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  1. Reference and Consciousness.John Campbell - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2):490-494.
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  • Making the Social World: The Structure of Human Civilization.John Searle - 2010 - Oxford University Press UK.
    The renowned philosopher John Searle reveals the fundamental nature of social reality. What kinds of things are money, property, governments, nations, marriages, cocktail parties, and football games? Searle explains the key role played by language in the creation, constitution, and maintenance of social reality. We make statements about social facts that are completely objective, for example: Barack Obama is President of the United States, the piece of paper in my hand is a twenty-dollar bill, I got married in London, etc. (...)
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  • On Social Facts.Margaret Gilbert - 1989 - Routledge.
    This book offers original accounts of a number of central social phenomena, many of which have received little if any prior philosophical attention. These phenomena include social groups, group languages, acting together, collective belief, mutual recognition, and social convention. In the course of developing her analyses Gilbert discusses the work of Emile Durkheim, Georg Simmel, Max Weber, David Lewis, among others.
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  • On Social Facts.Margaret Gilbert - 1989 - Ethics 102 (4):853-856.
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  • Joint Intention, We-Mode and I-Mode.Raimo Tuomela - 2006 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30 (1):35–58.
    The central topic of this paper is to study joint intention to perform a joint action or to bring about a certain state. Here are some examples of such joint action: You and I share the plan to carry a heavy table jointly upstairs and realize this plan, we sing a duet together, we clean up our backyard together, and I cash a check by acting jointly with you, a bank teller, and finally we together elect a new president for (...)
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  • Functional Imaging of 'Theory of Mind'.Helen L. Gallagher & Christopher D. Frith - 2003 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (2):77-83.
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  • Personal Identity and Dead People.David Mackie - 1999 - Philosophical Studies 95 (3):219-242.
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  • The Shared Circuits Model. How Control, Mirroring, and Simulation Can Enable Imitation and Mind Reading.Susan L. Hurley - 2008 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (1):1-22.
    Imitation, deliberation, and mindreading are characteristically human sociocognitive skills. Research on imitation and its role in social cognition is flourishing across various disciplines; it is here surveyed under headings of behavior, subpersonal mechanisms, and functions of imitation. A model is then advanced within which many of the developments surveyed can be located and explained. The shared circuits model explains how imitation, deliberation, and mindreading can be enabled by subpersonal mechanisms of control, mirroring and simulation. It is cast at a middle, (...)
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  • Is Collective Intentionality Really Primitive?Elisabeth Pacherie - unknown
    This paper offers a critical discussion of Searle's account of collective intentionality. It argues Bratman's alternative account avoids some of the shortcomings of Searle's account, over-intellectualizes collective intentionality and imposes an excessive cognitive burden on participating agents.Tthe capacities needed to sustain collective intentionality are examined in an attempt to show that we can preserve the gist of Bratman's account in a cognitively more parsimonious way.
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  • Toward an Explanatory Framework for Mental Ownership.Timothy Lane - 2012 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (2):251-286.
    Philosophical and scientific investigations of the proprietary aspects of self—mineness or mental ownership—often presuppose that searching for unique constituents is a productive strategy. But there seem not to be any unique constituents. Here, it is argued that the “self-specificity” paradigm, which emphasizes subjective perspective, fails. Previously, it was argued that mode of access also fails to explain mineness. Fortunately, these failures, when leavened by other findings (those that exhibit varieties and vagaries of mineness), intimate an approach better suited to searching (...)
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  • Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory.Uriah Kriegel - 2009 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Some mental events are conscious, some are unconscious. What is the difference between the two? Uriah Kriegel offers an answer. His aim is a comprehensive theory of the features that all and only conscious mental events have. The key idea is that consciousness arises when self-awareness and world-awareness are integrated in the right way. Conscious mental events differ from unconscious ones in that, whatever else they may represent, they always also represent themselves, and do so in a very specific way. (...)
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  • Agency, Simulation and Self-Identification.Marc Jeannerod & Elisabeth Pacherie - 2004 - Mind and Language 19 (2):113-146.
    This paper is concerned with the problem of selfidentification in the domain of action. We claim that this problem can arise not just for the self as object, but also for the self as subject in the ascription of agency. We discuss and evaluate some proposals concerning the mechanisms involved in selfidentification and in agencyascription, and their possible impairments in pathological cases. We argue in favor of a simulation hypothesis that claims that actions, whether overt or covert, are centrally simulated (...)
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  • How Does It Feel to Act Together?Elisabeth Pacherie - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (1):25-46.
    This paper on the phenomenology of joint agency proposes a foray into a little explored territory at the intersection of two very active domains of research: joint action and sense of agency. I explore two ways in which our experience of joint agency may differ from our experience of individual agency. First, the mechanisms of action specification and control involved in joint action are typically more complex than those present in individual actions, since it is crucial for joint action that (...)
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  • Self-Projection and the Brain.Randy L. Buckner & Daniel C. Carroll - 2007 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 11 (2):49-57.
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  • Joint Commitment: How We Make the Social World.Margaret Gilbert - 2013 - Oup Usa.
    This new essay collection by distinguished philosopher Margaret Gilbert provides a richly textured argument for the importance of joint commitment in our personal and public lives. Topics covered by this diverse range of essays range from marital love to patriotism, from promissory obligation to the unity of the European Union.
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  • Agency, Simulation and Self‐identification.Marc Jeannerod & Elisabeth Pacherie - 2004 - Mind and Language 19 (2):113-146.
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  • The Phenomenal Self.Barry Dainton - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
    Barry Dainton presents a fascinating new account of the self, the key to which is experiential or phenomenal continuity. Provided our mental life continues we can easily imagine ourselves surviving the most dramatic physical alterations, or even moving from one body to another. It was this fact that led John Locke to conclude that a credible account of our persistence conditions - an account which reflects how we actually conceive of ourselves - should be framed in terms of mental rather (...)
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  • On Social Facts.Michael Root - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (3):675.
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  • The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness.Mark Johnson - 2001 - Journal of Speculative Philosophy 15 (4):323-326.
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  • Ideen Zu Einer Reinen Phänomenologie Und Phänomenologischen Philosophie, Erstes Buch, Allgemeine Einführung in Die Reine Phänomenologie.L. O. Kattsoff - 1951 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 12 (1):139-139.
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  • Summary of "Elements of Mind" and Replies to Critics.Tim Crane - 2004 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (11):223-240.
    Elements of Mind (EM) has two themes, one major and one minor. The major theme is intentionality, the mind’s direction upon its objects; the other is the mind–body problem. I treat these themes separately: chapters 1, and 3–5 are concerned with intentionality, while chapter 2 is about the mind–body problem. In this summary I will first describe my view of the mind–body problem, and then describe the book’s main theme. Like many philosophers, I see the mind–body problem as containing two (...)
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  • The Unity of Consciousness: Subjects and Objectivity.Elizabeth Schechter - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (2):671-692.
    This paper concerns the role that reference to subjects of experience can play in individuating streams of consciousness, and the relationship between the subjective and the objective structure of consciousness. A critique of Tim Bayne’s recent book indicates certain crucial choices that works on the unity of consciousness must make. If one identifies the subject of experience with something whose consciousness is necessarily unified, then one cannot offer an account of the objective structure of consciousness. Alternatively, identifying the subject of (...)
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  • Plural Self-Awareness.Hans Bernhard Schmid - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (1):7-24.
    It has been claimed in the literature that collective intentionality and group attitudes presuppose some “sense of ‘us’” among the participants (other labels sometimes used are “sense of community,” “communal awareness,” “shared point of view,” or “we-perspective”). While this seems plausible enough on an intuitive level, little attention has been paid so far to the question of what the nature and role of this mysterious “sense of ‘us’” might be. This paper states (and argues for) the following five claims: (1) (...)
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  • B. Dainton: The Phenomenal Self. [REVIEW]Peter R. King - 2009 - Erkenntnis 71 (2):283-288.
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  • Logische Untersuchungen.Edmund Husserl (ed.) - 1900 - Felix Meiner Verlag.
    Husserl war ursprünglich davon ausgegangen, dass die Logik die Aufklärung ihrer eigenen Grundlagen aus der Psychologie zu erwarten habe. Fragen und Zweifel, wie sich die unbestreitbare Objektivität und strenge Allgemeingültigkeit logischer Wahrheiten denn psychologisch begreifen lasse, führten ihn jedoch aus dem Bannkreis solcher Begründungsversuche heraus: Mit seinen "Prolegomena zur reinen Logik", dem ersten Teilband der "Logischen Untersuchungen", legte Husserl 1900 eine kritische Abrechnung mit dem logischen Psychologismus vor, deren Ergebnisse bis heute unbestritten sind.In den sechs Detailstudien des zweiten Teilbandes findet (...)
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  • A Naturalistic Argument for the Irreducibility of Collective Intentionality.Mattia Gallotti - 2012 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 42 (1):3-30.
    According to many philosophers and scientists, human sociality is explained by our unique capacity to “share” attitudes with others. The conditions under which mental states are shared have been widely debated in the past two decades, focusing especially on the issue of their reducibility to individual intentionality and the place of collective intentions in the natural realm. It is not clear, however, to what extent these two issues are related and what methodologies of investigation are appropriate in each case. In (...)
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  • Origins of Human Communication.Michael Tomasello - 2008 - MIT Press.
    In this original and provocative account of the evolutionary origins of human communication, Michael Tomasello connects the fundamentally cooperative structure of human communication (initially discovered by Paul Grice) to the especially ...
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  • The Construction of Social Reality.John Searle - 1995 - Free Press.
    In The Construction of Social Reality, John Searle argues that there are two kinds of facts--some that are independent of human observers, and some that require..
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  • The Construction of Social Reality. Anthony Freeman in Conversation with John Searle.J. Searle & A. Freeman - 1995 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (2):180-189.
    John Searle began to discuss his recently published book `The Construction of Social Reality' with Anthony Freeman, and they ended up talking about God. The book itself and part of their conversation are introduced and briefly reflected upon by Anthony Freeman. Many familiar social facts -- like money and marriage and monarchy -- are only facts by human agreement. They exist only because we believe them to exist. That is the thesis, at once startling yet obvious, that philosopher John Searle (...)
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  • [Handout 12].J. L. Mackie - unknown
    1. Causal knowledge is an indispensable element in science. Causal assertions are embedded in both the results and the procedures of scientific investigation. 2. It is therefore worthwhile to investigate the meaning of causal statements and the ways in which we can arrive at causal knowledge.
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  • Why Not the First-Person Plural in Social Cognition?Mattia Gallotti - 2013 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (4):422-423.
    Through the mental alignment that sustains social interactions, the minds of individuals are shared. One interpretation of shared intentionality involves the ability of individuals to perceive features of the action scene from the perspective of the group. This first-person plural approach in social cognition is distinct from and preferable to the second-person approach proposed in the target article.
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  • The Shared Circuits Model (SCM): How Control, Mirroring, and Simulation Can Enable Imitation, Deliberation, and Mindreading.Susan Hurley - 2008 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (1):1-22.
    Imitation, deliberation, and mindreading are characteristically human sociocognitive skills. Research on imitation and its role in social cognition is flourishing across various disciplines. Imitation is surveyed in this target article under headings of behavior, subpersonal mechanisms, and functions of imitation. A model is then advanced within which many of the developments surveyed can be located and explained. The shared circuits model (SCM) explains how imitation, deliberation, and mindreading can be enabled by subpersonal mechanisms of control, mirroring, and simulation. It is (...)
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  • Self and Other: Exploring Subjectivity, Empathy, and Shame.Dan Zahavi - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
    Dan Zahavi engages with classical phenomenology, philosophy of mind, and a range of empirical disciplines to explore the nature of selfhood. He argues that the most fundamental level of selfhood is not socially constructed or dependent upon others, but accepts that certain dimensions of the self and types of self-experience are other-mediated.
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  • Wittgenstein Running: Neural Mechanisms of Collective Intentionality and We-Mode.Cristina Becchio & Cesare Bertone - 2004 - Consciousness and Cognition 13 (1):123-133.
    In this paper we discuss the problem of the neural conditions of shared attitudes and intentions: which neural mechanisms underlie “we-mode” processes or serve as precursors to such processes? Neurophysiological and neuropsychological evidence suggests that in different areas of the brain neural representations are shared by several individuals. This situation, on the one hand, creates a potential problem for correct attribution. On the other hand, it may provide the conditions for shared attitudes and intentions.
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  • The Embodied Self.Quassim Cassam - 2011 - In Shaun Gallagher (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Self. Oxford University Press. pp. 139--157.
    This article examines the concept of the so-called embodied self. It attempts to answer the metaphysical question about the relation between body and self, the phenomenological question about the nature of our awareness of our own body, and the epistemological question of whether anything is special about the knowledge we have of our own bodies. It considers arguments in favour and against the claim that the person is identical with body. It also evaluates whether bodily awareness is a form of (...)
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  • Collective Actors Without Collective Minds An Inferentialist Approach.Javier González de Prado Salas & Jesús Zamora-Bonilla - 2015 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 45 (1):3-25.
    We present an inferentialist account of collective rationality and intentionality, according to which beliefs and other intentional states are understood in terms of the normative statuses attributed to, and undertaken by, the participants of a discursive practice—namely, their discursive or practical commitments and entitlements. Although these statuses are instituted by the performances and attitudes of the agents, they are not identified with any physical or psychological entity, process or relation. Therefore, we argue that inferentialism allows us to talk of collective (...)
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  • Why Not the First-Person Plural in Social Cognition?Mattia Gallotti - 2013 - Behavioural and Brain Sciences 36 (4):422-423.
    Through the mental alignment that sustains social interactions, the minds of individuals are shared. One interpretation of shared intentionality involves the ability of individuals to perceive features of the action scene from the perspective of the group (the ). This first-person plural approach in social cognition is distinct from and preferable to the second-person approach proposed in the target article.
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  • Fodor's Guide to Mental Representation: The Intelligent Auntie's Vade-Mecum.J. A. Fodor - 1985 - Mind 94 (373):76-100.
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  • Sympathy, Simulation, and the Impartial Spectator.Robert M. Gordon - 1996 - In L. May, Michael Friedman & A. Clark (eds.), Ethics. MIT Press. pp. 727-742.
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  • The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness.Antonio R. Damasio - 1999 - Harcourt Brace and Co.
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  • Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective.Dan Zahavi - 2007 - Human Studies 30 (3):269-273.
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  • Elements of Mind: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind.Tim Crane - 2001 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Elements of Mind provides a unique introduction to the main problems and debates in contemporary philosophy of mind. Author Tim Crane opposes those currently popular conceptions of the mind that divide mental phenomena into two very different kinds (the intentional and the qualitative) and proposes instead a challenging and unified theory of all the phenomena of mind. In light of this theory, Crane engages students with the central problems of the philosophy of mind--the mind-body problem, the problem of intentionality (or (...)
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  • Sympathy, Simulation, and the Impartial Spectator.Robert M. Gordon - 1995 - Ethics 105 (4):727-742.
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  • Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie: Erstes Buch: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie.Edmund Husserl - 1976 - In . Springer.
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  • What Makes Human Cognition Unique? From Individual to Shared to Collective Intentionality.Michael Tomasello & Hannes Rakoczy - 2003 - Mind and Language 18 (2):121-147.
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  • Pretence as Individual and Collective Intentionality.Hannes Rakoczy - 2008 - Mind and Language 23 (5):499-517.
    Abstract: Focusing on early child pretend play from the perspective of developmental psychology, this article puts forward and presents evidence for two claims. First, such play constitutes an area of remarkable individual intentionality of second-order intentionality (or 'theory of mind'): in pretence with others, young children grasp the basic intentional structure of pretending as a non-serious fictional form of action. Second, early social pretend play embodies shared or collective we-intentionality. Pretending with others is one of the ontogenetically primary instances of (...)
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  • The „Shared Manifold‟ Hypothesis: From Mirror Neurons to Empathy.Gallese Vittorio - 2001 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (5-7):33-50.
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  • Three Cheers for Propositional Attitudes.Jerry A. Fodor - 1981 - In Representations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science. MIT Press.
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  • Faces of Intention.Michael Bratman - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (202):119-121.
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  • Logische untersuchungen. 1te Theil : Prolegomena zur reinen Logik.Edmund Husserl - 1901 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 51:414-418.
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