Perry argues that certain sorts of indexicals are 'essential', in the sense that they cannot be eliminated in favor of descriptions. This paper also introduces the influential idea that certain sorts of indexicals play a special role in thought, and have a special connection to action.

In a review of Frege's Puzzle1, Graeme Forbes makes the claim that Salmon's account of belief might be seen, under certain conditions, as a mere notational variant of a neo-Fregean theory; and thus that such an account might be reduced to a neo-Fregean one simply by rewriting it in terms of Fregean terminology. With a view to supporting his claim, Forbes offers an outline of an account of belief which, according to him, would satisfy the following conditions: (i) it could (...) be directly obtained from Salmon's own analysis by means of a certain set of substitutions, which presumably would not affect the essential features of Salmon's view; (ii) it could naturally be described as Fregean, in the sense that it would preserve, (at least) the spirit of Frege's doctrines, especially his fundamental intuitions about belief. Of course, the upshot of Forbes's argument is that Salmon's theory would not, at bottom, constitute a genuine alternative to a Fregean semantics for belief ascriptions. In this paper I argue to the effect that Forbes's claim is not in general sound. It seems to me that the sort of indirect argument used by Forbes - that of trying to undermine Salmon's theory by showing that it is just a version of a neo-Fregean account - does not provide someone working within a Fregean framework with an adequate strategy to counter Salmon's neo-Russellian views. It would perhaps be better to concentrate a Fregean attack on certain apparently dubious and highly controversial theses and results which are constitutive of Salmon's view, e.g. the counterintuitive character of a substantial set of consequences which follow from his theory of belief, as well as the associated revisionist stand he is forced to take towards our current patterns of speaking about belief. (shrink)

This book makes a stimulating contribution to the philosophy of language and philosophy of mind. It begins with a spirited defence of the view that propositions are structured and that propositional structure is 'psychologically real'. The author then develops a subtle view of propositions and attitude ascription. The view is worked out in detail with attention to such topics as the semantics of conversations, iterated attitude ascriptions, and the role of propositions as bearers of truth. Along the way important issues (...) in the philosophy of mind are addressed. Though intended primarily for professional philosophers and graduate students the book will also interest cognitive scientists and linguists. (shrink)

These papers treat those issues involved in formulating a logic of propositional attitutudes and consider the relevance of the attitudes to the continuing study of both the philosophy of language and the philosophy of mind. Table of Contents: Introduction, by C. Anthony Anderson and Joseph Owens Quine on Quantifying In, by Kit Fine Prolegomena to a Structural Theory of Belief and Other Attitudes, by Hans Kemp A Study in Comparitive Semantics, by Ernest LePore and Barry Loewer Wherein is Language Social?, (...) by Tyler Burge Narrow Content, by Robert Stalnaker Cognitive Access and Semantic Puzzles, by Joseph Owens On Some Thought-Experiments About Mind and Meaning, by John Wallace and H. E. Mason Belief and the Indentity of Reference, by Keith S. Dennellan A Millian Heir Rejects the Wages of Sinn, by Nathan Salmon The Mode-of-Presentation Problem, by Stephen Schiffer Consciousness and Intentionality: Robots With and Without the Right Stuff, by Keith Gunderson Consciousness, Unconsciousness, and Intentionality, by John R. Searle. (shrink)