Switch to: Citations

References in:

What is temporal ontology?

Philosophical Studies 175 (3):793-807 (2018)

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. Chronogeometrical Determinism and the Local Present.Steven Savitt - unknown
    Hilary Putnam argued that the special theory of relativity shows that there can be no temporal becoming. Howard Stein replied by defining a becoming relation in Minkowski spacetime. Clifton and Hogarth extended and sharpened Stein’s results. Game over? To the contrary, it has been argued that the Stein-Clifton-Hogarth theorems actually support Putnam’s contention, in that if an apparently minimal condition is put on the becoming relation, then these theorems entail that the becoming relation must be the universal relation. I recount (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   878 citations  
  • Writing the Book of the World.Theodore Sider - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
    In order to perfectly describe the world, it is not enough to speak truly. One must also use the right concepts - including the right logical concepts. One must use concepts that "carve at the joints", that give the world's "structure". There is an objectively correct way to "write the book of the world". Much of metaphysics, as traditionally conceived, is about the fundamental nature of reality; in the present terms, this is about the world's structure. Metametaphysics - inquiry into (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   379 citations  
  • On the Plurality of Worlds.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Wiley-Blackwell.
    This book is a defense of modal realism; the thesis that our world is but one of a plurality of worlds, and that the individuals that inhabit our world are only a few out of all the inhabitants of all the worlds. Lewis argues that the philosophical utility of modal realism is a good reason for believing that it is true.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1006 citations  
  • Demarcating Presentism.Christian Wuthrich - 2010 - In Henk de Regt, Samir Okasha & Stephan Hartmann (eds.), EPSA Philosophy of Science: Amsterdam 2009. Springer. pp. 441--450.
    This paper argues that recent arguments to the effect that the debate between presentism and eternalism lacks any metaphysical substance ultimately fail, although important lessons can be gleaned from them in how to formulate a non-vacuous version of presentism. It suggests that presentism can best be characterized in the context of spacetime theories. The resulting position is an ersatzist version of presentism that admits merely non-present entities as abstracta deprived of physical existence. Ersatzist presentism both escapes the charges of triviality (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Fine's McTaggart, Temporal Passage, and the A Versus B Debate.Natalja Deng - 2013 - Ratio 26 (1):19-34.
    I offer an interpretation and a partial defense of Kit Fine's ‘Argument from Passage’, which is situated within his reconstruction of McTaggart's paradox. Fine argues that existing A-theoretic approaches to passage are no more dynamic, i.e. capture passage no better, than the B-theory. I argue that this comparative claim is correct. Our intuitive picture of passage, which inclines us towards A-theories, suggests more than coherent A-theories can deliver. In Finean terms, the picture requires not only Realism about tensed facts, but (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  • What is Presentism?Daniel Deasy - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):378-397.
    Different versions of the A-theory of time are traditionally defined in terms of whether everything is present, or whether there are also past and future things. In this paper I argue that the traditional way of defining A-theories should be abandoned. I focus on the traditional definition of presentism, according to which always, everything is present. First, I argue that there are good reasons to reject all the most plausible interpretations of the predicate ‘is present’ as it appears in the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   25 citations  
  • (Existence) Presentism and the A-Theory.Jonathan Tallant - 2012 - Analysis 72 (4):673-681.
    Next SectionIn this article I offer a new version of presentism and argue that this new version of presentism is not a species of the A-theory. Along the way, I argue that Rasmussen’s recent attempt to articulate a version of presentism that is not also a version of the A-theory does not succeed.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  • The Fate of Presentism in Modern Physics.Christian Wuthrich - 2011 - In Roberto Ciuni, Kristie Miller & Giuliano Torrengo (eds.), New Papers on the Present--Focus on Presentism. Philosophia Verlag.
    Defining ‘presentism’ in a way that saves it from being trivially false yet metaphysically substantively distinct from eternalism is no mean feat, as the first part of this collection testifies. In Wuthrich (forthcoming), I have offered an attempt to achieve just this, arguing that this is best done in the context of modern spacetime theories. Here, I shall refrain from going through all the motions again and simply state the characterization of an ersatzist version of presentism as it has emerged (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  • The Midlife Crisis.Kieran Setiya - 2014 - Philosophers' Imprint 14.
    Argues that philosophy can solve the midlife crisis, at least in one of its forms. This crisis turns on the exhaustibility of our ends. The solution is to value ends that are ‘atelic,’ so inexhaustible. Topics include: John Stuart Mill's nervous breakdown; Aristotle on the finality of the highest good; and Schopenhauer on the futility of desire.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • On The Plurality of Worlds.Graeme Forbes - 1988 - Philosophical Quarterly 38 (151):222-240.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   513 citations  
  • The Presentist’s Dilemma.Ulrich Meyer - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 122 (3):213-225.
    This paper defends three theses: that presentism is either trivial or untenable; that the debate between tensed and tenseless theories of time is not about the status of presentism; and that there is no temporal analogue of the modal thesis of actualism.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   35 citations  
  • Other Times: Philosophical Perspectives on Past, Present and Future.David Cockburn - 1997 - Cambridge University Press.
    We view things from a certain position in time: in our language, thought, feelings and actions, we draw distinctions between what has happened, is happening, and will happen. Frequently, approaches to this feature of our lives - those seen in disputes between tensed and tenseless theories, between realist and anti-realist treatments of past and future, and in accounts of historical knowledge - embody serious misunderstandings of the character of the issues; they misconstrue the relation between metaphysics and ethics, and the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Other Times: Philosophical Perspectives on Past, Present and Future.David Cockburn - 1999 - Mind 108 (432):761-764.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Other Times: Philosophical Perspectives on Past, Present and Future.T. L. S. Sprigge - 1997 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 61 (2):485-488.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Defining Existence Presentism.Jonathan Charles Tallant - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S3):479-501.
    In this paper I argue in favour of a new definition of presentism that I call ‘existence presentism’ (EP). Typically, presentism is defined as the thesis that ‘only present objects exist’, or ‘nothing exists that is non-present’.1 I assume these statements to be equivalent. I call these statements of presentism ‘conventional presentism’ (CP). First, in §2, I rehearse arguments due to Ulrich Meyer that purport to show that presentism is not adequately defined as CP. In §§2.1–2.4 I show that considerations (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  • Anti‐Metaphysicalism, Necessity, and Temporal Ontology.Mark Balaguer - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):145-167.
    This paper argues for a certain kind of anti-metaphysicalism about the temporal ontology debate, i.e., the debate between presentists and eternalists over the existence of past and future objects. Three different kinds of anti-metaphysicalism are defined—namely, non-factualism, physical-empiricism, and trivialism. The paper argues for the disjunction of these three views. It is then argued that trivialism is false, so that either non-factualism or physical-empiricism is true. Finally, the paper ends with a discussion of whether we should endorse non-factualism or physical-empiricism. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Time and Truth: The Presentism-Eternalism Debate.Tom Stoneham - 2009 - Philosophy 84 (2):201-218.
    There are many questions we can ask about time, but perhaps the most fundamental is whether there are metaphysically interesting differences between past, present and future events. An eternalist believes in a block universe: past, present and future events are all on an equal footing. A gradualist believes in a growing block: he agress with the eternalist about the past and the present but not about the future. A presentist believes that what is present has a special status. My first (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  • Presentism and the Triviality Objection.Takeshi Sakon - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (4):1089-1109.
    Presentism is usually understood as the thesis that only the present exists whereas the rival theory of eternalism is usually understood as the thesis that past, present, and future things are all equally real. The significance of this debate has been threatened by the so-called triviality objection, which allegedly shows that the presentist thesis is either trivially true or obviously false: Presentism is trivially true if it is read as saying that everything that exists now is present, and it is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Time and Truth: The Presentism-Eternalism Debate: Tom Stoneham.Tom Stoneham - 2009 - Philosophy 84 (2):201-218.
    There are many questions we can ask about time, but perhaps the most fundamental is whether there are metaphysically interesting differences between past, present and future events. An eternalist believes in a block universe: past, present and future events are all on an equal footing. A gradualist believes in a growing block: he agrees with the eternalist about the past and the present but not about the future. A presentist believes that what is present has a special status. My first (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Time for a Change : A Polemic Against the Presentism/Eternalism Debate.Lawrence B. Lombard - 2010 - In Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & Harry Silverstein (eds.), Time and Identity. MIT Press.
    This chapter elaborates on an intuitive criterion much discussed by ancient Greek philosophers regarding the conditions under which an object can be said to change. Heraclitus and Parmenides both denied the possibility of change. Heraclitus believed that changes are constantly occurring. Consequently, he needed to sever the connection between the idea that a thing changes and the idea that a change occurs, a connection expressed by the claim that a change occurs just in case a thing changes. Heraclitus was a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Presentism and Eternalism in Perspective.Steven Savitt - unknown
    The distinction between presentism and eternalism is usually sought in some formula like ‘Only presently existing things exist’ or ‘Past, present, and future events are equally real’. I argue that ambiguities in the copula prevent these slogans from distinguishing significant opposed positions. I suggest in addition that one can find a series of significant distinctions if one takes spacetime structure into account. These presentisms and eternalisms are not contradictory. They are complementary elements of a complete naturalistic philosophy of time.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   40 citations