- Reliabilism and the Value of Knowledge.Alvin I. Goldman & Erik J. Olsson - 2009 - In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic value. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 19-41.details
|
|
Epistemic Normativity.Stephen R. Grimm - 2009 - In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic value. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 243-264.details
|
|
A Virtue Epistemology: Volume I: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge.Ernest Sosa - 2007 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
|
|
Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
The Nature of Rationality.Robert Nozick - 1993 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 186 (1):187-189.details
|
|
The Nature of Rationality.Robert Nozick - 1994 - Princeton University Press.details
|
|
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):452-458.details
|
|
Ambiguous rationality.Timothy Williamson - 2017 - Episteme 14 (3):263-274.details
|
|
The aim of belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Philosophical Perspectives 16:267-97.details
|
|
A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Volume I.Ernest Sosa - 2007 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
A virtue epistemology: Apt belief and reflective knowledge, volume I * by Ernest Sosa. [REVIEW]Ernest Sosa - 2007 - Analysis 69 (2):382-385.details
|
|
Ideal rationality and logical omniscience.Declan Smithies - 2015 - Synthese 192 (9):2769-2793.details
|
|
Belief and Self‐Knowledge: Lessons From Moore's Paradox.Declan Smithies - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):393-421.details
|
|
Suspending is Believing.Thomas Raleigh - 2019 - Synthese (3):1-26.details
|
|
Resolving epistemic dilemmas.Douglas Odegard - 1993 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (2):161 – 168.details
|
|
The Nature of Rationality.Robert Nozick - 1993 - Princeton University Press.details
|
|
The Nature of Rationality.Robert Nozick - 1995 - Journal des Economistes Et des Etudes Humaines 6 (1):189-200.details
|
|
We Have No Positive Epistemic Duties.Mark T. Nelson - 2010 - Mind 119 (473):83-102.details
|
|
Our errant epistemic aim.Stephen Maitzen - 1995 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (4):869-876.details
|
|
The Concept of Inductive Probability.Patrick Maher - 2006 - Erkenntnis 65 (2):185-206.details
|
|
The Enterprise of Knowledge: An Essay on Knowledge, Credal Probability, and Chance.Isaac Levi - 1980 - MIT Press.details
|
|
On indeterminate probabilities.Isaac Levi - 1974 - Journal of Philosophy 71 (13):391-418.details
|
|
On Indeterminate Probabilities.Isaac Levi - 1978 - Journal of Philosophy 71 (13):233--261.details
|
|
Justified belief and epistemically responsible action.Hilary Kornblith - 1983 - Philosophical Review 92 (1):33-48.details
|
|
Epistemic normativity.Hilary Kornblith - 1993 - Synthese 94 (3):357 - 376.details
|
|
Epistemic rationality as instrumental rationality: A critique.Thomas Kelly - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):612–640.details
|
|
Evidence and Normativity: Reply to Leite.Thomas Kelly - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):465-474.details
|
|
Should have known.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):2863-2894.details
|
|
Reliabilism, veritism, and epistemic consequentialism.Alvin I. Goldman - 2015 - Episteme 12 (2):131-143.details
|
|
Why Suspend Judging?Jane Friedman - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):302-326.details
|
|
Epistemic Merit, Intrinsic and Instrumental.Roderick Firth - 1981 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 55 (1):5-23.details
|
|
Evidential Probabilities and Credences.Anna-Maria Asunta Eder - 2023 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 74 (1).details
|
|
The Lottery Paradox and Our Epistemic Goal.Igor Douven - 2008 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (2):204-225.details
|
|
Against an epistemic dilemma.Earl Conee - 1994 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (4):475 – 481.details
|
|
Theorizing about the epistemic.Stewart Cohen - 2016 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 59 (7-8):839-857.details
|
|
Putting logic in its place: formal constraints on rational belief.David Phiroze Christensen - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
The Rejection of Epistemic Consequentialism.Selim Berker - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):363-387.details
|
|
Reply to Goldman: Cutting Up the One to Save the Five in Epistemology.Selim Berker - 2015 - Episteme 12 (2):145-153.details
|
|
A Defence of Epistemic Consequentialism.Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij & Jeffrey Dunn - 2014 - Philosophical Quarterly 64 (257):541-551.details
|
|
A virtue epistemology.Ernest Sosa - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Our Errant Epistemic Aim.Stephen Maitzen - 1995 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (4):869-876.details
|
|
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):105-116.details
|
|
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.details
|
|
Truth as the Primary Epistemic Goal: A Working Hypothesis.Marian David - 2013 - In Matthias Steup, John Turri & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (Second Edition). Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 363-377.details
|
|
There Are No Norms of Belief.David Papineau - 2013 - In Timothy Chan (ed.), The Aim of Belief. Oxford University Press.details
|
|
How to be a teleologist about epistemic reasons.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2011 - In Asbjorn Steglich-Petersen & Andrew Reisner (eds.), Reasons for Belief. Cambridge University Press. pp. 13--33.details
|
|
A defence of Epistemic Consequentialism.Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij & Jeffrey Dunn - unknowndetails
|
|