- Reasonable religious disagreements.Richard Feldman - 2011 - In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Peer disagreement and higher order evidence.Thomas Kelly - 2011 - In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 183--217.details
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Permission to believe : why permissivism is true and what it tells us about irrelevant influences on belief.Miriam Schoenfield - 2018 - In Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Contemporary epistemology: an anthology. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.details
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Epistemic permissiveness.Roger White - 2018 - In Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Contemporary epistemology: an anthology. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.details
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Epistemology of disagreement : the good news.David Christensen - 2018 - In Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Contemporary epistemology: an anthology. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.details
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Reasonable religious disagreements.Richard Feldman - 2010 - In Louise M. Antony (ed.), Philosophers Without Gods: Meditations on Atheism and the Secular Life. Oup Usa. pp. 194-214.details
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Pragmatic Reasons for Belief.Andrew Reisner - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
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Evidence Cannot Be Permissive.Roger White - 2013 - In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Blackwell. pp. 312.details
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Evidence Can Be Permissive.Thomas Kelly - 2013 - In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Blackwell. pp. 298.details
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Justification and truth.Stewart Cohen - 1984 - Philosophical Studies 46 (3):279--95.details
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Nominalism, Naturalism, Epistemic Relativism.William G. Lycan, Penelope Maddy, Gideon Rosen & Nathan Salmon - 2001 - Philosophical Perspectives 15:69–91.details
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On the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification.John Turri - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):312-326.details
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Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence.Thomas Kelly - 2010 - In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism.J. J. C. Smart - 1998 - In James Rachels (ed.), Ethical Theory 2: Theories About How We Should Live. Oxford University Press UK.details
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Epistemic permissiveness.Roger White - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):445–459.details
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Epistemology of disagreement: The good news.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.details
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The aim of belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Philosophical Perspectives 16:267-97.details
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Extreme and restricted utilitarianism.J. J. C. Smart - 1956 - Philosophical Quarterly 6 (25):344-354.details
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Nothing but the Evidential Considerations?Nathaniel P. Sharadin - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (2):1-19.details
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Nothing but the Evidential Considerations?Nathaniel P. Sharadin - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (2):343-361.details
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Permission to Believe: Why Permissivism Is True and What It Tells Us About Irrelevant Influences on Belief.Miriam Schoenfield - 2014 - Noûs 48 (2):193-218.details
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Evidentialism and the Numbers Game.Andrew E. Reisner - 2007 - Theoria 73 (4):304-316.details
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The Uniqueness Thesis.Matthew Kopec & Michael G. Titelbaum - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (4):189-200.details
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A Counterexample to the Uniqueness Thesis.Matthew Kopec - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (2):403-409.details
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Evidence.Thomas Kelly - 2006 - Philosophy Compass.details
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The sentiment of rationality.William James - 1879 - Mind 4 (15):317-346.details
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Immoderately rational.Sophie Horowitz - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (1):41-56.details
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Epistemic Decision Theory.Hilary Greaves - 2013 - Mind 122 (488):915-952.details
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``Evidence and Reasons for Belief".Richard Foley - 1991 - Analysis 51 (2):98-102.details
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Epistemic Merit, Intrinsic and Instrumental.Roderick Firth - 1981 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 55 (1):5-23.details
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Reflection and disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.details
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The Rejection of Epistemic Consequentialism.Selim Berker - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):363-387.details
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Justification and the Truth-Connection.Clayton Littlejohn - 2012 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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From Normativity to Responsibility.Joseph Raz - 2011 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology.Earl Brink Conee & Richard Feldman - 2004 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Edited by Richard Feldman.details
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Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology.Earl Conee & Richard Feldman - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (222):147-149.details
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Epistemological puzzles about disagreement.Richard Feldman - 2006 - In Stephen Hetherington (ed.), Epistemology Futures. Oxford University Press. pp. 216-236.details
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Leaps of Knowledge.Andrew Reisner - 2013 - In Timothy Chan (ed.), The Aim of Belief. Oxford University Press. pp. 167-183.details
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The Will to believe and other Essays in popular philosophy.William James - 1899 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 47:223-228.details
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