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  1. Towards a True Neural Stance on Consciousness.Victor A. F. Lamme - 2006 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10 (11):494-501.
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  • Introspective Physicalism as an Approach to the Science of Consciousness.Anthony I. Jack & T. Shallice - 2001 - Cognition 79 (1):161-196.
    Most ?theories of consciousness? are based on vague speculations about the properties of conscious experience. We aim to provide a more solid basis for a science of consciousness. We argue that a theory of consciousness should provide an account of the very processes that allow us to acquire and use information about our own mental states ? the processes underlying introspection. This can be achieved through the construction of information processing models that can account for ?Type-C? processes. Type-C processes can (...)
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  • Psychological Construction in the OCC Model of Emotion.Gerald L. Clore & Andrew Ortony - 2013 - Emotion Review 5 (4):335-343.
    This article presents six ideas about the construction of emotion: (a) Emotions are more readily distinguished by the situations they signify than by patterns of bodily responses; (b) emotions emerge from, rather than cause, emotional thoughts, feelings, and expressions; (c) the impact of emotions is constrained by the nature of the situations they represent; (d) in the OCC account (the model proposed by Ortony, Clore, and Collins in 1988), appraisals are psychological aspects of situations that distinguish one emotion from another, (...)
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  • Consciousness and its Function.David Rosenthal - 2008
    MS, under submission, derived from a Powerpoint presentation at a Conference on Consciousness, Memory, and Perception, in honor of Larry Weiskrantz, City University, London, September 15, 2006.
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  • Empirical Support for Higher-Order Theories of Conscious Awareness.Hakwan Lau & David Rosenthal - 2011 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15 (8):365-373.
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  • What Makes Human Cognition Unique? From Individual to Shared to Collective Intentionality.Michael Tomasello & Hannes Rakoczy - 2003 - Mind and Language 18 (2):121-147.
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  • The Merits of Higher-Order Thought Theories.Sam Coleman - 2018 - Trans/Form/Ação 41 (s1):31-48.
    Over many years and in many publications David Rosenthal has developed, defended and applied his justly well-known higher-order thought theory of consciousness.2 In this paper I explain the theory, then provide a brief history of a major objection to it. I suggest that this objection is ultimately ineffectual, but that behind it lies a reason to look beyond Rosenthal's theory to another sort of HOT theory. I then offer my own HOT theory as a suitable alternative, before concluding in a (...)
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  • How to Measure Metacognition.Stephen M. Fleming & Hakwan C. Lau - 2014 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 8.
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  • Consciousness.David M. Rosenthal - unknown
    One phenomenon pertains roughly to being awake. A person or other creature is conscious when it's awake and mentally responsive to sensory input; otherwise it's unconscious. This kind of consciousness figures most often in everyday discourse.
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  • Consciousness and Cognitive Access.Ned Block - 2008 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt3):289-317.
    This article concerns the interplay between two issues that involve both philosophy and neuroscience: whether the content of phenomenal consciousness is 'rich' or 'sparse', whether phenomenal consciousness goes beyond cognitive access, and how it would be possible for there to be evidence one way or the other.
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  • Keeping It Real: Intentional Inexistents, Fineness‐of‐Grain, and the Dilemma for Extrinsic Higher‐Order Representational Theories.Vincent Picciuto - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (4):555-575.
    According to the standard argument from targetless higher-order representations, the possibility of such representations presents a dilemma for higher-order theorists. In this article I argue that there are two theoretically well-motivated replies to the standard argument. Consequently, the standard argument against higher-order theories fails. I then go on to argue that while certain versions of higher-order theory can adequately respond to the standard argument, they both, nevertheless, fail to explain the fineness-of-grain that phenomenally conscious experience appears to have.
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  • A Higher-Order Theory of Emotional Consciousness.Joseph LeDoux & Richard Brown - 2017 - Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 114 (10):E2016-E2025.
    Emotional states of consciousness, or what are typically called emotional feelings, are traditionally viewed as being innately programed in subcortical areas of the brain, and are often treated as different from cognitive states of consciousness, such as those related to the perception of external stimuli. We argue that conscious experiences, regardless of their content, arise from one system in the brain. On this view, what differs in emotional and non-emotional states is the kind of inputs that are processed by a (...)
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  • The Entropic Brain: A Theory of Conscious States Informed by Neuroimaging Research with Psychedelic Drugs.Robin L. Carhart-Harris, Robert Leech, Peter J. Hellyer, Murray Shanahan, Amanda Feilding, Enzo Tagliazucchi, Dante R. Chialvo & David Nutt - 2014 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 8.
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  • Naturalizing the Mind.Fred Dretske - 1995 - MIT Press.
    In this provocative book, Fred Dretske argues that to achieve an understanding of the mind it is not enough to understand the biological machinery by means of...
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  • The Conscious Brain: How Attention Engenders Experience.Jesse Prinz - 2012 - Oup Usa.
    The Conscious Brain brings neuroscientific evidence to bear on enduring philosophical questions. Major philosophical and scientific theories of consciousness are surveyed, challenged, and extended.
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  • On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
    Consciousness is a mongrel concept: there are a number of very different "consciousnesses." Phenomenal consciousness is experience; the phenomenally conscious aspect of a state is what it is like to be in that state. The mark of access-consciousness, by contrast, is availability for use in reasoning and rationally guiding speech and action. These concepts are often partly or totally conflated, with bad results. This target article uses as an example a form of reasoning about a function of "consciousness" based on (...)
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  • The Higher Order Approach to Consciousness is Defunct.Ned Block - 2011 - Analysis 71 (3):419 - 431.
    The higher order approach to consciousness attempts to build a theory of consciousness from the insight that a conscious state is one that the subject is conscious of. There is a well-known objection1 to the higher order approach, a version of which is fatal. Proponents of the higher order approach have realized that the objection is significant. They have dealt with it via what David Rosenthal calls a “retreat” (2005b, p. 179) but that retreat fails to solve the problem.
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  • The HOROR Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness.Richard Brown - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1783-1794.
    One popular approach to theorizing about phenomenal consciousness has been to connect it to representations of a certain kind. Representational theories of consciousness can be further sub-divided into first-order and higher-order theories. Higher-order theories are often interpreted as invoking a special relation between the first-order state and the higher-order state. However there is another way to interpret higher-order theories that rejects this relational requirement. On this alternative view phenomenal consciousness consists in having suitable higher-order representations. I call this ‘HOROR’ (‘Higher-Order (...)
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  • Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory.Uriah Kriegel - 2009 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Some mental events are conscious, some are unconscious. What is the difference between the two? Uriah Kriegel offers an answer. His aim is a comprehensive theory of the features that all and only conscious mental events have. The key idea is that consciousness arises when self-awareness and world-awareness are integrated in the right way. Conscious mental events differ from unconscious ones in that, whatever else they may represent, they always also represent themselves, and do so in a very specific way. (...)
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  • Consciousness and Experience.William G. Lycan - 1996 - MIT Press.
    Lycan not only uses the numerous arguments against materialism, and functionalist theories of mind in particular, to gain a more detailed positive view of the ..
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  • Consciousness and Mind.David Rosenthal - 2005 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Consciousness and Mind presents David Rosenthal's influential work on the nature of consciousness. Central to that work is Rosenthal's higher-order-thought theory of consciousness, according to which a sensation, thought, or other mental state is conscious if one has a higher-order thought that one is in that state. The first four essays develop various aspects of that theory. The next three essays present Rosenthal's homomorphism theory of mental qualities and qualitative consciousness, and show how that theory fits with and helps sustain (...)
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  • Misrepresentation and Mental Appearance.David Rosenthal - 2018 - Trans/Form/Ação 41 (s1):49-74.
    I begin by discussing an objection often lodged against higher-order theories of consciousness. The objection is that those theories do not preclude consciousness from misrepresenting the mental properties of our conscious states. I argue that there are several reasons why this objection cannot succeed. Sam Coleman agrees that the objection fails, but sees it as pointing to a related objection, which he argues poses difficulties the higher-order theorist cannot avoid. His solution is a variant theory of consciousness that invokes mental (...)
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  • Drop It Like It’s HOT: A Vicious Regress for Higher-Order Thought Theories.Miguel Sebastián - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (6):1563-1572.
    Higher-order thought theories of consciousness attempt to explain what it takes for a mental state to be conscious, rather than unconscious, by means of a HOT that represents oneself as being in the state in question. Rosenthal Consciousness and the self: new essays, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011) stresses that the way we are aware of our own conscious states requires essentially indexical self-reference. The challenge for defenders of HOT theories is to show that there is a way to explain (...)
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  • Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness and What-It-is-Like-Ness.Jonathan Farrell - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (11):2743-2761.
    Ambitious higher-order theories of consciousness aim to account for conscious states when these are understood in terms of what-it-is-like-ness. This paper considers two arguments concerning this aim, and concludes that ambitious theories fail. The misrepresentation argument against HO theories aims to show that the possibility of radical misrepresentation—there being a HO state about a state the subject is not in—leads to a contradiction. In contrast, the awareness argument aims to bolster HO theories by showing that subjects are aware of all (...)
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  • Consciousness Lost and Found: A Neuropsychological Exploration.Lawrence Weiskrantz - 1997 - Oxford University Press.
    The phenomenon of `consciousness' is intrinsically related to one's awareness of one's self, of time, and of the physical world. What, then, can be learned about consciousness from people who have suffered brain damage such as amnesia which affects their awareness? This is the question explored by Lawrence Weiskrantz, a distinguished neuropsychologist who has worked with such patients over 30 years. Written in an engaging and accessible style, Consciousness Lost and Found provides a unique perspective on one of the most (...)
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  • The Global Workspace Needs Metacognition.Nicholas Shea & Chris D. Frith - 2019 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 23 (7):560-571.
    The global workspace and metacognition are, respectively, the basis of the two leading cognitive theories of consciousness. The two theories, which have recently been presented as rivals, are usually pursued separately, but there is no need to choose between them. There is in fact strong reason to expect items in the global workspace to have a metacognitive accompaniment in the form of a rating of confidence. Confidence ratings are relied on by the computations that compare, integrate, and compute over representations (...)
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  • Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory.Peter Carruthers - 2000 - Cambridge University Press.
    How can phenomenal consciousness exist as an integral part of a physical universe? How can the technicolour phenomenology of our inner lives be created out of the complex neural activities of our brains? Many have despaired of finding answers to these questions; and many have claimed that human consciousness is inherently mysterious. Peter Carruthers argues, on the contrary, that the subjective feel of our experience is fully explicable in naturalistic terms. Drawing on a variety of interdisciplinary resources, he develops and (...)
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  • The Cognitive Neuroscience of Working Memory.Naoyuki Osaka, Robert H. Logie & Mark D'Esposito (eds.) - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
    Working memory has been one of the most intensively studied systems in cognitive psychology. The Cognitive Neuroscience of Working Memory brings together world class researchers from around the world to summarise our current knowledge of this field, and directions for future research.
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  • Psychologie Vom Empirischen Standpunkt.Franz Brentano - 1926 - Philosophical Review 35:189.
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  • Working Memory and Consciousness: The Current State of Play.Marjan Persuh, Eric LaRock & Jacob Berger - 2018 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 12.
    Working memory, an important posit in cognitive science, allows one to temporarily store and manipulate information in the service of ongoing tasks. Working memory has been traditionally classified as an explicit memory system – that is, as operating on and maintaining only consciously perceived information. Recently, however, several studies have questioned this assumption, purporting to provide evidence for unconscious working memory. In this paper, we focus on visual working memory and critically examine these studies as well as studies of unconscious (...)
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  • What is It Like to Be a Bat?Thomas Nagel - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press.
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  • The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness.Antonio R. Damasio - 1999 - Harcourt Brace and Co.
    The publication of this book is an event in the making. All over the world scientists, psychologists, and philosophers are waiting to read Antonio Damasio's new theory of the nature of consciousness and the construction of the self. A renowned and revered scientist and clinician, Damasio has spent decades following amnesiacs down hospital corridors, waiting for comatose patients to awaken, and devising ingenious research using PET scans to piece together the great puzzle of consciousness. In his bestselling Descartes' Error, Damasio (...)
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  • A Universe of Consciousness: How Matter Becomes Imagination.Gerald M. Edelman & Giulio Tononi - 2000 - Basic Books.
    A Nobel Prize-winning scientist and a leading brain researcher show how the brain creates conscious experience.
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  • A Materialist Theory of the Mind.D. M. Armstrong - 1968 - Routledge.
    Breaking new ground in the debate about the relation of mind and body, David Armstrong's classic text - first published in 1968 - remains the most compelling and comprehensive statement of the view that the mind is material or physical. In the preface to this new edition, the author reflects on the book's impact and considers it in the light of subsequent developments. He also provides a bibliography of all the key writings to have appeared in the materialist debate.
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  • Change Blindness in Higher-Order Thought: Misrepresentation or Good Enough?Ingar Brinck & Asger Kirkeby-Hinrup - 2017 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 24 (5-6):50-73.
    Abstract: To evaluate the explanation of change blindness in terms of misrepresentation and determine its role for Rosenthal’s higher-order thought theory of consciousness, we present an alternative account of change blindness that affords an independent outlook and provides a viable alternative. First we describe Rosenthal’s actualism and the notion of misrepresentation, then introduce change blindness and the explanation of it by misrepresentation. Rosenthal asserts that, in change blindness, the first-order state tracks the post-change stimulus, but the higher-order state misrepresents it. (...)
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  • Explaining Consciousness.David M. Rosenthal - 1993 - In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Contemporary Readings. Oxford University Press. pp. 406--421.
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  • Explaining Consciousness.David M. Rosenthal - 2002 - In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford University Press. pp. 109-131.
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  • Consciousness, Accessibility, and the Mesh Between Psychology and Neuroscience.Ned Block - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5):481--548.
    How can we disentangle the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness from the neural machinery of the cognitive access that underlies reports of phenomenal consciousness? We can see the problem in stark form if we ask how we could tell whether representations inside a Fodorian module are phenomenally conscious. The methodology would seem straightforward: find the neural natural kinds that are the basis of phenomenal consciousness in clear cases when subjects are completely confident and we have no reason to doubt their (...)
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  • Sensory Qualities, Consciousness, and Perception.David M. Rosenthal - 2005 - In Consciousness and Mind. Clarendon Press. pp. 175-226.
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  • Intracranial Spectral Amplitude Dynamics of Perceptual Suppression in Fronto-Insular, Occipito-Temporal, and Primary Visual Cortex.Juan R. Vidal, Marcela Perrone-Bertolotti, Philippe Kahane & Jean-Philippe Lachaux - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5.
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  • Consciousness Doesn't Overflow Cognition.Richard Brown - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5:10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01399.
    Theories of consciousness can be separated into those that see it as cognitive in nature, or as an aspect of cognitive functioning, and those that see consciousness as importantly distinct from any kind of cognitive functioning. One version of the former kind of theory is the higher-order-thought theory of consciousness. This family of theories posits a fundamental role for cognitive states, higher-order thought-like intentional states, in the explanation of conscious experience. These states are higher-order in that they represent the subject (...)
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  • Varieties of Higher-Order Theory.David Rosenthal - 2004 - In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins.
    A touchstone of much modern theorizing about the mind is the idea, still tac- itly accepted by many, that a state's being mental implies that it's conscious. This view is epitomized in the dictum, put forth by theorists as otherwise di-.
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  • On a ‘Failed’ Attempt to Manipulate Visual Metacognition with Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation to Prefrontal Cortex.Eugene Ruby, Brian Maniscalco & Megan A. K. Peters - 2018 - Consciousness and Cognition 62:34-41.
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  • Unconscious Perception Reconsidered.Ian Phillips - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (4):471-514.
    Most contemporary theorists regard the traditional thesis that perception is essentially conscious as just another armchair edict to be abandoned in the wake of empirical discovery. Here I reconsider this dramatic departure from tradition. My aim is not to recapture our prelapsarian confidence that perception is inevitably conscious (though much I say might be recruited to that cause). Instead, I want to problematize the now ubiquitous belief in unconscious perception. The paper divides into two parts. Part One is more purely (...)
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  • Attention and Internal Monitoring: A Farewell to HOP.Wesley Sauret & William G. Lycan - 2014 - Analysis 74 (3):363-370.
    Higher-Order Perception (HOP) theories in the philosophy of mind are offered as explanations of what it is that makes a mental state a conscious state. According to HOP, a mental state is conscious just in case it is itself represented in a quasi-perceptual way by an internal monitor or scanning device. We start with one of the more popular objections to HOP and a seemingly innocuous concession to it: identifying the internal monitor with the faculty of attention. We show how (...)
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  • Why is “Blindsight” Blind? A New Perspective on Primary Visual Cortex, Recurrent Activity and Visual Awareness.Juha Silvanto - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 32:15-32.
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  • Covariation of Activity in Visual and Prefrontal Cortex Associated with Subjective Visual Perception.Erik Lumer & Geraint Rees - 1999 - Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 96 (4):1669-1673.
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  • What Can Synesthesia Teach Us About Higher Order Theories of Consciousness?Fred Adams & Charlotte Shreve - 2016 - Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 3 (3):251-257.
    In this article, we will describe higher order thought theories of consciousness. Then we will describe some examples from synesthesia. Finally, we will explain why the latter may be relevant to the former.
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  • Relative Blindsight in Normal Observers and the Neural Correlate of Visual Consciousness.Hakwan C. Lau & Richard E. Passingham - 2006 - Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 103 (49):18763-18768.
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  • Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory.Peter Carruthers - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (207):265-268.
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