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Perceptual experience is a many-layered thing.Michael Tye - 1996 - Philosophical Issues 7:117-126.details
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Representationalism and the transparency of experience.Michael Tye - 2002 - Noûs 36 (1):137-51.details
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Consciousness, color, and content.Michael Tye - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 113 (3):233-235.details
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The Phenomenology of Efficacy.Susanna Siegel - 2005 - Philosophical Topics 33 (1):265-84.details
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Representationalism, supervenience, and the cross-modal problem.John W. O’dea - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 130 (2):285-95.details
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Experiencing the production of sounds.Matthew Nudds - 2001 - European Journal of Philosophy 9 (2):210-229.details
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Intentionalism about Moods.Angela Mendelovici - 2013 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):126-136.details
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What’s so Transparent about Transparency?Amy Kind - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 115 (3):225-244.details
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Intentionalism defended.Alex Byrne - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):199-240.details
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Intentionalism Defended.Alex Byrne - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):199-240.details
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The Role of Consciousness in Grasping and Understanding.David Bourget - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (2):285-318.details
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Consciousness is Underived Intentionality.David Bourget - 2010 - Noûs 44 (1):32 - 58.details
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Representationalism, perceptual distortion and the limits of phenomenal concepts.David Bourget - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (1):16-36.details
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Mental paint and mental latex.Ned Block - 1996 - Philosophical Issues 7:19-49.details
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Not all perceptual experience is modality specific.Casey O'Callaghan - 2015 - In Dustin Stokes, Mohan Matthen & Stephen Biggs (eds.), Perception and Its Modalities. Oxford University Press. pp. 133-165.details
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Stream of Consciousness: Unity and Continuity in Conscious Experience.Barry Dainton - 2000 - New York: Routledge.details
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What Is It Like to See with Your Ears?: The Representational Theory of Mind.Dominic M. McIver Lopes - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2):439-453.details
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Why explain visual experience in terms of content?Adam Pautz - 2010 - In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World. Oxford University Press. pp. 254--309.details
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Representationalism about consciousness.William E. Seager & David Bourget - 2007 - In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell. pp. 261-276.details
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Tracking Representationalism.David Bourget & Angela Mendelovici - 2014 - In Andrew Bailey (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: The Key Thinkers. Continuum. pp. 209-235.details
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What is the unity of consciousness?Timothy J. Bayne & David J. Chalmers - 2003 - In Axel Cleeremans (ed.), The Unity of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.details
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Pure Intentionalism About Moods and Emotions.Angela Mendelovici - 2013 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind. Routledge. pp. 135-157.details
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Naturalizing the Mind.Fred Dretske - 1997 - Noûs 31 (4):528-537.details
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