- Current periodical articles 465.Why do We Value Knowledge & Ward E. Jones - 1997 - American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (4).details
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Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Logical foundations of probability.Rudolf Carnap - 1950 - Chicago]: Chicago University of Chicago Press.details
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A Dispositional Theory of Possibility.Neil E. Williams Andrea Borghini - 2008 - Dialectica 62 (1):21-41.details
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Word and Object.Willard Van Orman Quine, Patricia Smith Churchland & Dagfinn Føllesdal - 1960 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.details
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Knowledge and relevant alternatives.Palle Yourgrau - 1983 - Synthese 55 (2):175 - 190.details
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Interest-Relative Invariantism. [REVIEW]Stephen Schiffer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):188 - 195.details
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Knowledge and practical interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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What Else Justification Could Be1.Martin Smith - 2010 - Noûs 44 (1):10-31.details
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XIII*—Contextualist Solutions to Scepticism.Stephen Schiffer - 1996 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96 (1):317-334.details
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The context-sensitivity of knowledge attributions.Patrick Rysiew - 2001 - Noûs 35 (4):477–514.details
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On Meta-Epistemology.Duncan Pritchard - 2012 - The Harvard Review of Philosophy 18 (1):91-108.details
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Strukturale Repräsentation – By Andreas Bartels Subjektivität, Intersubjektivität, Personalität. Ein Beitrag zur Philosophie der Person – By Christian Beyer Bilder im Geiste. Die Imagery‐Debatte – By Verena Gottschling Der Blick von Innen. Zur transtemporalen Identität bewusstseinsfähiger Wesen – By Martine Nida‐Rümelin Illusion Freiheit? Mögliche und unmögliche Konsequenzen der Hirnforschung – By Michael Pauen Willensfreiheit und Hirnforschung. Das Freiheitsmodell des epistemischen Libertarismus – By Bettina Walde Der mentale Zugang zur Welt. Realismus, Skeptizismus und Intentionalität – By Marcus Willaschek. [REVIEW]Michael Sollberger Michael Esfeld - 2008 - Dialectica 62 (1):128-135.details
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What’s the Point of “Knowledge” Anyway?Christoph9 Kelp - 2011 - Episteme 8 (1):53-66.details
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Knowledge and Action.John Hawthorne & Jason Stanley - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):571-590.details
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Knowledge and lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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What knowledge is and what it ought to be: Feminist values and normative epistemology.Sally Haslanger - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13:459-480.details
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What good are our intuitions: Philosophical analysis and social kinds.Sally Haslanger - 2006 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 80 (1):89-118.details
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Philosophical analysis and social kinds.Sally Haslanger & Jennifer Saul - 2006 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (1):89-118.details
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Gender and race: (What) are they? (What) do we want them to be?Sally Haslanger - 2000 - Noûs 34 (1):31–55.details
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Warrant and action.Mikkel Gerken - 2011 - Synthese 178 (3):529-547.details
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The Roles of Knowledge Ascriptions in Epistemic Assessment.Mikkel Gerken - 2015 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (1):141-161.details
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Knowledge in an uncertain world.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Matthew McGrath.details
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Knowledge and practical reasoning.Igor Douven - 2008 - Dialectica 62 (1):101–118.details
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Knowledge and Practical Reasoning.Igor Douven - 2008 - Dialectica 62 (1):101-118.details
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Knowledge and the state of nature: an essay in conceptual synthesis.Edward Craig - 1990 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Verbal Disputes.David J. Chalmers - 2011 - Philosophical Review 120 (4):515-566.details
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Nonsense and illusions of thought.Herman Cappelen - 2013 - Philosophical Perspectives 27 (1):22-50.details
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Subject‐Sensitive Invariantism and the Knowledge Norm for Practical Reasoning.Jessica Brown - 2008 - Noûs 42 (2):167-189.details
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Contextualism and warranted assertibility manoeuvres.Jessica Brown - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 130 (3):407 - 435.details
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Knowledge and implicatures.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2013 - Synthese 190 (18):4293-4319.details
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Justified judging.Alexander Bird - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):81–110.details
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The unity of reason.Clayton Littlejohn - 2013 - In Clayton Littlejohn & John Turri (eds.), Epistemic Norms: New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion. Oxford University Press.details
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Now you know it, now you don’t.Keith DeRose - 2000 - The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 5:91-106.details
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On Saying that Someone Knows: Themes from Craig.Klemens Kappel - 2010 - In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Social Epistemology. Oxford University Press.details
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The value turn in epistemology.Wayne Riggs - 2007 - In Vincent Hendricks (ed.), New Waves in Epistemology. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 300--23.details
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Epistemic scorekeeping.Patrick Rysiew - 2012 - In Jessica Brown & Mikkel Gerken (eds.), Knowledge Ascriptions. Oxford University Press.details
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Are there Counterexamples to the Closure Principle.Jonathan Vogel - 1990 - In Michael David Roth & Glenn Ross (eds.), Doubting: Contemporary Perspetcives on Scepticism. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 13-29.details
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Knowledge, Bets, and Interests.Brian Weatherson - 2012 - In Jessica Brown & Mikkel Gerken (eds.), Knowledge Ascriptions. Oxford University Press. pp. 75--103.details
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Knowledge and Action.J. Stanley & J. Hawthorne - 2008 - Revista Cultura E Fé 37 (144).details
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Knowledge in Action.Jonathan Weisberg - 2013 - Philosophers' Imprint 13.details
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The (mostly harmless) inconsistency of knowledge ascriptions.Matt Weiner - 2009 - Philosophers' Imprint 9:1-25.details
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Why Do We Value Knowledge?Ward E. Jones - 1997 - American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (4):423 - 439.details
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