- Blurry images, double vision, and other oddities: New problems for representationalism.Michael Tye - 2002 - In Aleksandar Jokic & Quentin Smith (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Perceptual experience is a many-layered thing.Michael Tye - 1996 - Philosophical Issues 7:117-126.details
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Color constancy and Russellian representationalism.Brad Thompson - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (1):75-94.details
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Sense and Content: Experience, Thought and Their Relations.Kim Sterelny - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (4):581.details
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Translucent experiences.A. D. Smith - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 140 (2):197--212.details
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The Situation-Dependency of Perception.Susanna Schellenberg - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (2):55-84.details
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Perception: A Representative Theory by Frank Jackson. [REVIEW]David M. Rosenthal - 1985 - Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):28-41.details
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Perception: A Representative Theory.Stephanie A. Ross - 1978 - Philosophical Review 87 (4):623.details
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Sense and Content: Experience, Thought and Their Relations.Christopher Peacocke - 1983 - Oxford University Press.details
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Blurred vision and the transparency of experience.Michael Pace - 2007 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (3):328–354.details
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Peacocke’s trees.Boyd Millar - 2010 - Synthese 174 (3):445-461.details
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Colour constancy and Fregean representationalism.Boyd Millar - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (1):219-231.details
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Reliable Misrepresentation and Tracking Theories of Mental Representation.Angela Mendelovici - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (2):421-443.details
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Some arguments against intentionalism.John-Michael Kuczynski - 2004 - Acta Analytica 19 (32):107-141.details
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How representationalism can account for the phenomenal significance of illumination.René Jagnow - 2009 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (4):551-572.details
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Perception: A Representative Theory.Frank Jackson - 1977 - Cambridge University Press.details
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The intrinsic quality of experience.Gilbert Harman - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52.details
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Experience as representation.Fred Dretske - 2003 - Philosophical Issues 13 (1):67-82.details
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Consciousness is Underived Intentionality.David Bourget - 2010 - Noûs 44 (1):32 - 58.details
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Color as a secondary quality.Paul A. Boghossian & J. David Velleman - 1989 - Mind 98 (January):81-103.details
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Blur.Keith Allen - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):257-273.details
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The Sources of Intentionality.Uriah Kriegel - 2011 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Consciousness and Experience.William G. Lycan - 1996 - Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.details
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Does conceivability entail possibility.David J. Chalmers - 2002 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press. pp. 145--200.details
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Representational theories of consciousness.William G. Lycan - 2000 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Representationalism about consciousness.William E. Seager & David Bourget - 2007 - In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell. pp. 261-276.details
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The intrinsic quality of experience.Gilbert Harman - 2014 - In Josh Weisberg (ed.), Consciousness (Key Concepts in Philosophy). Polity.details
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Tracking Representationalism.David Bourget & Angela Mendelovici - 2014 - In Andrew Bailey (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: The Key Thinkers. Continuum. pp. 209-235.details
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The Intrinsic Quality of Experience.Gilbert Harman - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press.details
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The representational character of experience.David J. Chalmers - 2004 - In Brian Leiter (ed.), The Future for Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 153--181.details
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The representational theory of consciousness.David Bourget - 2010 - Dissertation, Australian National Universitydetails
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Mental Representation and Closely Conflated Topics.Angela Mendelovici - 2010 - Dissertation, Princeton Universitydetails
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Pure Intentionalism About Moods and Emotions.Angela Mendelovici - 2013 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind. Routledge. pp. 135-157.details
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Consciousness and Experience.William G. Lycan - 1996 - Philosophy 72 (282):602-604.details
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Seeing it all clearly: The real story on blurry vision.Robert Schroer - 2002 - American Philosophical Quarterly 39 (3):297-301.details
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Sense and Content: Experience, Thought & Their Relations.Christopher Peacocke - 1985 - Mind 94 (375):480-487.details
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