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  1. Two Dogmas of Empiricism.W. V. O. Quine - 2011 - In Robert B. Talisse & Scott F. Aikin (eds.), The Pragmatism Reader: From Peirce Through the Present. Princeton University Press. pp. 202-220.
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  • Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology.Rudolf Carnap - 2011 - In Robert B. Talisse & Scott F. Aikin (eds.), The Pragmatism Reader: From Peirce Through the Present. Princeton University Press. pp. 249-264.
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  • Gómez-Torrente on Modality and Tarskian Logical Consequence.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2010 - Theoria 18 (2):159-170.
    Gómez-Torrente’s papers have made important contributions to vindicate Tarski’s model-theoretic account of the logical properties in the face of Etchemendy’s criticisms. However, at some points his vindication depends on interpreting the Tarskian account as purportedly modally deflationary, i.e., as not intended to capture the intuitive modal element in the logical properties, that logical consequence is (epistemic or alethic) necessary truth-preservation. Here it is argued that the views expressed in Tarski’s seminal work do not support this modally deflationary interpretation, even if (...)
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  • Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy.Bertrand Russell - 1919 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 89:465-466.
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  • Two Dogmas of Empiricism.W. Quine - 1951 - [Longmans, Green].
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  • Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Critica 17 (49):69-71.
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  • Three Grades of Modal Involvement.W. V. Quine - 1953 - Proceedings of the XIth International Congress of Philosophy 14:65-81.
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  • What Makes Logical Truths True?Constantin C. Brîncuș - 2016 - Logos and Episteme 7 (3): 249-272.
    The concern of deductive logic is generally viewed as the systematic recognition of logical principles, i.e., of logical truths. This paper presents and analyzes different instantiations of the three main interpretations of logical principles, viz. as ontological principles, as empirical hypotheses, and as true propositions in virtue of meanings. I argue in this paper that logical principles are true propositions in virtue of the meanings of the logical terms within a certain linguistic framework. Since these principles also regulate and control (...)
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  • The Emperor’s New Intuitions.Jaakko Hintikka - 1999 - Journal of Philosophy 96 (3):127-147.
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  • Anti-exceptionalism about logic.Ole Thomassen Hjortland - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (3):631-658.
    Logic isn’t special. Its theories are continuous with science; its method continuous with scientific method. Logic isn’t a priori, nor are its truths analytic truths. Logical theories are revisable, and if they are revised, they are revised on the same grounds as scientific theories. These are the tenets of anti-exceptionalism about logic. The position is most famously defended by Quine, but has more recent advocates in Maddy, Priest, Russell, and Williamson. Although these authors agree on many methodological issues about logic, (...)
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  • Compositionality Solves Carnap’s Problem.Denis Bonnay & Dag Westerståhl - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (4):721-739.
    The standard relation of logical consequence allows for non-standard interpretations of logical constants, as was shown early on by Carnap. But then how can we learn the interpretations of logical constants, if not from the rules which govern their use? Answers in the literature have mostly consisted in devising clever rule formats going beyond the familiar what follows from what. A more conservative answer is possible. We may be able to learn the correct interpretations from the standard rules, because the (...)
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  • Naturalism; Or, Living Within One's Means.W. V. Quine - 1995 - Dialectica 49 (2‐4):251-263.
    Naturalism holds that there is no higher access to truth than empirically testable hypotheses. Still it does not repudiate untestable hypotheses. They fill out interstices of theory and lead to further hypotheses that are testable.A hypothesis is tested by deducing, from it and a background of accepted theory, some observation categorical that does not follow from the background alone. This categorical, a generalized conditional compounded of two observation sentences, admits in turn of a primitive experimental test.The observation sentences themselves, like (...)
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  • The Metaphysical Interpretation of Logical Truth.Tuomas Tahko - 2014 - In Penelope Rush (ed.), The Metaphysics of Logic. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 233-248.
    The starting point of this paper concerns the apparent difference between what we might call absolute truth and truth in a model, following Donald Davidson. The notion of absolute truth is the one familiar from Tarski’s T-schema: ‘Snow is white’ is true if and only if snow is white. Instead of being a property of sentences as absolute truth appears to be, truth in a model, that is relative truth, is evaluated in terms of the relation between sentences and models. (...)
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  • 'Necessary', 'A Priori' and 'Analytic'.Aaron Sloman - 1965 - Analysis 26 (1):12 - 16.
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  • Two Dogmas of Empiricism.Willard V. O. Quine - 1951 - Philosophical Review 60 (1):20–43.
    Modern empiricism has been conditioned in large part by two dogmas. One is a belief in some fundamental cleavage between truths which are analytic, or grounded in meanings independently of matters of fact, and truth which are synthetic, or grounded in fact. The other dogma is reductionism: the belief that each meaningful statement is equivalent to some logical construct upon terms which refer to immediate experience. Both dogmas, I shall argue, are ill founded. One effect of abandoning them is, as (...)
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  • What are logical notions?Alfred Tarski - 1986 - History and Philosophy of Logic 7 (2):143-154.
    In this manuscript, published here for the first time, Tarski explores the concept of logical notion. He draws on Klein's Erlanger Programm to locate the logical notions of ordinary geometry as those invariant under all transformations of space. Generalizing, he explicates the concept of logical notion of an arbitrary discipline.
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  • Methods of logic.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1952 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
    Provides comprehensive coverage of logical structure as well as the techniques of formal reasoning.
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  • Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology.Rudolf Carnap - 1950 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 4 (11):20-40.
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  • Is logic empirical?Guido Bacciagaluppi - unknown
    The philosophical debate about quantum logic between the late 1960s and the early 1980s was generated mainly by Putnam's claims that quantum mechanics empirically motivates introducing a new form of logic, that such an empirically founded quantum logic is the `true' logic, and that adopting quantum logic would resolve all the paradoxes of quantum mechanics. Most of that debate focussed on the latter claim, reaching the conclusion that it was mistaken. This chapter will attempt to clarify the possible misunderstandings surrounding (...)
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  • What is logic?Ian Hacking - 1979 - Journal of Philosophy 76 (6):285-319.
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  • On the method of theoretical physics.Albert Einstein - 1934 - Philosophy of Science 1 (2):163-169.
    If you wish to learn from the theoretical physicist anything about the methods which he uses, I would give you the following piece of advice: Don't listen to his words, examine his achievements. For to the discoverer in that field, the constructions of his imagination appear so necessary and so natural that he is apt to treat them not as the creations of his thoughts but as given realities.
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  • Analyticity reconsidered.Paul Artin Boghossian - 1996 - Noûs 30 (3):360-391.
    This essay distinguishes between metaphysical and epistemological conceptions of analyticity. The former is the idea of a sentence that is ‘true purely in virtue of its meaning’ while the latter is the idea of a sentence that ‘can be justifiably believed merely on the basis of understanding its meaning’. It further argues that, while Quine may have been right to reject the metaphysical notion, the epistemological notion can be defended from his critique and put to work explaining a priori justification. (...)
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  • Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology.Rudolf Carnap - 1950 - Bobbs-Merrill.
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  • Investigations into Logical Deduction.Gerhard Gentzen, M. E. Szabo & Paul Bernays - 1970 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 35 (1):144-145.
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  • Methods of Logic.W. V. Quine - 1952 - Critica 15 (45):119-123.
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  • Does The Necessity of Mathematical Truths Imply Their Apriority?Mark McEvoy - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (4):431-445.
    It is sometimes argued that mathematical knowledge must be a priori, since mathematical truths are necessary, and experience tells us only what is true, not what must be true. This argument can be undermined either by showing that experience can yield knowledge of the necessity of some truths, or by arguing that mathematical theorems are contingent. Recent work by Albert Casullo and Timothy Williamson argues (or can be used to argue) the first of these lines; W. V. Quine and Hartry (...)
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  • The philosophy of logic.Penelope Maddy - 2012 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 18 (4):481-504.
    This talk surveys a range of positions on the fundamental metaphysical and epistemological questions about elementary logic, for example, as a starting point: what is the subject matter of logic—what makes its truths true? how do we come to know the truths of logic? A taxonomy is approached by beginning from well-known schools of thought in the philosophy of mathematics—Logicism, Intuitionism, Formalism, Realism—and sketching roughly corresponding views in the philosophy of logic. Kant, Mill, Frege, Wittgenstein, Carnap, Ayer, Quine, and Putnam (...)
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  • Investigations into Logical Deduction.Gerhard Gentzen - 1964 - American Philosophical Quarterly 1 (4):288 - 306.
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  • The concept of logical consequence.John Etchemendy - 1990 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
    Of course we all know now that mathematics has proved that logic doesn't really make sense, but Etchemendy (philosophy, Stanford Univ.) goes further and challenges the received view of the conceptual underpinnings of modern logic by arguing that Tarski's model-theoretic analysis of logical consequences is wrong. He may have found the soft underbelly of the dead horse. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR.
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  • Anti-Exceptionalism about Logic.Ole Thomassen Hjortland - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Logic 16 (7):186.
    Introduction to this special issue of The Australasian Journal of Logic.
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  • The Concept of Logical Consequence.Gary N. Curtis - 1994 - Noûs 28 (1):132-135.
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  • Meaning Approached Via Proofs.Dag Prawitz - 2006 - Synthese 148 (3):507-524.
    According to a main idea of Gentzen the meanings of the logical constants are reflected by the introduction rules in his system of natural deduction. This idea is here understood as saying roughly that a closed argument ending with an introduction is valid provided that its immediate subarguments are valid and that other closed arguments are justified to the extent that they can be brought to introduction form. One main part of the paper is devoted to the exact development of (...)
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  • The Boundary Stones of Thought: An Essay in the Philosophy of Logic.Ian Rumfitt - 2015 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
    Classical logic has been attacked by adherents of rival, anti-realist logical systems: Ian Rumfitt comes to its defence. He considers the nature of logic, and how to arbitrate between different logics. He argues that classical logic may dispense with the principle of bivalence, and may thus be liberated from the dead hand of classical semantics.
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  • Completeness: from Gödel to Henkin.Maria Manzano & Enrique Alonso - 2014 - History and Philosophy of Logic 35 (1):1-26.
    This paper focuses on the evolution of the notion of completeness in contemporary logic. We discuss the differences between the notions of completeness of a theory, the completeness of a calculus, and the completeness of a logic in the light of Gödel's and Tarski's crucial contributions.We place special emphasis on understanding the differences in how these concepts were used then and now, as well as on the role they play in logic. Nevertheless, we can still observe a certain ambiguity in (...)
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  • Introduction to mathematical philosophy.Bertrand Russell - 1919 - New York: Dover Publications.
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  • Is logic in the mind or in the world?Gila Sher - 2011 - Synthese 181 (2):353 - 365.
    The paper presents an outline of a unified answer to five questions concerning logic: (1) Is logic in the mind or in the world? (2) Does logic need a foundation? What is the main obstacle to a foundation for logic? Can it be overcome? (3) How does logic work? What does logical form represent? Are logical constants referential? (4) Is there a criterion of logicality? (5) What is the relation between logic and mathematics?
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  • Gómez-Torrente on Modality and Tarskian Logical Consequence.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2003 - Theoria 18 (2):159-170.
    Gómez-Torrente’s papers have made important contributions to vindicate Tarski’s model-theoretic account of the logical properties in the face of Etchemendy’s criticisms. However, at some points his vindication depends on interpreting the Tarskian account as purportedly modally deflationary, i.e., as not intended to capture the intuitive modal element in the logical properties, that logical consequence is (epistemic or alethic) necessary truth-preservation. Here it is argued that the views expressed in Tarski’s seminal work do not support this modally deflationary interpretation, even if (...)
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  • On engendering an illusion of understanding.Dana Scott - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (21):787-807.
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  • Naming and Necessity.S. Kripke - 1972 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 45 (4):665-666.
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  • The Concept of Logical Consequence.John Etchemendy - 1994 - Erkenntnis 41 (2):281-284.
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  • Possibilities, models, and intuitionistic logic: Ian Rumfitt’s The boundary stones of thought.Stewart Shapiro - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (7):812-825.
    ABSTRACTAIan Rumfitt's new book presents a distinctive and intriguing philosophy of logic, one that ultimately settles on classical logic as the uniquely correct one–or at least rebuts some prominent arguments against classical logic. The purpose of this note is to evaluate Rumfitt's perspective by focusing on some themes that have occupied me for some time: the role and importance of model theory and, in particular, the place of counter-arguments in establishing invalidity, higher-order logic, and the logical pluralism/relativism articulated in my (...)
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  • Logical Consequence: A Constructivist View.Dag Prawitz - 2005 - In Stewart Shapiro (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
    The main question addressed in this chapter is how to analyze the modal ingredient in the concept of logical consequence or logical validity of an inference, here expressed by saying that the truth of the conclusion of a logically valid inference should follow by necessity of thought from the truth of the premisses. It is claimed that this modal ingredient is not taken care of by Tarski’s requirement, later developed in model theory, that for all interpretations of the non-logical terms (...)
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  • The status of logic.Stewart Shapiro - 2000 - In Paul Artin Boghossian & Christopher Peacocke (eds.), New Essays on the A Priori. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 333--366.
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  • Remarks on the Scott–Lindenbaum Theorem.Gillman Payette & Peter K. Schotch - 2014 - Studia Logica 102 (5):1003-1020.
    In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Dana Scott introduced a kind of generalization (or perhaps simplification would be a better description) of the notion of inference, familiar from Gentzen, in which one may consider multiple conclusions rather than single formulas. Scott used this idea to good effect in a number of projects including the axiomatization of many-valued logics (of various kinds) and a reconsideration of the motivation of C.I. Lewis. Since he left the subject it has been vigorously prosecuted (...)
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  • Carnap's Problem: What is it Like to be a Normal Interpretation of Classical Logic?Arnold Koslow - 2010 - Abstracta 6 (1):117-135.
    Carnap in the 1930s discovered that there were non-normal interpretations of classical logic - ones for which negation and conjunction are not truth-functional so that a statement and its negation could have the same truth value, and a disjunction of two false sentences could be true. Church ar-gued that this did not call for a revision of classical logic. More recent writers seem to disa-gree. We provide a definition of "non-normal interpretation" and argue that Church was right, and in fact, (...)
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