism is counterintuitive and metaphysically demanding. A number of philosophers, whilst not denying these negative aspects of the view, think that panpsychism has in its favour that it offers a good explanation of consciousness. In opposition to this, the paper argues that panpsychism cannot help us to explain consciousness, at least not the kind of consciousness we have pre-theoretical reason to believe in.
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  • Philosophy of Mind.Jaegwon Kim - 1996 - Westview Press.
    The philosophy of mind has always been a staple of the philosophy curriculum. But it has never held a more important place than it does today, with both traditional problems and new topics often sparked by the developments in the psychological, cognitive, and computer sciences. Jaegwon Kim’s Philosophy of Mind is the classic, comprehensive survey of the subject. Now in its second edition, Kim explores, maps, and interprets this complex and exciting terrain. Designed as an introduction to the field for (...)
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  • Personal Identity.Derek Parfit - 1971 - Philosophical Review 80 (January):3-27.
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  • Consciousness and its Place in Nature.David J. Chalmers - 2003 - In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. pp. 102--142.
    Consciousness fits uneasily into our conception of the natural world. On the most common conception of nature, the natural world is the physical world. But on the most common conception of consciousness, it is not easy to see how it could be part of the physical world. So it seems that to find a place for consciousness within the natural order, we must either revise our conception of consciousness, or revise our conception of nature. In twentieth-century philosophy, this dilemma is (...)
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  • ‘The Self’.Galen Strawson - 1997 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (5-6):405-428.
    Recommends an approach to the philosophical problem about the existence and nature of the self in which the author models the problem of the self rather than attempting to model the self. It is suggested that the sense of the self is the source in experience of the philosophical problem of the self. The first question to ask is the phenomenological question: What is the nature of the sense of the self? But this, in the first instance, is best taken (...)
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  • The Philosophy of Logical Atomism.Bertrand Russell - 1940 - Open Court.
    THE PHILOSOPHY which I advocate is generally regarded as a species of realism, and accused of inconsistency because of the elements in it which seem contrary to that doctrine. For my part, I do not regard the issue between realists and their opponents as a funda- mental one; I could alter my view on this issue without changing my mind as to any of the doctrines upon which I wish to lay stress. I hold that logic is what is fundamental (...)
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  • Stream of Consciousness: Unity and Continuity in Conscious Experience.Barry Dainton - 2000 - Routledge.
    _Stream of Consciousness_ is about the phenomenology of conscious experience. Barry Dainton shows us that stream of consciousness is not a mosaic of discrete fragments of experience, but rather an interconnected flowing whole. Through a deep probing into the nature of awareness, introspection, phenomenal space and time consciousness, Dainton offers a truly original understanding of the nature of consciousness.
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  • The Analysis of Mind.Warner Fite - 1922 - Philosophical Review 31 (3):298.
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  • The Principles of Psychology.William James - 1890 - The Monist 1:284.
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  • The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness.Edmund Husserl & Martin Heidegger - 1964 - University Microfilms International.
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  • From an Ontological Point of View.John Heil - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
    From an Ontological Point of View is a highly original and accessible exploration of fundamental questions about what there is. John Heil discusses such issues as whether the world includes levels of reality; the nature of objects and properties; the demands of realism; what makes things true; qualities, powers, and the relation these bear to one another. He advances an account of the fundamental constituents of the world around us, and applies this account to problems that have plagued recent work (...)
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  • Naming the Stages.Achille C. Varzi - 2003 - Dialectica 57 (4):387-412.
    Standard lore has it that a proper name, or a definite description on its de re reading, is a temporally rigid designator. It picks out the same entity at every time at which it picks out an entity at all. If the entity in question is an enduring continuant then we know what this means, though we are also stuck with a host of metaphysical puzzles concerning endurance itself. If the entity in question is a perdurant then the rigidity claim (...)
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  • Four Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time.Theodore Sider - 2001 - Oxford University Press.
    Four- Dimensionalism defends the thesis that the material world is composed of temporal as well as spatial parts. This defense includes a novel account of persistence over time, new arguments in favour of the four-dimensional ontology, and responses to the challenges four- dimensionalism faces." "Theodore Sider pays particular attention to the philosophy of time, including a strong series of arguments against presentism, the thesis that only the present is real. Arguments offered in favour of four- dimensionalism include novel arguments based (...)
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  • Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism.Galen Strawson - 2006 - In A. Freeman (ed.), Consciousness and its place in nature: does physicalism entail panpsychism? pp. 3-31.
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  • I Am a Lot of Things: A Pluralistic Account of the Self.Jiri Benovsky - 2014 - Metaphysica 15 (1).
    When I say that I am a lot of things, I mean it literally and metaphysically speaking. The Self, or so I shall argue, is a plurality (notwithstanding the fact that ordinary language takes "the Self" to be a singular term – but, after all, language is only language). It is not a substance or a substratum, and it is not a collection or a bundle. The view I wish to advocate for is a kind of reductionism, in line with (...)
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  • The Principles of Psychology.William James - 1890 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 11 (3):506-507.
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  • Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
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  • Scientific Thought.Harold Chapman Brown - 1923 - Journal of Philosophy 20 (25):689-692.
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  • The Stage View and Temporary Intrinsics.Theodore Sider - 2000 - Analysis 60 (1):84 - 88.
    According to four dimensionalism, the material world is divided into momentary stages. In a four-dimensional world, which objects are the ordinary things, the things we normally name and quantify over? Aggregates of stages, according to most four-dimensionalists, but according to stage theorists (or exdurantists), ordinary objects are instead to be identified with the stages themselves. (A temporal counterpart theoretic account of de re temporal predication is then given.) This paper argues that a stage theorist is best positioned to accept David (...)
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  • The 'Intrinsic Nature' Argument for Panpsychism.William E. Seager - 2006 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11):129-145.
    Strawson’s case in favor of panpsychism is at heart an updated version of a venerable form of argument I’ll call the ‘intrinsic nature’ argument. It is an extremely interesting argument which deploys all sorts of high caliber metaphysical weaponry (despite the ‘down home’ appeals to common sense which Strawson frequently makes). The argument is also subtle and intricate. So let’s spend some time trying to articulate its general form.
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  • The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness.C. W. K. Mundle - 1966 - Philosophical Quarterly 16 (63):185-186.
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  • The Self and the SESMET.Galen Strawson - 2002 - In Journal of Consciousness Studies. Thorverton Uk: Imprint Academic. pp. 99-135.
    Response to commentaries on keynote article.
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  • Naming the Stages.Achille C. Varzi - 2003 - Dialectica 57 (4):387–412.
    Standard lore has it that a proper name is a temporally rigid designator. It picks out the same entity at every time at which it picks out an entity at all. If the entity in question is an enduring continuant then we know what this means, though we are also stuck with a host of metaphysical puzzles concerning endurance itself. If the entity in question is a perdurant then the rigidity claim is trivial, though one is left wondering how it (...)
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  • From an Ontological Point of View.Crawford L. Elder - 2004 - Mind 113 (452):757-760.
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  • From an Ontological Point of View.John Heil - 2003 - Philosophy 79 (309):491-494.
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  • The Philosophy of Logical Atomism, Lectures 7-8.Bertrand Russell - 1919 - The Monist 29 (3):345-380.
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  • Time and Tense in Perceptual Experience.Christoph Hoerl - 2009 - Philosophers' Imprint 9:1-18.
    We can not just see, hear or feel how things are at a time, but we also have perceptual experiences as of things moving or changing. I argue that such temporal experiences have a content that is tenseless, i.e. best characterized in terms of notions such as 'before' and 'after' (rather than, say, 'past', 'present' and 'future'), and that such experiences are essentially of the nature of a process that takes up time, viz., the same time as the process that (...)
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  • Why Panpsychism Doesn't Help Us Explain Consciousness.Philip Goff - 2009 - Dialectica 63 (3):289-311.
    This paper starts from the assumption that panpsychism is counterintuitive and metaphysically demanding. A number of philosophers, whilst not denying these negative aspects of the view, think that panpsychism has in its favour that it offers a good explanation of consciousness. In opposition to this, the paper argues that panpsychism cannot help us to explain consciousness, at least not the kind of consciousness we have pre‐theoretical reason to believe in.
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  • Time in Experience: Reply to Gallagher.Barry F. Dainton - 2003 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 9.
    Consciousness exists in time, but time is also to be found within consciousness: we are directly aware of both persistence and change, at least over short intervals. On reflection this can seem baffling. How is it possible for us to be immediately aware of phenomena which are not (strictly speaking) present? What must consciousness be like for this to be possible? In "Stream of Consciousness" I argued that influential accounts of phenomenal temporality along the lines developed by Broad and Husserl (...)
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  • The Self and the SESMET.G. Strawson - 1999 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (4):99-135.
    Response to commentaries on keynote article.
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  • Indiscriminability and Experience of Change.Ian Phillips - 2011 - Philosophical Quarterly 61 (245):808 - 827.
    It is obvious both that some changes are too small for us to perceive and that we can perceive constant motion. Yet according to Fara, these two facts are in conflict, and one must be rejected. I show that conflict arises only from accepting a `zoëtrope conception' of change experience, according to which change experience is analysed in terms of a series of very short-lived sensory atoms, each lacking in dynamic content. On pain of denying the phenomenologically obvious, we must (...)
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