According to a captivating picture, epistemic justification is essentially a matter of epistemic or evidential likelihood. While certain problems for this view are well known, it is motivated by a very natural thought—if justification can fall short of epistemic certainty, then what else could it possibly be? In this paper I shall develop an alternative way of thinking about epistemic justification. On this conception, the difference between justification and likelihood turns out to be akin to the more widely recognised difference (...) between ceteris paribus laws and brute statistical generalisations. I go on to discuss, in light of this suggestion, issues such as classical and lottery-driven scepticism as well as the lottery and preface paradoxes. (shrink)

This paper presents a partial analysis of perceptual knowledge, an analysis that will, I hope, lay a foundation for a general theory of knowing. Like an earlier theory I proposed, the envisaged theory would seek to explicate the concept of knowledge by reference to the causal processes that produce (or sustain) belief. Unlike the earlier theory, however, it would abandon the requirement that a knower's belief that p be causally connected with the fact, or state of affairs, that p.

ON DECEMBER 10, 1991 Charles Shonubi, a Nigerian citizen but a resident of the USA, was arrested at John F. Kennedy International Airport for the importation of heroin into the United States.1 Shonubi's modus operandi was ``balloon swallowing.'' That is, heroin was mixed with another substance to form a paste and this paste was sealed in balloons which were then swallowed. The idea was that once the illegal substance was safely inside the USA, the smuggler would pass the balloons and (...) recover the heroin. On the date of his arrest, Shonubi was found to have swallowed 103 balloons containing a total of 427.4 grams of heroin. There was little doubt about Shonubi's guilt. In fact, there was considerable evidence that he had made at least seven prior heroin-smuggling trips to the USA (although he was not tried for these). In October 1992 Shonubi was convicted in a United States District Court for possessing and importing heroin. Although the conviction was only for crimes associated with Shonubi's arrest date of December 10, 1991, the sentencing judge, Jack B. Weinstein, also made a ®nding that Shonubi had indeed made seven prior drug-smuggling trips to the USA. The interesting part of this case was in the sentencing. According to the federal sentencing guidelines, the sentence in cases such as this should depend on the total quantity of heroin involved. This instruction was interpreted rather broadly.. (shrink)

Humpty, an enthusiastic football fan, is sued for gate-crashing a local football match. He was seen by Alice sneaking through the fence. Alice's visual identification ability is tested and shown to be accurate in nine times out of ten. This case seems straightforward and finding Humpty liable seems intuitively right. In another football match, Hatter, another enthusiastic football fan, is also sued for gate-crashing. This time, the only evidence available is that just one hundred tickets had been sold whilst yet (...) a thousand spectators were counted. Hatter being sued for gate-crashing is based on the fact that nine out of ten spectators gate-crashed. Surprisingly, this case is relatively straightforward too: finding Hatter liable based on this statistical evidence seems intuitively wrong. It is surprising because in both cases, at least prima facie, the risk of error is similar. In both cases, there is a one in ten chance that finding liability would be mistaken. A common intuitive response to the gate-crasher paradox is that the statistical evidence does not prove anything about the particular individual. Whilst this explanation may have an intuitive appeal, it merely serves as a starting point because it immediately begs the question as to why the statistical evidence fails. Fortunately, some writers have tried to develop this intuition into a more detailed and elucidated account. In particular, Zuckerman has argued that imposing liability based on such statistical evidence is a form of corporate liability, which contradicts the commitment of the legal system to an individualised justice. Wasserman, on the other hand, has suggested that using statistical evidence fails to respect the individuality and autonomy of the litigant because it treats the individual as a predetermined mechanism rather than an autonomous individual who is capable of determining his own conduct. Whilst each account suggests a slightly different answer, both put the individual at the centre of their explanations (either through the individualised justice or the individual's autonomy). This paper critically examines whether these individuality accounts could serve as an explanation for this paradox and a justification for restricting the usage of statistical evidence in some circumstances. I will argue that, whilst the individuality accounts have promising potential to provide such explanation and justification, they also suffer from several substantial deficiencies that need to be overcome before this potential is realised. This paper therefore lays the requirements and perhaps the foundations for a comprehensive answer. (shrink)