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Perceptual Learning Explains Two Candidates for Cognitive Penetration.Valtteri Arstila - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (6):1151-1172.details
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Possibilities of Perception.Jennifer Church (ed.) - 2013 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Perception as a Capacity for Knowledge.John Mcdowell - 2011 - Marquette University Press.details
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Immediate justification and process reliabilism.Alvin I. Goldman - 2008 - In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: New Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 63-82.details
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Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.details
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Why explain visual experience in terms of content?Adam Pautz - 2010 - In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World. Oxford University Press. pp. 254--309.details
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The representational character of experience.David J. Chalmers - 2004 - In Brian Leiter (ed.), The Future for Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 153--181.details
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Michael Huemer and the Principle of Phenomenal Conservatism.Michael Tooley - 2013 - In Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. Oup Usa. pp. 306.details
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A Study of Concepts.Christopher Peacocke - 1992 - Studia Logica 54 (1):132-133.details
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A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge.Donald Davidson - 2000 - In Sven Bernecker & Fred I. Dretske (eds.), Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology. Oxford University Press.details
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Perceptual Reports.Berit Brogaard - 2015 - In Mohan Matthen (ed.), Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception. Oxford University Press.details
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Moral Perception: High-Level Perception or Low-Level Intuition?Elijah Chudnoff - 2015 - In Thiemo Breyer & Christopher Gutland (eds.), Phenomenology of Thinking.details
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