This chapter argues in favour of three interrelated points. First, I argue that demonstration (as expression of scientific knowledge) is fundamentally defined as knowledge of the appropriate cause for a given explanandum: to have scientific knowledge of the explanandum is to explain it through its fully appropriate cause. Secondly, I stress that Aristotle’s notion of cause has a “triadic” structure, which fundamentally depends on the predicative formulation (or “regimentation”) of the explanandum. Thirdly, I argue that what has motivated Aristotle to (...) choose the syllogism as a demonstrative tool was precisely the fact that syllogisms are apt to express causal relations in their triadic structure. Instead of complaining against Aristotle’s preference for the syllogisms as demonstrative tools, I argue that Aristotle was fully aware of the advantages of regimenting the explanandum into a predication. One of these advantages is to abandon a purely extensional standpoint and to highlight the importance of the notion of relevancy in explanation. (shrink)

Collective volume with papers by alumni and students from the Campinas Aristotle Group.

THE PROTAGONISTS David Sedley The primary object of this historical introduction1 is to enable a reader encountering Hellenistic philosophy for the first ...

Me propongo ofrecer una interpretación unificada de la metodología aristotélica y mostrar que ella se integra en un empirismo híbrido en el cual se combina la doble naturaleza de los phainomena , hechos observacionales y creencias comunes. Polemizaré con la lectura coherentista de la prueba dialéctica de consistencia que se expresa en EN VII 1, y trataré de aclarar qué uso hace Aristóteles de aquella doble fuente de sus investigaciones en algunos textos de ciencia natural ( Ph . IV 4).

I reconstruct Aristotle's epistemology and scientific methodology avoiding some problems which, in my opinion, are attributed to them from inadequate interpretations in terms of foundationalism or coherentism. On the contrary, I credit Aristotle with a hybrid concept of empiricism in which our knowledge is made possible through the integration of two different but cooperative factors: observations and beliefs. By clarifying the implications of Aristotle's concept of experience and the basis for the elaboration of scientific knowledge, I try to give an (...) alternative account of Aristotle's vindication of a positive use of dialectic in science, as well as to show that an integration between dialectical examination of beliefs and scientific analysis of facts is possible and it also gives a plausible methodological image of Aristotle's theory. According to my proposal, some opinions play a conceptual role in the empirical basis of knowledge. But, for Aristotle, this does not amount to any more than a kind of knowledge of the facts, not being equivalent to a scientific knowledge of the causes. Finally, I try to show that within this complex epistemological framework Aristotle's use of induction could also be given an adequate explanation. (shrink)

I reconstruct Aristotle's epistemology and scientific methodology avoiding some problems which, in my opinion, are attributed to them from inadequate interpretations in terms of foundationalism or coherentism. On the contrary, I credit Aristotle with a hybrid concept of empiricism in which our knowledge is made possible through the integration of two different but cooperative factors: observations and beliefs. By clarifying the implications of Aristotle's concept of experience and the basis for the elaboration of scientific knowledge, I try to give an (...) alternative account of Aristotle's vindication of a positive use of dialectic in science, as well as to show that an integration between dialectical examination of beliefs and scientific analysis of facts is possible and it also gives a plausible methodological image of Aristotle's theory. According to my proposal, some opinions play a conceptual role in the empirical basis of knowledge. But, for Aristotle, this does not amount to any more than a kind of knowledge of the facts, not being equivalent to a scientific knowledge of the causes. Finally, I try to show that within this complex epistemological framework Aristotle's use of induction could also be given an adequate explanation. (shrink)

Exploring Aristotle's philosophical method and the merits of his conclusions, Irwin here shows how Aristotle defends dialectic against the objection that it cannot justify a metaphysical realist's claims. He focuses particularly on Aristotle's metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of mind, and ethics, stressing the connections between doctrines that are often discussed separately.

David Charles presents a major new study of Aristotle's views on meaning, essence, necessity, and related topics. These interconnected views are central to Aristotle's metaphysics, philosophy of language, and philosophy of science, and are also highly relevant to current philosophical debates. Charles aims to reach a clear understanding of Aristotle's claims and arguments, to assess their truth, and to evaluate their importance to ancient and modern philosophy.

In addition to being one of the world's most influential philosophers, Aristotle can also be credited with the creation of both the science of biology and the philosophy of biology. He was the first thinker to treat the investigations of the living world as a distinct inquiry with its own special concepts and principles. This book focuses on a seminal event in the history of biology - Aristotle's delineation of a special branch of theoretical knowledge devoted to the systematic investigation (...) of animals. Aristotle approached the creation of zoology with the tools of subtle and systematic philosophies of nature and of science that were then carefully tailored to the investigation of animals. The papers collected in this volume, written by a pre-eminent figure in the field of Aristotle's philosophy and biology, examine Aristotle's approach to biological inquiry and explanation, his concepts of matter, form and kind, and his teleology. (shrink)

This work examines Aristotle's discussions of definition in his logical works and the Metaphysics, and argues for the importance of definitions of simple ...

I have two aims in this paper. First, I argue that, in Aristotle’s theory of the four causes, there is a basic and common feature by which all causes are causes: they all work in a triadic framework in which they explain why a given attribute holds of a given underlying thing. Secondly, I argue against a version of “compatibilism” according to which each kind of cause is complete in its own domain and does not compete with any other kind. (...) I claim that there are priority relations according to which some kinds of cause are subordinated to others, even if these relations do not hold in every cases. (shrink)

En este artículo se discute la relación entre silogismo y demostración con respecto al concepto aristotélico del conocimiento científico formulado en los Analíticos segundos. La argumentación sigue tres líneas principales: (i) se ofrecen razones para rechazar la relegación de la sistematización silogística a la instancia postrera de justificación y exposición didáctica del conocimiento previamente adquirido. Como respuesta alternativa, (ii) se muestra que una explicación aristotélica necesita la silogística en virtud del papel que desempeña la causa como término medio silogístico. En (...) consecuencia, debería estar en condiciones de (iii) sostener que no resulta factible establecer firmemente los principios propios como premisas explicativas sin construir silogismos. This article focuses on the relation between syllogism and demonstration, as related to Aristotle's concept of scientific knowledge in his Posterior Analytics. Three main lines of argumentation are followed: (i) reasons are given to reject that syllogistic systematization plays a unique role as a skill for justification and didactic proof of a body of knowledge previously acquired. Alternatively, (ii) it is showed that an Aristotelian explanation requires syllogistic as to the role of cause as middle syllogistic term. Thus, it should be feasible (iii) to sustain that it is not possible to firmly establish proper principles as explanative premises without constructing syllogisms. (shrink)