ZusammenfassungDie demografische Entwicklung und der medizinische Fortschritt werden die Problematik der Ressourcenknappheit im Gesundheitswesen in Zukunft weiter verschärfen. Auch Deutschland steht eine Prioritätensetzung im Gesundheitswesen bevor. Diese sollte in möglichst transparenter Weise nach klaren Kriterien erfolgen. Ein nur selten in diesem Kontext besprochenes Kriterium der Verteilung von Mitteln in der Gesundheitsversorgung ist die marginale Wirksamkeit medizinischer Leistungen. Im vorliegenden Beitrag wird dieses Kriterium vorgestellt und auf seine Fairness hin untersucht. Nach der kritischen Diskussion einiger Argumente gegen den offenen Einsatz von (...) Rationierungskriterien und einer Definition von marginaler Wirksamkeit in zwei unterschiedlichen Dimensionen werden verschiedene Vorzüge und eventuelle Nachteile des Kriteriums beleuchtet. (shrink)

Howard Brody expresses concern that citing the “two cases that put futility on the map,” namely Helga Wanglie and Baby K, may be providing ammunition to the opponents of the concept of medical futility. He in fact joins well-known opponents of the concept of medical futility in arguing that it is one thing for the physician to say whether a particular intervention will promote an identified goal, quite another to say whether a goal is worth pursuing. In the latter instance, (...) physicians are laying themselves open “to the criticism of taking on basic value judgments that are more appropriately left to patients and their surrogates.” Brody states that in both the Wanglie and Baby K cases, the “basic value judgments” had to do with the worthiness of maintaining unconscious life via medical technology. He classifies this as “a question of professional integrity—but not a question of futility,” adding that “more than semantics hinges on this distinction.” The “more than semantics” factor is a pragmatic, even political one. Failure to make this distinction renders physicians “that much more suspect and less trustworthy in the public debate.”. (shrink)

Partly because physicians can “never say never,” partly because of the seduction of modern technology, and partly out of misplaced fear of litigation, physicians have increasingly shown a tendency to undertake treatments that have no realistic expectation of success. For this reason, we have articulated common sense criteria for medical futility. If a treatment can be shown not to have worked in the last 100 cases, we propose that it be regarded as medically futile. Also, if the treatment fails to (...) restore consciousness or alleviate total dependence on intensive care, we propose such treatment be judged futile. This definition provides clear end points and encourages the profession to review data from the past and perform, prospective clinical studies that not only report treatments that work but also treatments that do not work. We have also argued that, in a variety of settings, physicians have no ordinary ethical obligation to offer futile interventions. Although physicians should inform, and discuss all decisions to withhold or withdraw medical treatments with patients, they need not obtain the patient's permission to desist from futile interventions. (shrink)

Several recent articles raise an issue long unaddressed in the medical literature: physician compliance with patient or family requests for futile or ineffectice therapy. Although they agree philosophically that such treatment ought not be given, most physicians have followed the course described by Stanley Fiel, in which a young patient dying of cystic fibrosis was accepted “for evaluation” by a transplant center even though he has already passed the threshold of viability as a candidate for a heart-lung transplant. Dr. Fiel (...) reported this action was taken not in the hope of doing the transplant but so that the family could assure themselves they had done “everything possible.” The patient, after a long and stressful cross-country flight, arrived at the hospital in respiratory failure. He died soon thereafter far from home and familiar surroundings. (shrink)

Among those who criticize the concept of a common refrain is that we really have no idea what futility means. For example, physicians seem to disagree on whether a treatment being futile means that it has a less than 5% chance of working or a 20% chance of working. If the concept is so unclear, then it seems a thin reed upon which to base a momentous ethical decision—namely, that the physician's judgment should be allowed to override the wishes of (...) the competent patient or the patient's duly appointed surrogate. (shrink)