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  1. Natural Minds.Thomas W. Polger - 2004 - Bradford.
    In Natural Minds Thomas Polger advocates, and defends, the philosophical theory that mind equals brain -- that sensations are brain processes -- and in doing so brings the mind-brain identity theory back into the philosophical debate about consciousness. The version of identity theory that Polger advocates holds that conscious processes, events, states, or properties are type- identical to biological processes, events, states, or properties -- a "tough-minded" account that maintains that minds are necessarily indentical to brains, a position held by (...)
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  • Eliminative Materialism and Propositional Attitudes.Paul M. Churchland - 1981 - Journal of Philosophy 78 (2):67-90.
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  • Theory Change and the Indeterminacy of Reference.Hartry Field - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (14):462-481.
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  • Multiple Realizations.Lawrence A. Shapiro - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (12):635-654.
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  • Special Sciences, or Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis.Jerry Fodor - 1974 - Synthese 28 (2):97--115.
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  • Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction.Jaegwon Kim - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (1):1-26.
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  • Concepts of Localization: Balkanization in the Brain. [REVIEW]Jennifer Mundale - 2002 - Brain and Mind 3 (3):313-30.
    A spate of recent anti-localizationist publications have re-ignited the old debate about the localization of function. Many of the recent attacks on localization, however, are directed at what I will argue to be a narrow and outmoded view of localization, and thus have little conceptual or empirical impact. What I hope to present here is an analysis of functional localization that more adequately reflects the sophistication and complexity of its use in neuroscientific research, both historically and recently. Proceeding first by (...)
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  • Explaining the Brain: Mechanisms and the Mosaic Unity of Neuroscience.Carl F. Craver - 2007 - Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press.
    Carl Craver investigates what we are doing when we sue neuroscience to explain what's going on in the brain.
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  • Psychoneural Reduction: The New Wave.John W. Bickle - 2008 - Bradford.
    One of the central problems in the philosophy of psychology is an updated version of the old mind-body problem: how levels of theories in the behavioral and brain sciences relate to one another. Many contemporary philosophers of mind believe that cognitive-psychological theories are not reducible to neurological theories. However, this antireductionism has not spawned a revival of dualism. Instead, most nonreductive physicalists prefer the idea of a one-way dependence of the mental on the physical.In Psychoneural Reduction, John Bickle presents a (...)
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  • The New Phrenology: The Limits of Localizing Cognitive Processes in the Brain.William R. Uttal - 2001 - MIT Press.
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  • The Modularity of Mind.Jerry A. Fodor - 1983 - Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
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  • The Mind Incarnate.Lawrence A. Shapiro - 2004 - MIT Press.
    Shapiro tests these hypotheses against two rivals, the mental constraint thesis and the embodied mind thesis. Collecting evidence from a variety of sources (e.g., neuroscience, evolutionary theory, and embodied cognition) he concludes that the multiple realizability thesis, accepted by most philosophers as a virtual truism, is much less obvious than commonly assumed, and that there is even stronger reason to give up the separability thesis. In contrast to views of mind that tempt us to see the mind as simply being (...)
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  • The Architecture of the Mind: Massive Modularity and the Flexibility of Thought.Peter Carruthers - 2006 - Oxford University Press UK.
    This book is a comprehensive development and defense of one of the guiding assumptions of evolutionary psychology: that the human mind is composed of a large number of semi-independent modules. The Architecture of the Mind has three main goals. One is to argue for massive mental modularity. Another is to answer a 'How possibly?' challenge to any such approach. The first part of the book lays out the positive case supporting massive modularity. It also outlines how the thesis should best (...)
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  • The Metaphysics of Realization, Multiple Realizability, and the Special Sciences.Carl Gillett - 2003 - Journal of Philosophy 100 (11):591-603.
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  • Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction.Jaegwon Kim - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (1):1-26.
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  • Philosophy of Mind.Jaegwon Kim - 1996 - Philosophy 72 (280):317-320.
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  • Neurophilosophy: Toward A Unified Science of the Mind-Brain.Patricia S. Churchland - 1986 - MIT Press.
    This is a unique book. It is excellently written, crammed with information, wise and a pleasure to read.' ---Daniel C. Dennett, Tufts University.
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  • Imaging Cognitive Anatomy.K. Fristen - 1997 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 1 (1):21-27.
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  • Degeneracy and Redundancy in Cognitive Anatomy.Karl J. Friston & Cathy J. Price - 2003 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (4):151-152.
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  • Monkey Homologues of Language Areas: Computing the Ambiguities.Terrence Deacon - 2004 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8 (7):288-290.
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  • Testing Multiple Realizability: A Discussion of Bechtel and Mundale.Sungsu Kim - 2002 - Philosophy of Science 69 (4):606-610.
    Bechtel and Mundale (1999) argue that multiple realizability is not plausible. They point out that neuroscientists assume that psychological traits are realized similarly in homologous brain structures and contend that a biological aspect of the brain that is relevant to neuropsychological state individuation provides evidence against multiple realizability. I argue that Bechtel and Mundale adduce the wrong sort of evidence against multiple realizability. Homologous traits do not provide relevant evidence. It is homoplasious traits of brains that can provide evidence for (...)
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  • Shocking Lessons From Electric Fish: The Theory and Practice of Multiple Realization.Brian L. Keeley - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (3):444-465.
    This paper explores the relationship between psychology and neurobiology in the context of cognitive science. Are the sciences that constitute cognitive science independent and theoretically autonomous, or is there a necessary interaction between them? I explore Fodor's Multiple Realization Thesis (MRT) which starts with the fact of multiple realization and purports to derive the theoretical autonomy of special sciences (such as psychology) from structural sciences (such as neurobiology). After laying out the MRT, it is shown that, on closer inspection, the (...)
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  • What Psychological States Are Not.Ned Block & Jerry A. Fodor - 1972 - Philosophical Review 81 (April):159-81.
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  • The Nature of Mental States.Hilary Putnam - 1967 - In W.H. Capitan & D.D. Merrill (eds.), Art, Mind, and Religion. Pittsburgh University Press. pp. 1--223.
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  • Discussion: A Defense of Bechtel and Mundale.Mark B. Couch - 2004 - Philosophy of Science 71 (2):198-204.
    Kim claims that Bechtel and Mundale's case against multiple realization depends on the wrong kind of evidence. The latter argue that neuroscientific practice shows neural states across individuals and species are type identical. Kim replies that the evidence they cite to support this is irrelevant. I defend Bechtel and Mundale by showing why the evidence they cite is relevant and shows multiple realization does not occur.
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  • Levels, Individual Variation and Massive Multiple Realization in Neurobiology.Kenneth Aizawa & Carl Gillett - 2009 - In John Bickle (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience. Oxford University Press. pp. 539--582.
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  • Inference and Explanation in Cognitive Neuropsychology.Max Coltheart & Martin Davies - 2003 - Cortex 39 (1):188-191.
    The question posed by Dunn and Kirsner (D&K) is an instance of a more general one: What can we infer from data? One answer, if we are talking about logically valid deductive inference, is that we cannot infer theories from data. A theory is supposed to explain the data and so cannot be a mere summary of the data to be explained. The truth of an explanatory theory goes beyond the data and so is never logically guaranteed by the data. (...)
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  • Space and the Chiral Molecule.Robin Le Poidevin - 2000 - In Nalini Bhushan & Stuart Rosenfeld (eds.), Of Minds and Molecules: New Philosophical Perspectives on Chemistry. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  • Toward a New Behaviorism: The Case Against Perceptual Reductionism. Uttal - 1999 - Behavior and Philosophy 27 (1):51-74.
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  • Philosophy and Neuroscience a Ruthlessly Reductive Account.John Bickle - 2003
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  • Disjunctive Properties: Multiple Realizations.Leonard J. Clapp - 2001 - Journal of Philosophy 98 (3):111-136.
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