Switch to: Citations

References in:

Conditional Intentions

Noûs 43 (4):700 - 741 (2009)

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. Shared Agency and Contralateral Commitments.Abraham Sesshu Roth - 2004 - Philosophical Review 113 (3):359-410.
    My concern here is to motivate some theses in the philosophy of mind concerning the interpersonal character of intentions. I will do so by investigating aspects of shared agency. The main point will be that when acting together with others one must be able to act directly on the intention of another or others in a way that is relevantly similar to the manner in which an agent acts on his or her own intentions. What exactly this means will become (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  • Human Agency and Language.Charles Taylor - 1985 - Cambridge University Press.
    Charles Taylor has been one of the most original and influential figures in contemporary philosophy: his 'philosophical anthropology' spans an unusually wide range of theoretical interests and draws creatively on both Anglo-American and Continental traditions in philosophy. A selection of his published papers is presented here in two volumes, structured to indicate the direction and essential unity of the work. He starts from a polemical concern with behaviourism and other reductionist theories (particularly in psychology and the philosophy of language) which (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   79 citations  
  • Breakdown of Will.George Ainslie - 2001 - Cambridge University Press.
    Ainslie argues that our responses to the threat of our own inconsistency determine the basic fabric of human culture. He suggests that individuals are more like populations of bargaining agents than like the hierarchical command structures envisaged by cognitive psychologists. The forces that create and constrain these populations help us understand so much that is puzzling in human action and interaction: from addictions and other self-defeating behaviors to the experience of willfulness, from pathological over-control and self-deception to subtler forms of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   44 citations  
  • Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.J. David Velleman & Michael E. Bratman - 1991 - Philosophical Review 100 (2):277.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   191 citations  
  • A Conditional Intent to Perform.Gregory Klass - 2009 - Legal Theory 15 (2):107.
    The doctrine of promissory fraud holds that a contractual promise implicitly represents an intent to perform. A promisor's conditional intent to perform poses a problem for that doctrine. It is clear that some undisclosed conditions on the promisor's intent should result in liability for promissory fraud. Yet no promisor intends to perform come what may, so there is a sense in which all promisors conditionally intend to perform. Building on Michael Bratman's planning theory of intentions, this article provides a theoretical (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Mind and Change of Mind.Annette Baier - 1979 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):157-176.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals.Jonathan Bennett - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
    Conditional sentences are among the most intriguing and puzzling features of language, and analysis of their meaning and function has important implications for, and uses in, many areas of philosophy. Jonathan Bennett, one of the world's leading experts, distils many years' work and teaching into this Philosophical Guide to Conditionals, the fullest and most authoritative treatment of the subject. An ideal introduction for undergraduates with a philosophical grounding, it also offers a rich source of illumination and stimulation for graduate students (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   122 citations  
  • New Foundations for Imperative Logic I: Logical Connectives, Consistency, and Quantifiers.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2008 - Noûs 42 (4):529-572.
    Imperatives cannot be true or false, so they are shunned by logicians. And yet imperatives can be combined by logical connectives: "kiss me and hug me" is the conjunction of "kiss me" with "hug me". This example may suggest that declarative and imperative logic are isomorphic: just as the conjunction of two declaratives is true exactly if both conjuncts are true, the conjunction of two imperatives is satisfied exactly if both conjuncts are satisfied—what more is there to say? Much more, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • Practical Reflection.J. David Velleman - 1989 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (4):949-952.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   49 citations  
  • How To Share An Intention.J. David Velleman - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: A Quarterly Journal 57 (1):29-50.
    Existing accounts of shared intention do not claim that a single token of intention can be jointly framed and executed by multiple agents; rather, they claim that multiple agents can frame distinct, individual intentions in such a way as to qualify as jointly intending something. In this respect, the existing accounts do not show that intentions can be shared in any literal sense. This article argues that, in failing to show how intentions can be literally shared, these accounts fail to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   51 citations  
  • Intending.J. F. M. Hunter - 1978 - Published for the Canadian Association for Publishing in Philosophy by Dalhousie University Press.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Conditional Intention.J. P. W. Cartwright - 1990 - Philosophical Studies 60 (3):233 - 255.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Center for the Study of Language and Information.
    What happens to our conception of mind and rational agency when we take seriously future-directed intentions and plans and their roles as inputs into further practical reasoning? The author's initial efforts in responding to this question resulted in a series of papers that he wrote during the early 1980s. In this book, Bratman develops further some of the main themes of these essays and also explores a variety of related ideas and issues. He develops a planning theory of intention. Intentions (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   351 citations  
  • Problems of the Self.Bernard Williams - 1973 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 37 (3):551-551.
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   114 citations  
  • Constitutivism and the Inescapability of Agency.Luca Ferrero - 2009 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 4:303-333.
    Constitutivism argues that the source of the categorical force of the norms of rationality and morality lies in the constitutive features of agency. A systematic failure to be guided by these norms would amount to a loss or lack of agency. Since we cannot but be agents, we cannot but be unconditionally guided by these norms. The constitutivist strategy has been challenged by David Enoch. He argues that our participation in agency is optional and thus cannot be a source of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   27 citations  
  • Is an Agreement an Exchange of Promises?Margaret Gilbert - 1993 - Journal of Philosophy 90 (12):627-649.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   43 citations  
  • Default Reasoning: Jumping to Conclusions and Knowing When to Think Twice.Kent Bach - 1984 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 65 (1):37.
    Look before you leap. - Proverb. He who hesitates is lost. - Another proverb.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   62 citations  
  • Mind in Action.Hugh J. McCann & Bede Rundle - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (4):566.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Intending.Lawrence H. Davis & John F. M. Hunter - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (4):652.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • On Conditionals.Dorothy Edgington - 1995 - Mind 104 (414):235-329.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   204 citations  
  • A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals.Jonathan Bennett - 2005 - Mind 114 (453):116-119.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   27 citations  
  • Mind in Action.Bede Rundle - 1997 - Oxford University Press.
    Mind in Action challenges the dominant view in contemporary philosophy that human action is driven by thoughts and desires much as a machine is made to function by the operation of physical causes. Bede Rundle rejects the materialist view of mind and the causal theory of action; his alternative approach elucidates such key concepts as thought, belief, desire, intention, and freedom to give a fresh view of human behavior.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Problems of the Self.Bernard A. O. Williams - 1973 - Cambridge University Press.
    A volume of philosophical studies, centred on problems of personal identity and extending to related topics in the philosophy of mind and moral philosophy.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   197 citations  
  • Shared Agency and Contralateral Commitments.Abraham Sesshu Roth - 2004 - Philosophical Review 113 (3):359-410.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity.Christine M. Korsgaard - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
    Agency and identity -- Necessitation -- Acts and actions -- Aristotle and Kant -- Agency and practical identity -- The metaphysics of normativity -- Constitutive standards -- The constitution of life -- In defense of teleology -- The paradox of self-constitution -- Formal and substantive principles of reason -- Formal versus substantive -- Testing versus weighing -- Maximizing and prudence -- Practical reason and the unity of the will -- The empiricist account of normativity -- The rationalist account of normativity (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   128 citations  
  • Decisions, Diachronic Autonomy, and the Division of Deliberative Labor.Luca Ferrero - 2010 - Philosophers' Imprint 10:1-23.
    It is often argued that future-directed decisions are effective at shaping our future conduct because they give rise, at the time of action, to a decisive reason to act as originally decided. In this paper, I argue that standard accounts of decision-based reasons are unsatisfactory. For they focus either on tie-breaking scenarios or cases of self-directed distal manipulation. I argue that future-directed decisions are better understood as tools for the non-manipulative, intrapersonal division of deliberative labor over time. A future-directed decision (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • What Good is a Diachronic Will?Luca Ferrero - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (3):403-430.
    There are two standard conceptions of the functioning of and rationale for the diachronic will, i.e., for an agent's capacity to settle on her future conduct in advance. According to the pragmatic-instrumentalist view, the diachronic will benefits us by increasing the long-term satisfaction of our rational preferences. According to the cognitive view, it benefits us by satisfying our standing desire for self-knowledge and self-understanding. Contrary to these views, I argue for a constitutive view of the diachronic will: the rationale for (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Philosophical Papers.J. L. Austin - 1961 - Oxford University Press.
    The influence of J. L. Austin on contemporary philosophy was substantial during his lifetime, and has grown greatly since his death, at the height of his powers, in 1960. Philosophical Papers, first published in 1961, was the first of three volumes of Austin's work to be edited by J. O. Urmson and G. J. Warnock. Together with Sense and Sensibilia and How to do things with Words, it has extended Austin's influence far beyond the circle who knew him or read (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   272 citations  
  • How to Share an Intention.J. David Velleman - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1):29-50.
    Existing accounts of shared intention do not claim that a single token of intention can be jointly framed and executed by multiple agents; rather, they claim that multiple agents can frame distinct, individual intentions in such a way as to qualify as jointly intending something. In this respect, the existing accounts do not show that intentions can be shared in any literal sense. This article argues that, in failing to show how intentions can be literally shared, these accounts fail to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Philosophical Guide to Conditionals.Jonathan Bennett - 2003 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Conditional sentences are among the most intriguing and puzzling features of language, and analysis of their meaning and function has important implications for, and uses in, many areas of philosophy. Jonathan Bennett, one of the world's leading experts, distils many years' work and teaching into this book, making it the fullest and most authoritative treatment of the subject.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   25 citations  
  • Conditional Intent and Mens Rea.Gideon Yaffe - 2004 - Legal Theory 10 (4):273-310.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Is an Agreement an Exchange of Promises?Margaret Gilbert - 1993 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (12):627-649.
    This paper challenges the common assumption that an agreement is an exchange of promises. Proposing that the performance obligations of some typical agreements are simultaneous, interdependent, and unconditional, it argues that no promise-exchange has this structure of obligations. In addition to offering general considerations in support of this claim, it examines various types of promise-exchange, showing that none satisfy the criteria noted. Two forms of conditional promise are distinguished and both forms are discussed. A positive account of agreements as joint (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Practical Reflection.David Velleman - 1989 - Princeton University Press.
    “What do you see when you look at your face in the mirror?” asks J. David Velleman in introducing his philosophical theory of action. He takes this simple act of self-scrutiny as a model for the reflective reasoning of rational agents: our efforts to understand our existence and conduct are aided by our efforts to make it intelligible. Reflective reasoning, Velleman argues, constitutes practical reasoning. By applying this conception, Practical Reflection develops philosophical accounts of intention, free will, and the foundation (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   33 citations  
  • Intention, Belief, and Instrumental Rationality.Michael Bratman - 2009 - In David Sobel & Steven Wall (eds.), Reasons for Action. Cambridge University Press. pp. 13--36.
    Two approaches to instrumental rationality Suppose I intend end E, believe that a necessary means to E is M, and believe that M requires that I intend M. My attitudes concerning E and M engage a basic requirement of practical rationality, a requirement that, barring a change in my cited beliefs, I either intend M or give up intending E.2 Call this the Instrumental Rationality requirement – for short, the IR requirement.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • Settled Objectives and Rational Constraints.Hugh J. McCann - 1991 - American Philosophical Quarterly 28 (1):25-36.
    Some authors reject what they call the "Simple View"---i.e., the principle that anyone who A's intentionally intends to A. My purpose here is to defend this principle. Rejecting the Simple View, I shall claim, forces us to assign to other mental states the functional role of intention: that of providing settled objectives to guide deliberation and action. A likely result is either that entities will be multiplied, or that the resultant account will invite reassertion of reductionist theories. In any case, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   33 citations  
  • Simple Intention.Michael Bratman - 1979 - Philosophical Studies 36 (3):245 - 259.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations