- (1 other version)Relevant Logic: A Philosophical Examination of Inference.Stephen Read - 1988 - New York, NY, USA: Wiley-Blackwell.details
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Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing.Duncan Pritchard - 2015 - Princeton: Princeton University Press.details
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Against Knowledge Closure.Marc Alspector-Kelly - 2019 - New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.details
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Vagueness and Contradiction.Roy Sorensen - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):695-703.details
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(5 other versions)Philosophical Explanations. [REVIEW]Robert Nozick - 1981 - Philosophy 58 (223):118-121.details
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A Defence Of Modus Tollens.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Alonso Church - 1990 - Analysis 50 (1):9.details
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Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):353-356.details
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(3 other versions)Conditionals.Frank Jackson - 1988 - Mind 97 (388):626-628.details
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Two Kinds of Skeptical Argument.Stewart Cohen - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1):143-159.details
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(5 other versions)Philosophical Explanations. [REVIEW]Robert Nozick - 1982 - Critica 14 (41):87-93.details
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(2 other versions)The Development of Logic.William Calvert Kneale & Martha Kneale - 1962 - Oxford, England: Clarendon Press. Edited by Martha Kneale.details
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Open knowledge and changing the subject.Stephen Yablo - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (4):1047-1071.details
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Evidence and the openness of knowledge.Assaf Sharon & Levi Spectre - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (4):1001-1037.details
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On Sharon and Spectre’s argument against closure.Juan Comesaña - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (4):1039-1046.details
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Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing.Duncan Pritchard - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (3):70-90.details
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Questions, topics and restricted closure.Peter Hawke - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2759-2784.details
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The New Relevant Alternatives Theory.Jonathan Vogel - 1999 - Noûs 33 (s13):155-180.details
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(1 other version)Philosophical Guide to Conditionals.Jonathan Bennett - 2003 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
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On synchronic dogmatism.Rodrigo Borges - 2015 - Synthese 192 (11):3677-3693.details
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Epistemic closure.Peter Baumann - 2010 - In Sven Bernecker & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Epistemology. New York: Routledge. pp. 597--608.details
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The Case for Closure.John Hawthorne - 2013 - In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Blackwell. pp. 26-43.details
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(3 other versions)What is Justified Belief?Alvin I. Goldman - 1979 - In George Pappas (ed.), Justification and Knowledge: New Studies in Epistemology. Boston: D. Reidel. pp. 1-25.details
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The Case Against Closure.Fred I. Dretske - 2013 - In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Blackwell. pp. 13--25.details
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Justification, Deductive Closure and Reasons to Believe.Robert Audi - 1991 - Dialogue 30 (1-2):77-.details
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Deductive Justification.Catherine M. Canary & Douglas Odegard - 1989 - Dialogue 28 (2):305-.details
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Rational Self-Doubt and the Failure of Closure.Joshua Schechter - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):428-452.details
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Dogmatism repuzzled.Assaf Sharon & Levi Spectre - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 148 (2):307 - 321.details
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Certainty, a refutation of scepticism.Peter David Klein - 1981 - Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.details
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Knowledge and lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)A philosophical guide to conditionals.Jonathan Bennett - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)A brief history of the paradox: philosophy and the labyrinths of the mind.Roy A. Sorensen - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Vagueness and contradiction.Roy A. Sorensen - 2001 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Contemporary theories of knowledge.John L. Pollock - 1986 - London: Hutchinson.details
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Justification and truth.Stewart Cohen - 1984 - Philosophical Studies 46 (3):279--95.details
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(Anti-)sceptics simple and subtle: G. E. Moore and John McDowell.Crispin Wright - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):330-348.details
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A counterexample to modus ponens.Vann McGee - 1985 - Journal of Philosophy 82 (9):462-471.details
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(1 other version)Strong and weak justification.Alvin Goldman - 1987 - Philosophical Perspectives 2:51-69.details
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(1 other version)Epistemic operators.Fred I. Dretske - 1970 - Journal of Philosophy 67 (24):1007-1023.details
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(1 other version)The structure of the skeptical argument.Anthony Brueckner - 1994 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (4):827-835.details
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Contemporary Theories of Knowledge.John Pollock - 1986 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39 (1):131-140.details
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(1 other version)Relevant logic: a philosophical examination of inference.Stephen Read - 1988 - Oxford: Blackwell.details
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The Rationality of Science.W. Newton-Smith - 1981 - Boston: Routledge.details
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Replies to Comesaña and Yablo.Assaf Sharon & Levi Spectre - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (4):1073-1090.details
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If P, Then Q: Conditionals and the Foundations of Reasoning.David H. Sanford - 1989 - New York, NY, USA: Routledge.details
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Reliabilism and Intellectual Virtue.Ernest Sosa - 2000 - In Guy Axtell (ed.), Knowledge, Belief, and Character: Readings in Virtue Epistemology. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. pp. 33-40.details
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(3 other versions)What is justified belief?Alvin I. Goldman - 2003 - In Steven Luper (ed.), Essential Knowledge: Readings in Epistemology. Longman. pp. 178.details
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Transmission of Justification and Warrant.Luca Moretti & Tommaso Piazza - 2013 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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The Structure of Sceptical Arguments.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (218):37 - 52.details
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Conditionals.Michael Woods - 1997 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by David Wiggins & Dorothy Edgington.details
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Skeptical arguments.Jonathan Vogel - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):426–455.details
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