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Zur Kritik des Funktionalismus

In Wolfgang Köhler & Hans Mutschler (eds.), Ist der Geist berechenbar? Philosophische Reflexionen. WBG. pp. 58-76 (2004)

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  1. The Components of Content.David Chalmers - 2002 - In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford University Press.
    [[This paper appears in my anthology _Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings_ (Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 608-633. It is a heavily revised version of a paper first written in 1994 and revised in 1995. Sections 1, 7, 8, and 10 are similar to the old version, but the other sections are quite different. Because the old version has been widely cited, I have made it available (in its 1995 version) at http://consc.net/papers/content95.html.
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  • The Nonreductivist’s Trouble with Mental Causation.Jaegwon Kim - 1992 - In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.). Oxford University Press.
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  • On the Search for the Neural Correlate of Consciousness.David J. Chalmers - 1998 - In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A.C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II. MIT Press. pp. 2--219.
    *[[This paper appears in _Toward a Science of Consciousness II: The Second Tucson Discussions and Debates_ (S. Hameroff, A. Kaszniak, and A.Scott, eds), published with MIT Press in 1998. It is a transcript of my talk at the second Tucson conference in April 1996, lightly edited to include the contents of overheads and to exclude some diversions with a consciousness meter. A more in-depth argument for some of the claims in this paper can be found in Chapter 6 of my (...)
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  • Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?Colin McGinn - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press.
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  • Conceiving the Impossible and the Mind-Body Problem.Thomas Nagel - 1998 - Philosophy 73 (285):337-52.
    Intuitions based on the first-person perspective can easily mislead us about what is and is not conceivable.1 This point is usually made in support of familiar reductionist positions on the mind-body problem, but I believe it can be detached from that approach. It seems to me that the powerful appearance of contingency in the relation between the functioning of the physical organism and the conscious mind -- an appearance that depends directly or indirectly on the first- person perspective -- must (...)
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  • Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?Colin McGinn - 1989 - Mind 98 (July):349-66.
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  • Philosophy and Our Mental Life.Hilary Putnam - 1975 - In Mind, Language, and Reality. Cambridge University Press.
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