- Peer disagreement and higher order evidence.Thomas Kelly - 2011 - In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 183--217.details
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Rational Reflection.David Christensen - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):121-140.details
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Why epistemology cannot be operationalized.Timothy Williamson - 2008 - In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: new essays. New York : Oxford University Press,: Oxford University Press.details
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Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence.Thomas Kelly - 2010 - In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Epistemic permissiveness.Roger White - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):445–459.details
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Choosing for Changing Selves.Richard Pettigrew - 2019 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
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Living on the Edge: Against Epistemic Permissivism.Ginger Schultheis - 2018 - Mind 127 (507):863-879.details
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The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence.Alex Worsnip - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):3-44.details
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Very Improbable Knowing.Timothy Williamson - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (5):971-999.details
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Confidence, Evidence, and Disagreement.Katia Vavova - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S1):173-183.details
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Rationality’s Fixed Point.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 5.details
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Moore's Paradox and the Accessibility of Justification.Declan Smithies - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):273-300.details
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Ideal rationality and logical omniscience.Declan Smithies - 2015 - Synthese 192 (9):2769-2793.details
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Respecting all the evidence.Paulina Sliwa & Sophie Horowitz - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2835-2858.details
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Stop Making Sense? On a Puzzle about Rationality.Littlejohn Clayton - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:257-272.details
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Permissive Rationality and Sensitivity.Benjamin Anders Levinstein - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (2):342-370.details
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New Rational Reflection and Internalism about Rationality.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 5.details
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A defense of imprecise credences in inference and decision making1.James M. Joyce - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):281-323.details
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Two mistakes about credence and chance.Ned Hall - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):93 – 111.details
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The Puzzle of Metacoherence.Michael Huemer - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (1):1-21.details
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Epistemic Akrasia.Sophie Horowitz - 2013 - Noûs 48 (4):718-744.details
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Correcting the guide to objective chance.Ned Hall - 1994 - Mind 103 (412):505-518.details
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Could KK Be OK?Daniel Greco - 2014 - Journal of Philosophy 111 (4):169-197.details
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Access externalism.John Gibbons - 2006 - Mind 115 (457):19-39.details
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Respecting the evidence.Richard Feldman - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):95–119.details
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The puzzle of the unmarked clock and the new rational reflection principle.Adam Elga - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (1):127-139.details
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Reflection and disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.details
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Evidence: A Guide for the Uncertain.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (3):586-632.details
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Higher Order Evidence.David Christensen - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):185-215.details
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Disagreement, Drugs, etc.: from Accuracy to Akrasia.David Christensen - 2016 - Episteme 13 (4):397-422.details
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.Maryanne Kline Horowitz (ed.) - 2005 - Charles Scribner’s Sons.details
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Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.details
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Evidential Symmetry and Mushy Credence.Roger White - 2009 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 3:161-186.details
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Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.details
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Plausible Permissivism.Michael G. Titelbaum & Matthew Kopec - manuscriptdetails
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