- Seeking a centaur, adoring adonis: Intensional transitives and empty terms.Mark Richard - 2001 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 25 (1):103–127.details
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Pure Russellianism.Sean Crawford - 2004 - Philosophical Papers 33 (2):171-202.details
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Philosophy of Logic.W. V. O. Quine - 2005-01-01 - In José Medina & David Wood (eds.), Truth. Blackwell.details
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Beyond belief.Daniel C. Dennett - 1982 - In Andrew Woodfield (ed.), Thought And Object: Essays On Intentionality. New York: Oxford: Clarendon Press.details
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Word and Object.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1960 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.details
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The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by John Henry McDowell.details
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Intensions revisited.W. V. Quine - 1977 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1):5-11.details
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Belief and satisfaction.John Wallace - 1972 - Noûs 6 (2):85-95.details
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From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case against Belief.Takashi Yagisawa - 1985 - Noûs 19 (2):288-294.details
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Propositional Attitudes De Dicto and De Re.Ernest Sosa - 1970 - Journal of Philosophy 67 (21):883-896.details
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Is de re_ Belief Reducible to _de dicto?Nathan Salmon - 1997 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 27 (sup1):85-110.details
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Relational belief reports.François Recanati - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 100 (3):255-272.details
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Replies.W. V. Quine - 1968 - Synthese 19 (1-2):264 - 322.details
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Philosophy of logic.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1970 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Edited by Simon Blackburn & Keith Simmons.details
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Quantifiers and propositional attitudes.Willard van Orman Quine - 1955 - Journal of Philosophy 53 (5):177-187.details
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From stimulus to science.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1997 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.details
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De re senses.John Mcdowell - 1984 - Philosophical Quarterly 34 (136):283-294.details
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Notional Specificity.Mark Crimmins - 1995 - Mind and Language 10 (4):464-477.details
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Reference and propositional attitudes.Brian Loar - 1972 - Philosophical Review 81 (1):43-62.details
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Russell’s Notion of Scope.Saul A. Kripke - 2005 - Mind 114 (456):1005-1037.details
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Quantifying in.David Kaplan - 1968 - Synthese 19 (1-2):178-214.details
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Kaplan on Quine and suspension of judgment.Herbert Heidelberger - 1974 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 3 (4):441 - 443.details
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Substitutivity and the Coherence of Quantifying In.Graeme Forbes - 1996 - Philosophical Review 105 (3):337-372.details
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Objectual attitudes.Graeme Forbes - 2000 - Linguistics and Philosophy 23 (2):141-183.details
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Frege's Puzzle. [REVIEW]Graeme Forbes - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (3):455.details
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Suspension of judgment: A response to Heidelberger on Kaplan. [REVIEW]Michael Devitt - 1976 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 5 (1):17 - 24.details
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A solution for Russellians to a puzzle about belief.Sean Crawford - 2004 - Analysis 64 (3):223-29.details
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The First Person: An Essay on Reference and Intentionality.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1981 - University of Minnesota Press.details
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The First Person: An Essay on Reference and Intentionality.Steven E. Boer - 1981 - Philosophy 58 (225):403-405.details
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The First Person: An Essay on Reference and Intentionality.Peter van Inwagen - 1985 - Noûs 19 (1):122-129.details
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Kaplan, quine, and suspended belief.Tyler Burge - 1977 - Philosophical Studies 31 (3):197-203.details
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Belief De Re.Tyler Burge - 1977 - Journal of Philosophy 74 (6):338-362.details
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Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment.Robert Brandom - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.details
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Making it Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment.Robert Kirk - 1996 - Philosophical Quarterly 46 (183):238-241.details
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The Varieties of Reference.Louise M. Antony - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (2):275.details
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Frege’s Puzzle (2nd edition).Nathan U. Salmon - 1986 - Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing Company.details
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Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics and Epistemology of Demonstratives and other Indexicals.David Kaplan - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press. pp. 481-563.details
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On the nature of truth and falsehood.Bertrand Russell - 1910 - In Philosophical Essays. Longmans, Green.details
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From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief.Stephen P. Stich - 1983 - MIT Press.details
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Propositional Attitudes: An Essay on Thoughts and How We Ascribe Them.Mark Richard - 1990 - Cambridge [England] ; New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Themes From Kaplan.Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.) - 1989 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science.Stephen Stich - 1986 - Philosophical Quarterly 36 (143):261-278.details
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Opacity.David Kaplan - 1986 - In Lewis Edwin Hahn & Paul Arthur Schilpp (eds.), The Philosophy of W. V. Quine. Open Court. pp. 229-289.details
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Afterthoughts.David Kaplan - 1989 - In J. Almog, J. Perry & H. Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press. pp. 565-614.details
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A puzzle about belief.Saul A. Kripke - 1979 - In A. Margalit (ed.), Meaning and Use. Reidel. pp. 239--83.details
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The problem of de re modality.Kit Fine - 1989 - In John Perry, J. Almog & Howard K. Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press. pp. 197--272.details
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Books Received. [REVIEW]W. V. Quine - 1968 - Synthese 19 (1-2):323.details
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Word and Object.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1960 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 17 (2):278-279.details
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Themes from Kaplan.Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein - 1990 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 180 (3):572-573.details
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Thoughts about things.William G. Lycan - 1986 - In Myles Brand & Robert M. Harnish (eds.), The Representation of Knowledge and Belief. University of Arizona Press.details
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