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Values and the heart's command.Bas C. Van Fraassen - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (1):5-19.details
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The test of truth: An experimental investigation of the norm of assertion.John Turri - 2013 - Cognition 129 (2):279-291.details
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Excuse validation: a study in rule-breaking.John Turri & Peter Blouw - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (3):615-634.details
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What time travelers cannot not do (but are responsible for anyway).Joshua Spencer - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):149-162.details
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`Ought' conversationally implies `can'.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1984 - Philosophical Review 93 (2):249-261.details
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Morality's Demands and Their Limits.Samuel Scheffler - 1986 - Journal of Philosophy 83 (10):531.details
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For the greater goods? Ownership rights and utilitarian moral judgment.J. Charles Millar, John Turri & Ori Friedman - 2014 - Cognition 133 (1):79-84.details
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Universal moral grammar: Theory, evidence, and the future.John Mikhail - 2007 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 11 (4):143 –152.details
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Person as scientist, person as moralist.Joshua Knobe - 2010 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (4):315.details
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Moral dilemmas, disjunctive obligations, and Kant's principle that 'ought' implies 'can'.Dale Jacquette - 1991 - Synthese 88 (1):43 - 55.details
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“Cannot” implies “not ought”.Frances Howard-Snyder - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 130 (2):233-246.details
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Pushing moral buttons: The interaction between personal force and intention in moral judgment.Joshua D. Greene, Fiery A. Cushman, Lisa E. Stewart, Kelly Lowenberg, Leigh E. Nystrom & Jonathan D. Cohen - 2009 - Cognition 111 (3):364-371.details
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The psychology of meta-ethics: Exploring objectivism.Geoffrey P. Goodwin & John M. Darley - 2008 - Cognition 106 (3):1339-1366.details
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'Ought-implies-can', causal determinism and moral responsibility.J. M. Fischer - 2003 - Analysis 63 (3):244-250.details
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Doing the Best We Can: An Essay in Informal Deontic Logic.Fred Feldman - 1986 - D. Reidel Publishing Company.details
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Ought implies can and deontic logic.Norman O. Dahl - 1974 - Philosophia 4 (4):485-511.details
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Crime and punishment: Distinguishing the roles of causal and intentional analyses in moral judgment.Fiery Cushman - 2008 - Cognition 108 (2):353-380.details
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Against moral dilemmas.Earl Conee - 1982 - Philosophical Review 91 (1):87-97.details
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The Kantian versus Frankfurt.A. Blum - 2000 - Analysis 60 (3):287-288.details
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What are we morally responsible for.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1988 - In The Importance of What We Care About. Cambridge University Press. pp. 95-113.details
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Does Consequentialism Demand too Much? Recent Work on the Limits of Obligation.Shelly Kagan - 1984 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 13 (3):239-254.details
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Identification, Situational Constraint, and Social Cognition: Studies in the Attribution of Moral Responsibility.Rob Woolfolk, John Doris & John Darley - 2008 - In Shaun Nichols & Joshua Knobe (eds.), Experimental Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 61.details
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Insanity Defenses.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Ken Levy - 2011 - In John Deigh & David Dolinko (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of the Criminal Law. Oxford University Press. pp. 299--334.details
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