- Beliefs, Degrees of Belief, and the Lockean Thesis.Richard Foley - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer. pp. 37-47.details
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Epistemic Normativity.Stephen R. Grimm - 2009 - In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic value. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 243-264.details
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Change in View: Principles of Reasoning.Gilbert Harman - 1986 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.details
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Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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The normativity of rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2013 - Dissertation, Humboldt University of Berlindetails
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The Nature of Rationality.Robert Nozick - 1993 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 186 (1):187-189.details
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Can the lottery paradox be solved by identifying epistemic justification with epistemic permissibility?Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2019 - Episteme 16 (3):241-261.details
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The Normativity of Rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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On justifications and excuses.B. J. C. Madison - 2017 - Synthese 195 (10):4551-4562.details
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The Nature of Rationality.Robert Nozick - 1994 - Princeton University Press.details
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The Value of Rationality.Ralph Wedgwood - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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The Importance of Being Rational.Errol Lord - 2018 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
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Believable Evidence.Veli Mitova - 2017 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Why There are No Epistemic Duties.Chase B. Wrenn - 2007 - Dialogue: The Canadian Philosophical Review 46 (1):115-136.details
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Why There Are No Epistemic Duties.Chase B. Wrenn - 2007 - Dialogue 46 (1):115-136.details
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Knowledge and Its Limits.R. Foley - 2002 - Mind 111 (443):718-726.details
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Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):452-458.details
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The Value of Rationality. [REVIEW]Sebastian Schmidt - 2019 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 73 (1):153-157.details
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The Value of Rationality. [REVIEW]Ralph Wedgwood - 2019 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 73 (1):153-157.details
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The ontology of epistemic reasons.John Turri - 2009 - Noûs 43 (3):490-512.details
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Stick to what you know.Jonathan Sutton - 2005 - Noûs 39 (3):359–396.details
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Reason and the grain of belief.Scott Sturgeon - 2008 - Noûs 42 (1):139–165.details
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Norms of Belief.Mona Simion, Christoph Kelp & Harmen Ghijsen - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):374-392.details
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Rational Self-Doubt and the Failure of Closure.Joshua Schechter - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):428-452.details
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The Nature of Rationality.Robert Nozick - 1993 - Princeton University Press.details
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Review of Robert Nozick: The Nature of Rationality. [REVIEW]Donald C. Hubin - 1993 - Ethics 105 (3):659-662.details
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The Nature of Rationality.Robert Nozick - 1995 - Journal des Economistes Et des Etudes Humaines 6 (1):189-200.details
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We Have No Positive Epistemic Duties.Mark T. Nelson - 2010 - Mind 119 (473):83-102.details
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What You’re Rationally Required to Do and What You Ought to Do.Errol Lord - 2017 - Mind 126 (504):1109-1154.details
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The Coherent and the Rational.Errol Lord - 2014 - Analytic Philosophy 55 (2):151-175.details
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No Evidence is False.Clayton Littlejohn - 2013 - Acta Analytica 28 (2):145-159.details
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New Rational Reflection and Internalism about Rationality.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 5.details
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Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):314-345.details
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Enkrasia or evidentialism? Learning to love mismatch.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (3):597-632.details
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The lottery paradox, epistemic justification and permissibility.Thomas Kroedel - 2012 - Analysis 72 (1):57-60.details
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Review of Gilbert Harman: Change in View: Principles of Reasoning. [REVIEW]Howard Margolis - 1986 - Ethics 99 (4):966-966.details
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Dr. Truthlove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Bayesian Probabilities.Kenny Easwaran - 2016 - Noûs 50 (4):816-853.details
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Contemporary Epistemic Logic and the Lockean Thesis.Lorenz Demey - 2013 - Foundations of Science 18 (4):599-610.details
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Epistemic Akrasia and Epistemic Reasons.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2019 - Episteme 16 (3):282-302.details
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Epistemic normativity and the justification-excuse distinction.Cameron Boult - 2017 - Synthese 194 (10):4065-4081.details
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Epistemic Conditions on “Ought”: E=K as a Case Study.Cameron Boult - 2017 - Acta Analytica 32 (2):223-244.details
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Justification and the Truth-Connection.Clayton Littlejohn - 2012 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology.Earl Brink Conee & Richard Feldman - 2004 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Edited by Richard Feldman.details
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Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology.Earl Conee & Richard Feldman - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (222):147-149.details
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Justifications, Excuses, and Sceptical Scenarios.Timothy Williamson - forthcoming - In Fabian Dorsch & Julien Dutant (eds.), The New Evil Demon. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.details
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Reasons and belief's justification.Clayton Littlejohn - 2011 - In Andrew Evan Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. Cambridge University Press.details
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Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):105-116.details
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No Need for Excuses: Against Knowledge-First Epistemology and the Knowledge Norm of Assertion.Joshua Schechter - 2017 - In J. Adam Carter, Emma Gordon & Benjamin Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge-First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford University Press. pp. 132-159.details
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The Spectra of Epistemic Norms.Matt Weiner - 2013 - In Clayton Littlejohn & John Turri (eds.), Epistemic Norms: New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 201-218.details
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