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The problems of philosophy.Bertrand Russell - 1912 - New York: Barnes & Noble.details
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Transparent experience and the availability of qualia.Brian Loar - 2002 - In Aleksandar Jokic & Quentin Smith (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Essence and modality.Kit Fine - 1994 - Philosophical Perspectives 8 (Logic and Language):1-16.details
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The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality.Angela A. Mendelovici - 2018 - New York, USA: Oxford University Press.details
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The Limits of Adverbialism about Intentionality.Casey Woodling - 2016 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 59 (5):488-512.details
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Phenomenal consciousness: The explanatory gap as a cognitive illusion.Michael Tye - 1999 - Mind 108 (432):705-25.details
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Beyond rigidity: the unfinished semantic agenda of Naming and necessity.Scott Soames - 2002 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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The mental lives of zombies.Declan Smithies - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):343-372.details
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The Rediscovery of the Mind, by John Searle. [REVIEW]Mark William Rowe - 1992 - Philosophy 68 (265):415-418.details
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The Rediscovery of the Mind.John R. Searle - 1992 - MIT Press. Edited by Ned Block & Hilary Putnam.details
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Consciousness, explanatory inversion and cognitive science.John R. Searle - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):189-189.details
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Consciousness, explanatory inversion and cognitive science.John R. Searle - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (1):585-642.details
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The Phenomenology of Cognition: Or What Is It Like to Think That P?David Pitt - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):1-36.details
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Intentional Psychologism.David Pitt - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 146 (1):117-138.details
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What are the contents of experiences.Adam Pautz - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):483-507.details
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Does Phenomenology Ground Mental Content?Adam Pautz - 2013 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. Oxford University Press. pp. 194-234.details
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Intentionalism and perceptual presence.Adam Pautz - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):495-541.details
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A Simple View of Consciousness.Adam Pautz - 2009 - In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism. Oxford University Press. pp. 25--66.details
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I—The Presidential Address: Sensory Experience and Representational Properties.David Papineau - 2014 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 114 (1pt1):1-33.details
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Naturalizing Intentionality: Tracking Theories Versus Phenomenal Intentionality Theories.Angela Mendelovici & David Bourget - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (5):325-337.details
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Mental Content.Colin McGinn - 1989 - New York, NY, USA: Blackwell.details
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Mental Content.Michael Levin - 1993 - Noûs 27 (1):137-139.details
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The case for phenomenal externalism.William G. Lycan - 2001 - Philosophical Perspectives 15:17-35.details
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The Case for Phenomenal Externalism.William G. Lycan - 2001 - Noûs 35 (s15):17-35.details
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Reference from the first person perspective.Brian Loar - 1995 - Philosophical Issues 6:53-72.details
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Phenomenal states.Brian Loar - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:81-108.details
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The Veil of Abstracta.Uriah Kriegel - 2011 - Philosophical Issues 21 (1):245-267.details
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The dispensability of (merely) intentional objects.Uriah Kriegel - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 141 (1):79-95.details
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Intentional inexistence and phenomenal intentionality.Uriah Kriegel - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):307-340.details
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Is intentionality dependent upon consciousness?Uriah Kriegel - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 116 (3):271-307.details
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The intrinsic quality of experience.Gilbert Harman - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52.details
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The determinable–determinate relation can’t save adverbialism.Alex Grzankowski - 2018 - Analysis 78 (1):45-52.details
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Phenomenal intentionality without compromise.Katalin Farkas - 2008 - The Monist 91 (2):273-93.details
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The Many-Relations Problem for Adverbialism.Alexander Dinges - 2015 - Analysis 75 (2):231-237.details
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The Rediscovery of the Mind by John Searle. [REVIEW]Daniel C. Dennett - 1993 - Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):193-205.details
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Is Perception a Propositional Attitude?Tim Crane - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):452-469.details
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Why Are Some Phenomenal Experiences 'Vivid' and Others 'Faint'? Representationalism, Imagery, and Cognitive Phenomenology.David Bourget - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (4):673-687.details
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The Rational Role of Experience.David Bourget - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (5-6):467-493.details
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The Role of Consciousness in Grasping and Understanding.David Bourget - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (2):285-318.details
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Representationalism and Sensory Modalities: An Argument for Intermodal Representationalism.David Bourget - 2017 - American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (3):251-268.details
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Implications of Intensional Perceptual Ascriptions for Relationalism, Disjunctivism, and Representationalism About Perceptual Experience.David Bourget - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (2):381-408.details
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Intensional Perceptual Ascriptions.David Bourget - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (3):513-530.details
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Consciousness is Underived Intentionality.David Bourget - 2010 - Noûs 44 (1):32 - 58.details
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How to be an adverbialist about phenomenal intentionality.Kyle Banick - 2018 - Synthese 198 (1):661-686.details
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The Given: Experience and its Content.Michelle Montague - 2016 - Oxford: Oxford University Press UK.details
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The Phenomenal and the Representational.Jeffrey Speaks - 2015 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Beyond Rigidity: The Unfinished Semantic Agenda of Naming and Necessity.Scott Soames - 2004 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (217):637-640.details
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The Objects of Thought.Tim Crane - 2013 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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The Sources of Intentionality.Uriah Kriegel - 2011 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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