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Mental agency, conscious thinking, and phenomenal character.Matthew Soteriou - 2009 - In Lucy O'Brien & Matthew Soteriou (eds.), Mental actions. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 231.details
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Judging and the scope of mental agency.Fabian Dorsch - 2009 - In Lucy O'Brien & Matthew Soteriou (eds.), Mental actions. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 38-71.details
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What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - In Josh Weisberg (ed.), Consciousness (Key Concepts in Philosophy). Polity.details
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What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.details
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Moorean Moral Phenomenology.Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons - 2007 - In Susana Nuccetelli & Gary Seay (eds.), Themes From G. E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology and Ethics. Oxford University Press.details
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Experience and Introspection.Fabian Dorsch - 2013 - In Fiona Macpherson & Dimitris Platchias (eds.), Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. pp. 175-220.details
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Index.T. M. Scanlon - 2008 - In Thomas Scanlon (ed.), Moral dimensions: permissibility, meaning, blame. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. pp. 243-247.details
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Values and Secondary Qualities.John McDowell - 1985 - In Ted Honderich (ed.), Morality and objectivity: a tribute to J.L. Mackie. Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul. pp. 110-129.details
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Identity and Discrimination.Roy A. Sorensen - 1992 - Philosophical Quarterly 42 (166):95-98.details
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Identity and Discrimination.Timothy Williamson (ed.) - 1990 - Cambridge, Mass., USA: Wiley-Blackwell.details
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The Possibility of Practical Reason.Thomas Pink - 2003 - Mind 112 (448):812-816.details
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The Possibility of Practical Reason.David Velleman - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by J. David Velleman.details
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The silence of the senses.Charles Travis - 2004 - Mind 113 (449):57-94.details
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Transparency, Intentionalism, and the Nature of Perceptual Content.Jeff Speaks - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):539-573.details
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What Is the Role of Consciousness in Demonstrative Thought?Declan Smithies - 2011 - Journal of Philosophy 108 (1):5-34.details
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Subject and Object in the Contents of Visual Experience.Susanna Siegel - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (3):355--88.details
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Self-knowledge and "inner sense": Lecture I: The object perception model.Sydney Shoemaker - 1994 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (2):249-269.details
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Picture, image and experience. [REVIEW]Sonia Sedivy - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (3):472-475.details
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Identity and Discrimination.Stephen P. Schwartz - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (4):888.details
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The Phenomenology of Cognition: Or What Is It Like to Think That P?David Pitt - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):1-36.details
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Conscious attitudes, attention, and self-knowledge.Christopher Peacocke - 1998 - In Crispin Wright, Barry C. Smith & Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press. pp. 83.details
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Being Known.A. Goldman - 2001 - Mind 110 (440):1105-1109.details
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Précis of Being Known_ _*.Christopher Peacocke - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (3):636-640.details
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Being known.Christopher Peacocke - 1999 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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A Study of Concepts.Christopher Peacocke - 1992 - MIT Press.details
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Reason without Freedom: The Problem of Epistemic Normativity.Eugene Mills - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):462-466.details
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Tye: Consciousness, color and content. [REVIEW]Barry Maud - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 113 (3):249 - 260.details
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The transparency of experience.Michael G. F. Martin - 2002 - Mind and Language 17 (4):376-425.details
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The limits of self-awareness.Michael G. F. Martin - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):37-89.details
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Self–observation.M. G. F. Martin - 1997 - European Journal of Philosophy 5 (2):119–140.details
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Self–Observation.M. G. F. Martin - 2002 - European Journal of Philosophy 5 (2):119-140.details
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Why be rational.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.details
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How Does Coherence Matter?Niko Kolodny - 2007 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt3):229 - 263.details
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The intrinsic quality of experience.Gilbert Harman - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52.details
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A Study of Concepts.Robert Hanna - 1994 - Philosophical Review 103 (3):541.details
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Experience and Reason.Fabian Dorsch - 2011 - Rero Doc.details
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The Unity of Hallucinations.Fabian Dorsch - 2010 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (2):171-191.details
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The Unity of Imagining.Fabian Dorsch - 2012 - De Gruyter.details
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Transparency and Imagining Seeing.Fabian Dorsch - 2010 - Philosophical Explorations 13 (3):173-200.details
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Register.Fabian Dorsch - 2009 - In Die Natur der Farben. De Gruyter. pp. 485-495.details
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Die Natur der Farben.Fabian Dorsch - 2009 - De Gruyter.details
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Is Perception a Propositional Attitude?Tim Crane - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):452-469.details
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The Case Against Cognitive Phenomenology.Peter Carruthers & Bénédicte Veillet - 2011 - In Tim Bayne & Michelle Montague (eds.), Cognitive phenomenology. Oxford University Press. pp. 35.details
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Phenomenal Consciousness.Peter Carruthers - 2001 - Mind 110 (440):1057-1062.details
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On Kendall Walton's Mimesis as Make-BelieveMemesis As Make-Believe. [REVIEW]Noel Carroll & Kendall Walton - 1991 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (2):383.details
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Reason and the first person.Tyler Burge - 1998 - In Crispin Wright, Barry C. Smith & Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press.details
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