- Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence.Thomas Kelly - 2010 - In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Belief in the Face of Controversy.Hilary Kornblith - 2010 - In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Belief's Own Ethics.[author unknown] - 2004 - Behavior and Philosophy 32 (2):269-272.details
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The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement.Tom Kelly - 2005 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 1. Oxford University Press UK.details
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On Treating Oneself and Others as Thermometers.Roger White - 2009 - Episteme 6 (3):233-250.details
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On Treating Oneself and Others as Thermometers.Roger White - 2009 - Episteme 6 (3):233-250.details
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Epistemology of disagreement: The good news.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.details
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Thinking, Fast and Slow.Daniel Kahneman - 2011 - New York: New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.details
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Very Improbable Knowing.Timothy Williamson - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (5):971-999.details
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Rationality’s Fixed Point.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 5.details
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Respecting all the evidence.Paulina Sliwa & Sophie Horowitz - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2835-2858.details
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Rational Self-Doubt and the Failure of Closure.Joshua Schechter - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):428-452.details
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Permission to Believe: Why Permissivism Is True and What It Tells Us About Irrelevant Influences on Belief.Miriam Schoenfield - 2014 - Noûs 48 (2):193-218.details
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Bridging Rationality and Accuracy.Miriam Schoenfield - 2015 - Journal of Philosophy 112 (12):633-657.details
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A Dilemma for Calibrationism.Miriam Schoenfield - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (2):425-455.details
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Some resistance to the idealized thermometer model.Lauren Leydon-Hardy - 2016 - Episteme 13 (4):423-426.details
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New Rational Reflection and Internalism about Rationality.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 5.details
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Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):314-345.details
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Epistemic Akrasia.Sophie Horowitz - 2013 - Noûs 48 (4):718-744.details
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A puzzle about epistemic akrasia.Daniel Greco - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):201-219.details
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Not Just a Truthometer: Taking Oneself Seriously (but not Too Seriously) in Cases of Peer Disagreement.David Enoch - 2010 - Mind 119 (476):953-997.details
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The puzzle of the unmarked clock and the new rational reflection principle.Adam Elga - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (1):127-139.details
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Reflection and disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.details
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Higher Order Evidence.David Christensen - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):185-215.details
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Conciliation, Uniqueness, and Rational Toxicity.David Christensen - 2014 - Noûs 50 (3):584-603.details
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Belief dependence: How do the numbers count?Zach Barnett - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (2):297-319.details
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Belief's Own Ethics.Jonathan Eric Adler - 2002 - MIT Press.details
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Does murphy’s law apply in epistemology?David Christensen - 2007 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 2:3-31.details
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Does Murphy's Law Apply in Epistemology?: Self-Doubt and Rational Ideals.David Christensen - 2007 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology: Volume 2. Oxford University Press.details
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Peer disagreement and higher order evidence.Thomas Kelly - 2010 - In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. Oxford University Press. pp. 183--217.details
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Improbable knowing.Timothy Williamson - 2011 - In Trent Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford University Press.details
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The epistemic significance of disagreement.Thomas Kelly - 2005 - In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology, Volume 1. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 167-196.details
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Disagreement, Question-Begging and Epistemic Self-Criticism.David Christensen - 2011 - Philosophers' Imprint 11.details
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Disagreement and the Burdens of Judgment.Thomas Kelly - 2013 - In David Phiroze Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford University Press.details
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A Defense of the (Almost) Equal Weight View.Stewart Cohen - 2013 - In David Phiroze Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 98-117.details
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Do Judgments Screen Evidence?Brian Weatherson - manuscriptdetails
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Rational Epistemic Akrasia.Allen Coates - 2012 - American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (2):113-24.details
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Disagreement and Belief Dependence: Why Numbers Matter.Jennifer Lackey - 2013 - In David Phiroze Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 243-268.details
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