- (1 other version)Epistemic permissiveness.Roger White - 2018 - In Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Contemporary epistemology: an anthology. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.details
|
|
Impermissive Bayesianism.Christopher J. G. Meacham - 2013 - Erkenntnis 79 (Suppl 6):1185-1217.details
|
|
(1 other version)Goldman's psychologism: Review of Epistemology and Cognition. [REVIEW]Paul Thagard - 1986 - Erkenntnis 34 (1):117-123.details
|
|
(1 other version)Cognitive science and naturalized epistemology: A review of Alvin I. Goldman's Epistemology and Cognition. [REVIEW]Gerald W. Glaser - 1989 - Behaviorism 17 (2):161-164.details
|
|
When Rational Reasoners Reason Differently.Michael G. Titelbaum & Matthew Kopec - 2019details
|
|
An Argument for Uniqueness About Evidential Support.Sinan Dogramaci & Sophie Horowitz - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):130-147.details
|
|
Can the aim of belief ground epistemic normativity?Charles Côté-Bouchard - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (12):3181-3198.details
|
|
Uniqueness and Metaepistemology.Daniel Greco & Brian Hedden - 2016 - Journal of Philosophy 113 (8):365-395.details
|
|
(1 other version)A Partial Defense of Permissivism.Nathaniel Sharadin - 2015 - Ratio 28 (2):57-71.details
|
|
A Defense of the (Almost) Equal Weight View.Stewart Cohen - 2013 - In David Phiroze Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 98-117.details
|
|
Evidence Cannot Be Permissive.Roger White - 2013 - In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Blackwell. pp. 312.details
|
|
(1 other version)Permission to Believe: Why Permissivism Is True and What It Tells Us About Irrelevant Influences on Belief.Miriam Schoenfield - 2012 - Noûs 48 (2):193-218.details
|
|
Epistemology and cognition.Alvin I. Goldman - 1986 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.details
|
|
The social dimensions of scientific knowledge.Helen Longino - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|
(1 other version)Epistemic permissiveness.Roger White - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):445–459.details
|
|
Epistemic Instrumentalism and the Too Few Reasons Objection.Charles Côté-Bouchard - 2015 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (3):337-355.details
|
|
Immoderately rational.Sophie Horowitz - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (1):41-56.details
|
|
Epistemic Normativity.Stephen Grimm - 2009 - In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic value. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 243-264.details
|
|
(1 other version)Epistemology and Cognition.Fred Dretske - 1988 - Journal of Philosophy 85 (5):265-270.details
|
|
The Uniqueness Thesis.Matthew Kopec & Michael G. Titelbaum - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (4):189-200.details
|
|
A Counterexample to the Uniqueness Thesis.Matthew Kopec - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (2):403-409.details
|
|
(1 other version)A Partial Defense of Permissivism.Nathaniel Sharadin - 2015 - Ratio 30 (1):57-71.details
|
|
The Case for Rational Uniqueness.Jonathan Matheson - 2011 - Logic and Episteme 2 (3):359-373.details
|
|
(1 other version)Permission to believe : why permissivism is true and what it tells us about irrelevant influences on belief.Miriam Schoenfield - 2018 - In Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Contemporary epistemology: an anthology. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.details
|
|
(1 other version)Alvin I. Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition. [REVIEW]Darryl Bruce - 1989 - Synthese 79 (1):165-169.details
|
|