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  1. Convention: A Philosophical Study.David Lewis - 1969 - Wiley-Blackwell.
    _ Convention_ was immediately recognized as a major contribution to the subject and its significance has remained undiminished since its first publication in 1969. Lewis analyzes social conventions as regularities in the resolution of recurring coordination problems-situations characterized by interdependent decision processes in which common interests are at stake. Conventions are contrasted with other kinds of regularity, and conventions governing systems of communication are given special attention.
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  • Evolutionary Dynamics of Lewis Signaling Games: Signaling Systems Vs. Partial Pooling.Simon Huttegger, Brian Skyrms, Rory Smead & Kevin Zollman - 2010 - Synthese 172 (1):177-191.
    Transfer of information between senders and receivers, of one kind or another, is essential to all life. David Lewis introduced a game theoretic model of the simplest case, where one sender and one receiver have pure common interest. How hard or easy is it for evolution to achieve information transfer in Lewis signaling?. The answers involve surprising subtleties. We discuss some if these in terms of evolutionary dynamics in both finite and infinite populations, with and without mutation.
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  • Philosophical Issues Arising From Experimental Economics.Zachary Ernst - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (3):497–507.
    Human beings are highly irrational, at least if we hold to an economic standard of ‘rationality’. Experimental economics studies the irrational behavior of human beings, with the aim of understanding exactly how our behavior deviates from the Homo economicus, as ‘rational man’ has been called. Insofar as philosophical theories depend upon rationality assumptions, experimental economics is the source of both problems and (at least potential) solutions to several philosophical issues. This article offers a programmatic and highly biased survey of some (...)
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  • Local Interactions and the Dynamics of Rational Deliberation.J. McKenzie Alexander - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (1):103-121.
    Whereas The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure supplements Evolution of the Social Contract by examining some of the earlier work’s strategic problems in a local interaction setting, no equivalent supplement exists for The Dynamics of Rational Deliberation . In this article, I develop a general framework for modeling the dynamics of rational deliberation in a local interaction setting. In doing so, I show that when local interactions are permitted, three interesting phenomena occur: (a) the attracting deliberative equilibria (...)
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  • Covenants and Reputations.Peter Vanderschraaf - 2007 - Synthese 157 (2):167 - 195.
    In their classic analyses, Hobbes and Hume argue that offensively violating a covenant is irrational because the offense ruins one’s reputation. This paper explores conditions under which reputation alone can enforce covenants. The members of a community are modeled as interacting in a Covenant Game repeated over time. Folk theorems are presented that give conditions under which the Humean strategy of performing in covenants only with those who have never offensively violated or performed with an offensive violator characterizes an equilibrium (...)
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  • The Flow of Information in Signaling Games.Brian Skyrms - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (1):155 - 165.
    Both the quantity of information and the informational content of a signal are defined in the context of signaling games. Informational content is a generalization of standard philosophical notions of propositional content. It is shown how signals that initially carry no information may spontaneously acquire informational content by evolutionary or learning dynamics. It is shown how information can flow through signaling chains or signaling networks.
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  • War or Peace?: A Dynamical Analysis of Anarchy.Peter Vanderschraaf - 2006 - Economics and Philosophy 22 (2):243-279.
    I propose a dynamical analysis of interaction in anarchy, and argue that this kind of dynamical analysis is a more promising route to predicting the outcome of anarchy than the more traditional a priori analyses of anarchy in the literature. I criticize previous a priori analyses of anarchy on the grounds that these analyses assume that the individuals in anarchy share a unique set of preferences over the possible outcomes of war, peace, exploiting others and suffering exploitation. Following Hobbes' classic (...)
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  • The Evolution of Vagueness.Cailin O'Connor - 2013 - Erkenntnis (S4):1-21.
    Vague predicates, those that exhibit borderline cases, pose a persistent problem for philosophers and logicians. Although they are ubiquitous in natural language, when used in a logical context, vague predicates lead to contradiction. This paper will address a question that is intimately related to this problem. Given their inherent imprecision, why do vague predicates arise in the first place? I discuss a variation of the signaling game where the state space is treated as contiguous, i.e., endowed with a metric that (...)
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  • Evolution and the Explanation of Meaning.Simon M. Huttegger - 2007 - Philosophy of Science 74 (1):1-27.
    Signaling games provide basic insights into some fundamental questions concerning the explanation of meaning. They can be analyzed in terms of rational choice theory and in terms of evolutionary game theory. It is argued that an evolutionary approach provides better explanations for the emergence of simple communication systems. To substantiate these arguments, I will look at models similar to those of Skyrms (2000) and Komarova and Niyogi (2004) and study their dynamical properties. My results will lend partial support to the (...)
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  • The Conditions of Tolerance.Ryan Muldoon, Michael Borgida & Michael Cuffaro - 2012 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 11 (3):322-344.
    The philosophical tradition of liberal political thought has come to see tolerance as a crucial element of a liberal political order. However, while much has been made of the value of toleration, little work has been done on individual-level motivations for tolerant behavior. In this article, we seek to develop an account of the rational motivations for toleration and of where the limits of toleration lie. We first present a very simple model of rational motivations for toleration. Key to this (...)
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  • Signals: Evolution, Learning, and Information.Brian Skyrms - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
    Brian Skyrms offers a fascinating demonstration of how fundamental signals are to our world. He uses various scientific tools to investigate how meaning and communication develop. Signals operate in networks of senders and receivers at all levels of life, transmitting and processing information. That is how humans and animals think and interact.
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  • Computer-Mediated Communication and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: An Experimental Analysis.Cristina Bicchieri & Azi Lev-On - 2007 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 6 (2):139-168.
    University of Pennsylvania, USA, el322{at}nyu.edu ' + u + '@' + d + ' '//--> One of the most consistent findings in experimental studies of social dilemmas is the positive influence of face-to-face communication on cooperation. The face-to-face `communication effect' has been recently explained in terms of a `focus theory of norms': successful communication focuses agents on pro-social norms, and induces preferences and expectations conducive to cooperation. 1 Many of the studies that point to a communication effect, however, do not (...)
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  • Choosing Justice: An Experimental Approach to Ethical Theory.Norman Frohlich & Joe A. Oppenheimer - 1992 - University of California Press.
    This book presents an entirely new answer to the question: “What is fair?” In their radical approach to ethics, Frohlich and Oppenheimer argue that much of the empirical methodology of the natural sciences should be applied to the ethical questions of fairness and justice.
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  • The Strategy of Conflict.Thomas Schelling - 1960 - Harvard University Press.
    Analyzes the nature of international disagreements and conflict resolution in terms of game theory and non-zero-sum games.
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  • Norm Manipulation, Norm Evasion: Experimental Evidence: Cristina Bicchieri and Alex K. Chavez.Cristina Bicchieri & Alex K. Chavez - 2013 - Economics and Philosophy 29 (2):175-198.
    Using an economic bargaining game, we tested for the existence of two phenomena related to social norms, namely norm manipulation – the selection of an interpretation of the norm that best suits an individual – and norm evasion – the deliberate, private violation of a social norm. We found that the manipulation of a norm of fairness was characterized by a self-serving bias in beliefs about what constituted normatively acceptable behaviour, so that an individual who made an uneven bargaining offer (...)
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  • Dynamic Stability and Basins of Attraction in the Sir Philip Sidney Game.Simon M. Huttegger & Kevin J. S. Zollman - unknown
    We study the handicap principle in terms of the Sir Philip Sidney game. The handicap principle asserts that cost is required to allow for honest signalling in the face of conflicts of interest. We show that the significance of the handicap principle can be challenged from two new directions. Firstly, both the costly signalling equilibrium and certain states of no communication are stable under the replicator dynamics ; however, the latter states are more likely in cases where honest signalling should (...)
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  • Learning to Signal: Analysis of a Micro-Level Reinforcement Model.Brian Skyrms, Raffaele Argiento, Robin Pemantle & and Stanislav Volkov - manuscript
    We consider the following signaling game. Nature plays first from the set {1, 2}. Player 1 (the Sender) sees this and plays from the set {A, B}. Player 2 (the Receiver) sees only Player 1’s play and plays from the set {1, 2}. Both players win if Player 2’s play equals Nature’s play and lose otherwise. Players are told whether they have won or lost, and the game is repeated. An urn scheme for learning coordination in this game is as (...)
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  • Norm Manipulation, Norm Evasion: Experimental Evidence.Cristina Bicchieri & Alex K. Chavez - 2013 - Economics and Philosophy 29 (2):175-198.
    Using an economic bargaining game, we tested for the existence of two phenomena related to social norms, namely norm manipulation and norm evasion – the deliberate, private violation of a social norm. We found that the manipulation of a norm of fairness was characterized by a self-serving bias in beliefs about what constituted normatively acceptable behaviour, so that an individual who made an uneven bargaining offer not only genuinely believed it was fair, but also believed that recipients found it fair, (...)
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  • Numerical Simulations of the Lewis Signaling Game: Learning Strategies, Pooling Equilibria, and the Evolution of Grammar.Jeffrey A. Barrett - unknown
    David Lewis (1969) introduced sender-receiver games as a way of investigating how meaningful language might evolve from initially random signals. In this report I investigate the conditions under which Lewis signaling games evolve to perfect signaling systems under various learning dynamics. While the 2-state/2- term Lewis signaling game with basic urn learning always approaches a signaling system, I will show that with more than two states suboptimal pooling equilibria can evolve. Inhomogeneous state distributions increase the likelihood of pooling equilibria, but (...)
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